Skip to main content

Full text of "South African defense policy."

See other formats


fVofTORADU^SCHOOL 



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 

Monterey, California 




H E.S IS 



SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE POLICY 




by 




Carl T. Orbann 




June 1984 




Thesis Advisor: M. W. 


Clough 



Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 



U222994 



UNCLASSIFIED 



SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered) 



REPORT DOCUMENTATION' PAGE 



READ INSTRUCTIONS 
BEFORE COMPLETING FORM 



1. REPORT NUMBER 



2. GOVT ACCESSION NO 



RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER 



4. TITLE (and Subtitle) 



South African Defense Policy 



5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED 

Master's Thesis 
June 1984 



S. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER 



7. AllTHORfj; 

Carl T. Orbann 



8. CONTRACT CR GRANT NUMBERCM 



9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND AODRESS 

Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943 



10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK 
AREA ft WORK UNIT NUMBERS 



11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 

Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943 



12. REPORT DATE 

June 1984 



13. NUMBER OF P AGES 



200 



14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME 4 ADDRESSf// dltferent trom Controlling Olttca) 



15. SECURITY CLASS, (ot thta report) 

Unclassified 



15«. DECLASSIFICATION/ DOWNGRADING 
SCHEDULE 



16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ot this Report) 



Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 



17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ot the abstract entered In Block 20, It dltterent trom Report) 



18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 



19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse aide II neceesary and Identity by block number) 



South African Defense Policy, Total Onslaught, Total Strategy, 
South African Defense Force, ARMSCOR, State Security Council, 
The Twelve Point Plan, Destabilization in Southern Africa 



20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse aide It neceaaary and Identity by block number) 

The Republic of South Africa is the preeminent regional 
military and economic power in southern Africa. It is also a 
country that has earned near universal condemnation over the 
practice of apartheid. South Africa's strength as opposed to 
its neighbors' weakness and the fact that South Africa practices 
internal policies which are condemned by its neighbors and the 
international community, provide the basis for conflict in southern 



DD 



1 JAN 73 



1473 EDITION OF I NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE 

S N 0102- LF- 014- 6601 1 



UNCLASSIFIED 



SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Sntarad) 



UNCLASSIFIED 



SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whan Dtm Enffd) 



#20 - ABSTRACT - (CONTINUED) 

Africa. Further, as South African military capabilities 
grow, and the ability of outside actors to influence the 
actions of the Republic is lessened, a better understanding 
of the defense policies of South Africa becomes even more 
important to the West. 

This paper examines South African defense policy as it 
is today, and as it has developed historically from 1910. 
Historical development of the South African Defense Force 
and South African defense policies are examined in Chapter 
I . Chapter II is devoted to the Total Onslaught/Total 
National Strategy concept developed and instituted by Prime 
Minister P.W. Botha. The Total Onslaught is important as 
it provides the basis for current South African threat 
assessments. Likewise, the Total National Strategy provides 
the framework within which defense policies are defined. 

Finally, Chapter III is devoted to an examination of 
current South African defense policies. This chapter 
examines South Africa's threat perceptions and constraints 
placed upon South Africa, and the country's assets. Lastly, 
it examines the defense strategies which have developed in 
response to these factors. 



S N 0102- LF- 014- 6601 

UNCLASSIFIED 



SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(T?i»n Dmtm Enffd) 



Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 

South African Defense Policy 

by 

Carl T. Orbann 
Lieutenant Commander /'united States Navy 
B.A., University of South Florida, 1971 



Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 



MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 

from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
June 19 84 



*0i* v ABSTRACT 

The Republic of South Africa is the preeminent regional 
military and economic power in southern Africa. It is also 
a country that has earned near universal condemnation over 
the practice of apartheid. South Africa's strength as op- 
posed to its neighbors' weakness and the fact that South 
Africa practices internal policies which are condemned by its 
neighbors and the international community provide the basis 
for conflict in southern Africa. Further, as South African 
military capabilities grow, and the ability of outside actors 
to influence the actions of the Republic is lessened, a better 
understanding of the defense policies of South Africa becomes 
even more important to the West. 

This paper examines South African defense policy as it is 
today, and as it has developed historically from 1910. His- 
torical development of the South African Defense Force and 
South African defense policies are examined in Chapter I. 
Chapter II is devoted to the Total Onslaught/Total National 
Strategy concept developed and instituted by Prime Minister 
P.W. Botha. The Total Onslaught is important as it provides 
the basis for current South African threat assessments. Like- 
wise, the Total National Strategy provides the framework 
within which defense policies are defined. 

Finally, Chapter III is devoted to an examination of current 
South African defense policies. This chapter examines South 



Africa's threat perceptions, constraints placed upon South 
Africa, and the country's assets. Lastly, it examines the 
defense strategies which have developed in response to 
these factors. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN 

DEFENSE FORCE AND SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE POLICY — 13 

A. BACKGROUND: TO 1948 ■ 13 

B. 1948-1960 r 17 

1. Background 17 

2. Defense Policy 17 

3. The Changing South African Defense 

Force 20 

4. Summary 1948-1960 ■ 21 

C. 1960-1973 GROWING ISOLATION 22 

1. Background 22 

a. Internal Security 22 

b. External Pressures 23 

2. Foreign Policy 24 

a. Verwoerd to 1965 24 

b. Vorster 1966-1973 25 

3. South African Defense Policy 1960-1973 — 27 

a. Threat Perception 27 

b. Response 30 

(1) Background 30 

(2) Defense Expenditures 31 

(3) Manpower 32 

(4) Arms and the Arms Industry 34 

(5) Defense Reorganization 36 



(6) Training 37 

(7) The Security Establishment 38 

(a) The Bureau of State 

Security 38 

(b) The Establishment of the 
State Security Council 40 

c. The Consequences of South African 

Defense Policy 1960-1973 41 

II. TOTAL ONSLAUGHT/TOTAL STRATEGY 44 

A. 19 73 AND AFTER: THE INWARD TURNING 44 

1. Effects of the Portuguese Coup and 

South African Intervention in Angola 44 

2. Rhodesia 46 

3. Confluence of Pressures: Other Events 

1974 and After 47 

a. Arab Oil Embargo 48 

b. South Africa and the United Nations - 49 

c. Internal Unrest 50 

4. South African Foreign Policy 1974-1978 — 51 

B. P.W. BOTHA: TOTAL ONSLAUGHT/TOTAL STRATEGY - 5 3 

1. The Total Onslaught — Background 53 

2. Total Onslaught Defined 54 

C. TOTAL NATIONAL STRATEGY 56 

1. Background 56 

2. The Twelve-Point Plan 57 

3. The Mechanics of the Total National 
Strategy 59 

a. Government Reorganization 60 

b. The Rise of the Security 
Establishment 61 



(1) Background 61 

(2) The Security Establishment 62 

(a) The South African Defense 
Force/Department of 

Defense 62 

(b) The Intelligence 

Community 65 

(c) The Intellectual 

Community 66 

(d) Arms and Associated 
Industries 66 

(e) The South African Police -- 68 

(f) The State Security 

Council ■ ■ 70 

c. Constitutional Change • 73 

(1) Background 73 

(2) The Constitution 74 

(3) The New Constitution and the 

Total National Strategy 75 

d. Government, Business and Defense 76 

e. Other Racial Groups 78 

D. EFFECTS OF THE TOTAL NATIONAL STRATEGY 79 

1. Internal Effects 80 

a. Government 80 

b. The Militarization of Society 81 

(1) Impact on Government 81 

(2) Economic Issues 82 

(3) Social Issues 83 

c. The Nature of Society ■ 85 



2. Regional Effects 86 

3. International Effects of the Total 

National Strategy 88 

III. SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE POLICY 93 

A. THE THREAT 93 

1. Background 93 

• 2. The Conventional Threat 94 

3. The Terrorist Threat 98 

B. CONSTRAINTS 100 

1. Population 101 

a. The Civilian Workforce and 

Apartheid 102 

b. Military Manpower 102 

2. Border Vulnerability 104 

3. International Opposition 106 

a. Lack of Defensive Alliances 107 

b. The United Nations Arms Embargo 

1977 ' 109 

c. Resource Vulnerabilities 110 

(1) Water 110 

(2) Oil 111 

4. Economic Constraints 112 

a. Investor Confidence 113 

b. Balance of Payments Concerns 114 

c. The Labor Force 114 

d. The Effect of Government on the 

Economy 116 

5. Perceptual Constraints 118 



C. ASSETS 121 

1. The South African Defense Force 121 

a. The Army 121 

(1) Organization ■ 121 

(2) Army Equipment ■ 126 

b. The South African Air Force 127 

(1) Organization 127 

(2) SAAF Equipment 128 

c. The South African Navy 129 

(1) Organization 129 

(2) SAN Equipment — 130 

2. The South African Arms Industry 130 

a. Background 130 

b. Sources of Arms 131 

c. The South African Arms Industry 

and Self Sufficiency 135 

3. Economic Assets 137 

a. Transportation Infrastructure 137 

b. Strategic Resources • 138 

c. Economic Strength 139 

4. Population Assets 140 

D. RESPONSE — SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE POLICY 142 

1. Military Actions 142 

a. Maintenance of a Strong Defense 

Force ■ ■ 142 

b. Offensive Warfare—Crossborder 
Operations 144 

(1) Goals of Crossborder 

Operations 144 

10 



(2) Types of Crossborder 

Operations 147 

c. Maritime Strategy 148 

2. Political Actions 149 

a. Effective Mobilization of Manpower 

for Defense 149 

(1) Conscription 150 

(2) Utilization of Non-whites 150 

(3) Immigrants 152 

b. The Search for Security 153 

c. Destabilization 155 

(1) Background 155 

(2) The Destabilization Program 156 

(3) The Benefits of Destabilization - 161 

d. The South African Nuclear Program 162 

3. Economic Actions 163 

a. The Economy and the Government 164 

b. The Economic Dependence of Southern 
Africa 165 

c. Self-Sufficiency in Strategic 

Materials 166 

IV. CONCLUSIONS 169 

APPENDIX A: THE 12-POINT PLAN 171 

APPENDIX B: MISSIONS OF THE SADF AS DEFINED IN THE 

19 82 WHITE PAPER ON DEFENSE 173 

APPENDIX C: MILITARY EQUIPMENT PRODUCED IN SOUTH 

AFRICA 175 

APPENDIX D: WEAPONS/EQUIPMENT FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES 177 

ENDNOTES 181 

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 199 

11 



LIST OF TABLES 

1. South African Defense Spending 1960 to 1974 31 

2. South African Defense Force Composition 33 

3. South African Government Organization Executive 
Branch 62 

4. South African Defense Spending 1974/75 — 1983/84 64 

5. Growth of the South African Defense Force 64 

6. SADF Service Requirements 84 

7. The Military Balance in Southern Africa 95 

8. Population by Racial Composition 1970 and 19 80 101 

9. Army Order of Battle 1979 123 



12 



I . HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN 

DEFENSE FORCE AND SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE POLICY 

A. BACKGROUND: TO 19 4 8 1 

South Africa's regular defense force, the Union Defense 
Force (UDF) was established by the Defense Act of 1912, two 
years after the Act of Union. In developing the plans for 
an effective defense force, General Jan C. Smuts, an Afrikaner 
hero of the Boer War, relied on the military traditions of 
both the Afrikaner and the English-speaking segments of the 
country's white population. In the case of the Afrikaners, 
these traditions reflected the Boer "Commandos," which 
developed as a sort of frontier militia in the defense of the 
early settlers, and which had grown into the military arm of 
the Boer Republics. The military traditions of the English- 
speaking whites derived from the colonial period^ when British 
troops were garrisoned in Cape Province and Natal. The 
Volunteer Ordinance of 1854 created a militia in these two 
colonies which trained in accordance with British procedures 
and were often affiliated with regular army regiments sta- 
tioned in southern Africa. 

Initially, the permanent force of the UDF consisted of 
about 2500 men organized into headquarters, a training staff, 
five artillery batteries, and five mounted rifle regiments. 
In addition, the Active Citizens' Force (ACF) numbered 
25,000 reservists serving four year tours in fifteen mounted 



13 



rifle regiments and fourteen infantry regiments. Finally, 
the Defense Act provided for reserve coast artillery batter- 
ies, a small flying corps, and a naval reserve. It also 
reinstated the Commandos as a separate voluntary reserve 
formation. 

The UDF ' s first operation took place in January 1914, when 
thousands of reservists were mobilized to maintain order in 
Witwatersrand during a miner's strike. In World War I, the 
Union government mobilized reserves for operations against 
German Southwest Africa, an action which led to much Afri- 
kaner opposition, the resignation of many Afrikaner officers 
(some of whom organized an armed uprising against the Union) , 
and the defection of an Afrikaner UDF unit to the Germans. 
It took two months for loyal forces to deal with the Afrikaner 
rebellion, which pitted pro-Union and anti-British Commandos 
against one another. 

Once internal problems were settled, the UDF turned to 
Southwest Africa, which was captured in a six month campaign 
in 1915. In addition, the Union launched a recruiting drive 
to raise a volunteer expeditionary force, which eventually 
served the Allied cause in Egypt against pro-Ottoman Arabs, 
in Palestine against the Turks, and in German East Africa 
and Europe against the Germans. In addition to white combat 
troops, 60,000 colored auxiliaries and 25,000 black laborers 
saw service in World War I . 

Between World War I and World War II, a lack of commit- 
ment of funds to defense restricted the development of South 

14 



Africa's armed forces. After demobilization, reserve levels 
were kept at about 15,000 men, but reduced pay scales eroded 
the ranks of the regulars. The last units of the British 
Army were withdrawn in 1921, although the Royal Navy retained 
its bases at Simonstown and Walvis Bay. Due to the Afrikaner 
uprising during World War I, it was 19 34 before ACF regiments 
were formed which used Afrikans as the language of command. 

In 1922, the ACF was again mobilized to deal with miners' 
strikes at Witwatersrand. In addition, the armed forces 
were deployed on several occasions to deal with tribal rebel- 
lions in Southwest Africa, which had been mandated to South 
Africa by the League of Nations. 

World War II again saw a split between Afrikaners and 
English-speakers over participation in the war, and a proposal 
for "qualified neutrality" was narrowly defeated in Parliament 
The decision to enter the war had the effect of turning 
Smuts' Union Party into the party of English speakers and of 
aligning the majority of Afrikaner speakers against him. It 
was the issue of participation in the war with Britain which 
provided the impetus which led to a National Party victory 
in 1948. 2 

During the war, South African troops saw service against 
the Italians in Italian Somaliland, with the British Eighth 
Army in Egypt and Libya, in Italy, and against the Vichy 
French in the occupation of Madagascar. In addition, 3000 
South African naval personnel were seconded to the Royal 



15 



Navy, and the South African air arm served with distinction 
in many theaters of operations. 

The defeat of General Smuts in the 19 4 8 elections brought 
to an end an era in South African politics, and saw the 
beginning of another, both for South Africa in general and 
for the UDF in particular. Four important points must be 
made about defense policy and the pre-1948 defense establish- 
ment. First, other than the employment of forces in the two 
World Wars, which were exceptions, the military establishment 
during this period was politically insignificant and militarily 
weak. At the time of South Africa's decision to enter World 
War II, the UDF consisted of only 313 officers and 3040 other 
ranks in the Permanent Force (PF) , 1900 in the Air Force, and 

432 in the Navy, and the Defense Force had no role in Union 

3 
politics. Second, the UDF was identified as an institution 

very much dominated by the English speaking portion of the 

white population. Third, the precedent of the use of the 

UDF by the Union government to maintain internal order in the 

1914 and 1922 labor disputes and against native unrest between 

the wars was established. Finally, the participation of South 

Africa in wars outside of the Union and southern Africa 

proved a divisive issue among South Africa's white population, 

and eventually was a factor in the coalesce of Afrikaners in 

the National Party, and in the ascension of that party to 

power in 19 48. 



16 



B. 1948-1960 

1 . Background 

The 1948 elections in South Africa brought to power 
the coalition of the Nationalist Party (NP) and the Afrikaner 
Party (later absorbed into the NP) . From this point on, 
governments controlled by a growing NP majority sought to 
implement the apartheid policy and ensure Afrikaner control 
of the government through legislation and regulation. While 
a survey of the actual implementation of apartheid is beyond 
the scope of this paper, it is important to note that from 
1948 onwards, South African foreign and security policies 
have been explicitly and implicitly concerned with the pro- 
tection of this internal policy, making South Africa a country 

whose foreign relations are determined almost entirely by a 

4 
domestic political and social policy. 

The ultimate foreign policy goals of the first NP 
government of Dr. D. F. Malan were first discussed in his 
1945 "African Charter." This document called for the preser- 
vation of Africa for "Western European Christian Civiliza- 

5 
tion." It proposed to keep both Asiatics and Communists out 

of Africa and to forbid the arming of "natives" and their use 

in white wars. 

2 . Defense Policy 

As the new South African NP government worked to 
improve its hold on the government and implement apartheid 
internally, its leaders also sought to frame a basic strategy 



17 



for external defense. While there appeared to be a little 
threat of outside attack, growing black nationalism, which 
was seen as a direct result of Communist agitation and part 
of a global Communist plan to weaken the West through denial 
of southern Africa's strategic resources, was of much concern. 
In defining its strategy, the governments of Malan, 

and of his successor, J. G. Strijdon, made several strategic 

7 
assumptions. First, that South Africa would be a welcome 

ally of the West due to its strategic position, economic 

resources, and white, Christian, an ti- communist government. 

Second, that the colonial powers would give a major role to 

South Africa in African regional affairs. Third, that the 

colonial powers would defend the status quo in Africa, and 

that decolonization would be piecemeal, selective, and take 

many years. Finally, that South Africa was a "small power" 

and that the main burden of defending Africa must fall to the 

Western powers. 

Based on these assumptions, the South African govern- 
ment developed a two-fold strategy. First, in the event of 
war against Communism the enemy must be engaged as far from 
South Africa as possible. Second, South Africa attempted to 
become involved in a formal Western defense alliance to ensure 
Western commitment to the defense of Africa. 

In view of its strategic assumptions and the strategy 
which resulted from these assumptions, South Africa undertook 
policies designed to draw closer to the West. South Africa 



18 



undertook policies designed to draw closer to the West. South 
Africa demonstrated its willingness to embark on anti-Communist 
missions by providing small but symbolic forces to partici- 
pate in the Berlin airlift and in the Korean War. Further, 
South Africa applauded the development of Western defense 
agreements such as the South East Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO) , and the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) 

agreement, and continued lobbying for NATO to extend its 

9 
coverage into the South Atlantic. In addition, as early as 

1951, Malan was promoting the concept of an African defense 
organization to include South Africa and the colonial powers 
in Africa. In 1951 South Africa joined Britain in sponsoring 
a defense conference in Nairobi, and participated in another 
at Dakar in 1954. However, in spite of South African state- 
ments to the contrary, nothing concrete regarding strategic 
planning came of either of these meetings. In the early 
1950 's, South Africa also supported Britain in an attempt 
to develop a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) . This 
led to the purchase of Centurion tanks and Sabre jet air- 
craft as a potential contribution to this alliance. However, 
MEDO was also abandoned. 

The closest South Africa came to obtaining a Western 
defense commitment was the Simonstown Agreement with Britain 
in 1955, whereby both the British and South African govern- 
ments agreed in general terms to contribute forces for the 
defense of southern Africa against external aggression. The 



19 



British naval base at Simonstown was turned over to South 

Africa, and South Africa in turn made a commitment to expand 

12 

its navy to assist in the defense of the Cape sea route. 

3 . The Changing South African Defense Force 

This period brought two major changes to the South 
African Defense Force (SADF) . First, the ascension of the 
National Party to power in 19 48 brought an accompanying 
"Af rikanerization" throughout the government, including both 
the defense forces and the police. Government institutions, 
including the SADF, were converted into apartheid institutions 
to strengthen the party's hold on the state. British trained, 
English speaking officers were retired early and replaced 
with Afrikaners. A Defense Amendment Act required fluency 
in both English and Afrikaans of all officers and non- 
commissioned officers, and for all members of the Permanent 
Force. These moves had the effect of decreasing the influence 
of the English-speakers in the SADF, as they were less likely 
to be bilingual, and, for a time, lowering, the combat effi- 
ciency of the SADF as veteran officers and NCO ' s were re- 
placed by less experienced Afrikaners and as units with long 

traditions (normally associated with the English speaking 

13 
community) lost their historic identity. 

Secondly, the Simonstown Agreement and attempts to 

participate in other Western alliancs brought the SADF its 

first modern equipment, albeit in small quantity. Tanks and 

aircraft were acquired for participation in the stillborn 



20 



MEDO, and modern warships and long range maritime patrol 
aircraft and strike aircraft to comply with the Simonstown 
Agreement. While defense spending remained low, these 
acquisitions were the first new major equipment acquired by 
the SADF since the end of World War II. 
4. Summary 19 4 8-19 60 

The salient points to be made from the discussion of 
this period center around South Africa's key strategic assump- 
tions. First, some of the perceptions upon which the National 
Party leaders based their developing foreign policy strategy 
would evolve into the basis for current South African foreign 
policy strategy. These perceptions were: 1) That South 
Africa could be a valuable ally to the West; 2) That South 
Africa's strategic location and economic importance would be 
of value to the West; 3) That South Africa was an important 
player in southern Africa; and, 4) That decolonization would 
be selective and time consuming. 

Several of these key assumptions turned out to be 
false. Other than the Simonstown Agreement, which was not 
a full-fledged treaty but a series of letters of agreement, 
South Africa was never able to generate much Western enthu- 
siasm for defense agreements. Western interests at the time 

were focused on Europe, and southern Africa seemed far removed 

14 
and of small importance. Further, doubts among the colonial 

powers concerning the viability of the colonial system caused 

Western nations to refrain from becoming too closely associated 



21 



with South Africa, thus affording little hope of a defense 
alliance and small role for South Africa in regional colonial 
affairs. Finally, once decolonization did come, it came 
with a rush which was unexpected not only in South Africa, 
but in the rest of the world. 



C. 19 60-19 73 GROWING ISOLATION 
1 . Background 

a. Internal Security 

The first years of the 1960's caused the over- 
riding concern for South Africa to become one of internal 
security. This period opened with what was seen as the first 
major threat of black insurrection in South Africa, brought 
about by the shooting of African demonstrators by South 
African police units at Sharpeville 'on 21 March 1960. The 
disorders which followed lasted until mid-April and led the 

government to declare a state of emergency. Eventually, more 

16 
than 11,000 people were detained. 

In the wake of Sharpeville, African resistance 

to white policies turned to violence. Resistance movements 

such as Umkhonto we Size (Spear of the Nation) and Poqo (We 

Alone) grew up as offshoots of the African National Congress 

17 
(ANC) and Pan-African Congress (PAC) . From August 1961 to 

July 19 63, 19 3 acts of sabotage were recorded in South 

TV 4= • 18 
Africa . 

For its part, by 1963 the South African govern- 
ment had penetrated and destroyed much of the underground 



22 



resistance. In its efforts in this direction, the South 
African Police (SAP) were aided by a series of harsh security 
laws passed beginning in 1961. During this period, spanning 
from 1961 to the passage of the Terrorism Act of 19 67, South 
Africa moved away from the protection of individual rights 
guaranteed under British law to regulations under which the 
powers of the State were greatly increased. By 1964 incidents 

of sabotage dropped from 100 a year to 10, and by 19 65 inter- 

19 
nal resistance had disappeared. All the while, the South 

African government denied the country ' s internal troubles 

were related to the racial policies of apartheid, instead 

claiming incidents like Sharpeville were initiated by "sub- 

20 
versive, communist and liberal elements outside South Africa." 

b. External Pressures 

The rush of decolonization in the early 1960's 
led to the establishment of black ruled states throughout 
Africa, and the sheer number of these states gave them con- 
siderable diplomatic weight at the United Nations. Change 
for South Africa was signalled beginning in 1961, when these 
new countries joined with India, Pakistan, and Ceylon to 
give South Africa little choice but to withdraw from the 

British Commonwealth. This marked the first step in the 

21 
isolation and inward turning of South Africa. 

In 1963, a new source of danger for South Africa 

came into being with the formation of the Organization of 

African Unity (OAU) . At its first meeting, this organization 



23 



resolved to provide arms and assistance to launch guerrilla 

wars against colonial and white minority governments in 

22 

Africa. Although this threatened action turned out to be 

easier said than done, formation and rise of the African bloc 
in the United Nations, coupled with the liberal wave which 
swept the West in the 1960's led to trouble for South Africa 
in the UN. In 19 60, the United States supported a Security 
Council resolution against apartheid. In 1963, Britain voted 
for a General Assembly resolution favoring anti-apartheid 

actions by member states, and the next year the United Nations 

23 
passed a voluntary arms embargo against the Republic. 

2 . Foreign Policy 

a. Verwoerd to 1965 

As regional and international hostility to its 

domestic policies intensified, South Africa's leaders were 

forced to search for new strategies to cope with and, if 

possible, reverse their country's growing isolation. In 

1959, Prime Minister Verwoerd embarked on the policy of 

separate development, providing Bantu homelands for blacks 

which were ultimately to become independent states. South 

Africa saw the Bantustan policy as a bridge between internal 

and external affairs, as "the first link in a chain which 

started in the Republic, led through the small neighboring 

black states, and then outward to the rest of the continent 

24 
and the wider international community." While this was a 

domestic policy, it obviously was influenced by foreign 



24 



opinion. Verwoerd saw the Bantustan policy as a counter to 

both African and international opposition to South Africa's 

, . . 25 
racial policies. 

Regionally, South Africa's focus narrowed to its 

immediate neighbors. Verwoerd sought unsuccessfully to draw 

the British territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and 

Swaziland into the. homelands plan. He also formulated plans 

for a Southern African Common Market to include South Africa, 

future independent homelands, and other countries as far 

2 6 
north as Zaire. In putting forward the Common Market scheme, 

the South African government assumed economic considerations 

would become more important than political ones in relations 

with black African countries, and emphasized South African 

willingness to provide direct, bilateral aid to these 

countries. 

b. Vorster, 1966-1973 

By the time B. J. Vorster succeeded Verwoerd as 

Prime Minister in 1966, the troubles of the early 1960 's had 

been overcome. Verwoerd 's politics of security had resulted 

in the banning of domestic subversives (such as the ANC and 

PAC) , suppression of internal violence, and, most importantly, 

27 
restoration of white confidence. The internal stability 

achieved within the country soon gave Vorster maneuvering room 

to expand upon what had been a cautious policy towards black 

African nations. The "Outward Movement" was launched in 

hopes of improving South Africa's foreign relations overall 



25 



through a rapprochement within Africa. The Outward Movement 
was, from South Africa's viewpoint, essentially an externally 

oriented policy. Importantly, this policy implicitly denied 

2 8 
that any domestic change was required. 

The Outward Movement enjoyed some initial suc- 
cess in 1967, when South Africa established diplomatic ties 
with Malawi. In addition, South Africa was finally able to 
make good on long-standing offers of aid to black nations. 
In retrospect, however, it is apparent this policy could 
never have achieved the success hoped for by Vorster. Con- 
tacts were made and economic relations encouraged with many 
African states, but the fact that most of these states based 
their relations with South Africa on the condition that there 
would be change in the Republic's internal policies did not 
mesh with the South African perception that Outward Movement 
policies were independent of domestic linkages. In addition, 

there are some indications that Vorster himself may have 

29 

lacked sustained interest in the Outward Movement. 

By the early 1970 's strong black opposition to any 
rapprochement with South Africa, as expressed in the Lusaka 
Manifesto of April 1969 and the Mogadishu Declaration of 
October 19 71, made it apparent to South Africa that the 
Outward Movement had failed. The Portuguese Coup of 
April 19 74 and the ensuing South African intervention in 
Angola effectively marked an end to the Outward Movement as 
a policy, although South Africa still attempted rapprochement 



26 



with individual black states such as Mozambique in 1975. 
In addition, Vorster continued to pressure the Smith regime 
in Rhodesia to come to a negotiated settlement, both to gain 
possible influence among other African nations and to try and 
prevent the establishment of another black radical state on 
the Republic's borders. However," in spite of these indi- 
vidual diplomatic efforts, 1975 marked the beginning of a 
new phase in South African foreign policy. South Africa was 
not slow to recognize the potential consequences of a Portu- 
guese withdrawal from its African holdings, and from this 

point on, the Republic concentrated on consolidating its 

3 1 
position in southern Africa. 

3 . South African Defense Policy 1960-1973 

a. Threat Perception 

The period 1960-1973 was one of rapid change in 

South African defense thought, beginning with the Sharpeville 

disturbances and threats of internal revolution and ending 

with increased white confidence and new feelings of military 

and economic strength. In short, this era bridges what have 

been described as the "Years of Crisis and Doubt" and the 

32 

"Years of Confidence." It was during the years 1960-1964 

that critical events occurred and judgments were made which 
affected South African defense policy until the mid-1970 's. 
The events of the early 1960's caused South Africa's defense 
policy to evolve from one which, in 1960, envisioned a response 
to the threat of internal unrest to one which, by 1964, 



27 



sought a broader response to both internal unrest and ex- 
ternal attack. This external threat was vaguely defined at 

first but was eventually identified as mainly a terrorist 

33 
or guerrilla threat. 

The evolution of policy can be seen in the actions 

of the South African government in the years between 19 61 

and 1964. In 1961 Defense Minister J. J. Fouche gave three 

general reasons for rises in defense spending and buildup 

34 

in the SADF: (1) to preserve internal security; (2) to 

have something to offer when South Africa wanted to enter 
military alliances with other countries, and; (3) to meet 
threats of external invasion. This general statement encom- 
passed both recognition of the internal and the external 
threat, but it became apparent from the government's subse- 
quent actions that much of the defense legislation introduced 

35 

during early 1961 was aimed at strengthening internal security. 

By 19 62, however, the external threat was more 
clearly outlined during South African House of Assembly debates. 
By now, the threat was seen to encompass three broad areas 
of danger: (1) An attack by black states with Communist 
assistance. This was considered by Verwoerd the most dan- 
gerous possibility; (2) A major East-West conflict with South 
Africa involved on the West side. This was later dismissed 
as the likelihood of such a conflict diminished; (3) A 
combined international action against South Africa on the 
pretext of "enforcing international law." 



28 



While at this time it was not clear what shape 
the threat from black states would take, it soon became 
apparent that these states could not match the rising 
strength of the SADF, and the possibility of conventional 
attack began to seem more remote. By 1973, the majority of 
Defense Force training was aimed at counterinsurgency 
warfare . 

Once the threat had been determined to be mainly 
an unconventional one, it became clear to Pretoria that it 
was one which could be handled. In 1971, this basic threat 
perception was further refined by P. W. Botha, who had 
assumed the Defense portfolio in 196 5. He made the final 
link between the guerrilla threat and the global one, reason- 
ing that, due to the nuclear stalemate between the superpowers, 
the Communists had been forced to change tactics in their 
quest for global domination. The first phase of this new 
"onslaught" had been to create internal unrest, and this had 
been the cause of South Africa's internal difficulties in the 
early 1960 's. Botha further identified the threat as "...a 
total indirect strategy which is directed at us, and if and 

when it has achieved sufficient success, the final conven- 

37 
tional confrontation will take place." 

Botha's statements in 19 71 are an important 
precursor of the Total Onslaught/Total Strategy concept 
which he would bring to the Prime Minister's office. 

By the time of the upheavals of the mid-19 70 's 
in southern Africa, South African defense objectives were 

29 



3 8 
fairly well defined: (1) to implement relations with 

Western or pro-Western countries and prevent total isolation; 
(2) to protect frontiers by maintaining close relations with 
Rhodesia and the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique; (3) to 
continue attempts to gain a military alliance with NATO or 
the United States to counter Communist influence in the 
South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, or southern Africa, 
b. Response 

(1) Background . With the increasing perception 
of threat that grew within the South African government in 
the early 1960's, there arose in the government a determina- 
tion to meet the growing threat. When action was taken in 
1961 to enlarge the Permanent Force and the Active Citizens' 
Force, even the opposition in Parliament supported the move. 
The Permanent Force grew from 9,000 in 1960 to 15,000 in 1964, 
and National Servicemen under training increased from 2,000 
to nearly 20,000 during the same time period. By 1970, the 
total number of men in uniform, including Commandos and the 

South African Police (SAP) had grown to 130,000, and the 

39 
annual intake of conscripts had reached 26,000 men. 

For its part, the government defended its 

increasing expenditures and military buildup in terms of the 

rising threat, both internal and external. Verwoerd compared 

the military preparations to taking out an insurance policy-- 

saying a man does not expect to be injured, but covers 

40 
himself for the unexpected. 



30 



(2) Defense Expenditures . Until 1960 the SADF 
had played only a minor role in South African planning, 
and its budget during this time reflected its lack of signi- 
ficance. Defense spending had totaled less than 7% of the 
government budget and less than 1% of the Gross National 
Produce (GNP) . 41 

In the early 1960's defense costs rose 
rapidly in total, as a percentage of government spending, 
and as a percentage of GNP (see Table 1) . In defending 
the size of the increase in defense spending in the 1962 
budget, the Minister of Finance called the entire national 

budget a "budget of national security," adding, "...defense 

42 
is its dominant theme and its ultimate justification." 



43 
TABLE 1 

South African Defense Spending 1960 to 1974 

Financial Defense Budget percent of percent of percent increase 
Year (million current R) Budget GNP over previous year 



38 

96 


92 
NA 
13 

3 
NA 

8 
NA 
23 

6 
41 



1960/61 


44 


1961/62 


61 


1962/63 


120 


1963/64 


120 


1964/65 


230 


1965/66 


219 


1966/67 


248 


1967/68 


256 


1968/69 


252 


1969/70 


272 


1970/71 


257 


1971/72 


317 


1972/73 


335 


1973/74 


472 



Budget 


GNP 


6.6 


0.9 


10.0 


NA 


NA 


NA 


NA 


NA 


21.0 


NA 


NA 


NA 


19.0 


NA 


NA 


NA 


16.1 


2.5 


16.8 


2.4 


13.0 


NA 


12.0 


2.6 


12.0 


2.3 


13.7 


2.6 



31 



After the initial large increases, the 
middle part of the 1960 's saw a leveling off in defense 
spending. From 1964 to 1973, the defense budget averaged 

285 million current Rand a year. This leveling off was 

44 
probably due to several causes: (1) the terrorist threat 

seemed not to have increased, and there was the beginning 
of the shift in perception to the "years of confidence:" 
(2) the Minister of Defense was under pressure to reduce 
spending in line with changing threat perception, and; (3) the 
concern of South African economists caused by the burden of 
defense spending as a total share of government spending due . 
to its inflationary tendency in an overheating economy, and 
due to its draw off of badly needed skilled technicians. 

In spite of these limits on the defense 
budget, defense spending increased ten fold during this 
period, and at times approached 20 percent of all government 
spending. Had not the South African economy been in a period 
of rapid expansion, with a GNP increase of 140 percent be- 
tween 1960 and 1970, it is unlikely this rapid growth in the 
defense sector could have been achieved without damaging 

economic strain and a decline in the white standard of 

, . . 45 

living. 

(3) Manpower . Throughout the period 1960-1973, 
the availability of manpower became and remained a critical 
limitation on the expansion of the SADF . The Defense Force 
was not only limited by being forced to draw almost exclusively 



32 



on the nation's four million whites, but was also forced 
to compete with the rapidly expanding private sector, which 

also relied heavily on whites to fill technical and skilled 

• K 46 
jobs . 

In order to fill the manpower requirements 

of the expanding Defense Force, several steps were taken. 

In 1967, in order to better compete with the private sector, 

salaries in the SADF were increased 11 to 50 percent and 

47 
technical training opportunities were increased. More 

importantly, in 196 8 the lottery, or selective system of 

conscription was abolished and all physically able white males 

were required to enter the National Service, which served 

under the Permanent Force component for training. National 

Service personnel were trained while serving on active 

duty, and became available for later call up in a reserve 

48 
status in either Citizens' Force or Commando units (see 

Table 2) . 



49 
TABLE 2 

South African Defense Force Composition 



Standing Forces 

Branch of Permanent National 
Service Force Servicemen 





(career 
personnel) 


(conscripts) 


Army 


X 


X 


Navy 


X 


X 


Air Force 


X 


X 



Reserve Forces 

Citizens ' Force Commandos 
(regular reserve) (militia 

reserve) 



X 

X 
X 



Limited number 
of units 



33 



Another solution to the manpower shortage 
which was discussed was the large scale recruitment of non- 
whites. In 1963, the Cape Coloured Corps, which had been 
disbanded after World War II, was reestablished with white 
officers and coloured NCOs . The mission of the Cape Coloured 
Corps was to fulfill non-combat roles. In 19 73, the Cape 
Corps Service Battalion was formed to train coloured volun- 
teers at a rate of 200 a year, and plans were announced to 
form an Indian Service Battalion. 

More problematic for the government was the 
arming of blacks. In 1972, when the issue was raised in 
Parliament, Defense Minister Botha stated that while blacks 
served the SADF as civilians, it would be wrong to create a 
black military corps. Action in this direction remained 
some years away. 

(4) Arms and the Arms Industry . Through the 
1950s, the SADF was dependent upon Britain for much of its 
material. Under the implicit division of defense responsi- 
bility which existed between Britain and South Africa, South 
Africa developed such defense industries as were required to 
supplement equipment procured from the United Kingdom. Thus, 
South African industry produced significant amounts of mortars, 
light to medium field artillery, armored cars, communications 
equipment, and ammunition, fuzes and bombs. Major hardware 
purchases were keyed to "allied" requirements, such as the 
antisubmarine warfare frigates acquired within the context 



34 



52 
of the 1955 Simonstown Agreement. For the most part, prior 

to 1960 the SADF's equipment featured outdated and obsolete 
British and American aircraft, tanks, and armored cars. 

Beginning in 1960, the rising pressure of new 
African states at the United Nations for an arms embargo 
against South Africa grew stronger each year, and the con- 
cern over this pressure prompted Pretoria to take steps 
towards ensuring its source of arms was secure. In spite of 
the fact that the UN passed an arms embargo in 1963, South 
Africa had little difficulty in obtaining the arms it needed 
during this period, as only the United States and Britain 
made any realistic effort to restrain the flow of military 

goods, and in their cases, only on clearly military end 

53 
products, such as guns, tanks, and combat aircraft. Britain 

was rapidly replaced as South Africa's major arms supplier 

by France and Italy. 

South Africa's determination to modernize 

and ensure the availability of arms, outlined in the 1960 

54 
General Staff review was rapidly carried forward. To 

promote local production and self-sufficiency, the Defense 
Production Board was established in 1964, and the Defense 
Council in 19 66. The Board procured locally manufactured 
arms while the Council was responsible for guiding and finan- 
cing weapons research. A further important step was taken 
in May 196 8, when an Act of Parliament established the Armament 
Development and Production Corporation (ARMSCOR) , which was 



35 



funded with the equivalent of $144 million to "meet as effec- 
tively and economically as feasible South Africa's armament 

55 
requirements..." by initiating research and development 

for domestic defense production. Later this came to include 
buying abroad. 

By 1965, South Africa had acquired 127 
licenses for the manufacture and assembly of foreign military 
equipment ranging from French and Belgium small arms to 
French armored cars and French and Italian aircraft. How- 
ever, in spite of these acquisitions, the key to assessing 
the South African motive for expanding its domestic arms 
production capability is to note that each step in arms 
industry development was a result of Western actions to limit 
arms supplies. Decisive for South Africa were the trade-offs 
between the desire for Western links and the fear of being 

cut off from arms supplies on one hand, and between the most 

5 8 
economic source and the most reliable source on the other. 

The SADF during this period opted for economy and Western 

defense ties until it became apparent that Western arms 

sources were no longer reliable. 

(5) Defense Reorganization . As the Defense 

Force grew between the years 1960-1973, it became necessary 

to reconsider South Africa's command and control practices. 

In September 1972, the Minister of Defense replaced the 

Supreme Command, which had functioned as advisor to the Head 

of the Defense Force, with a Defense Staff Council, headed 



36 



by the Commandant General and made up of the General Officer 
Commanding Joint Combat Forces, Commander Maritime Defense 
and Chief of the Navy, Chief of Defense Staff, Chief of Air 

Force, Chief of Defense Force Administration, the Comptroller 

59 
of the SADF, and the Surgeon General. 

In addition, the operational command was 
also reconfigured. Two commands were charged individually 
with ground and naval defense, incorporating of all three SADF 
branches in operations either on land or at sea. In 1969, 
ground forces were further reorganized to better support the 
South African Police in opposing insurgency and terrorism. 
Army territorial divisions were rearranged to conform to 
police administrative divisions. Each region was placed 
under the command of a Permanent Force colonel, and was 
responsible for the coordination of Army reserve and civil 
defense actions. The army, through the Commando units, was 
made responsible for providing the SAP with operational 
support for counterinsurgency efforts. Commando units 
were expected to "ensure the immediate and continuous pro- 
tection of their own home regions" at all times. 

(6) Training . As the size of the SADF increased, 
training facilities to handle the growing numbers of service- 
men were strained. In response, specialized schools were 
established for each branch, such as the Commando Training 
Center, the Army College, and the Air Force College in 
order to standardize training and economize efforts. The 



37 



Permanent Force began to emphasize unconventional warfare 
techniques while conducting training. Commandos were 
trained in reconnaissance and unconventional warfare and 
were in some cases formed into specialized groups, such as 
Industrial or Urban Commando units. 

The largest training difficulty encountered 
was related to the manpower shortage. The Permanent Force 
had been responsible for training National Service inductees, 
but the Permanent Force represented the smallest part of 
the armed services and suffered, in addition, from chronic 
shortages of career personnel. The SADF was forced to 
supplement Permanent Force instructors with National Service- 
men, who were trained specifically to be instructors, and 
who served in that capacity for their entire service, even 
though this detracted from the number of troops actually 
available for operational duty. 

( 7) The Security Establishment . 

(a) The Bureau of State Security. As the 
escalating internal strife of the early 1960s brought new 
and more repressive laws to South Africa, it also brought 
the recognition that an improvement was needed in the 
government's security system. Discussions at the time be- 
tween the Minister of Justice Vorster and the Commissioner 
of Police led to the appointment of General Hendrik van den 
Bergh as head of the Security Police to reorganize the 
country s security set-up. 



38 



Van den Bergh had been a close confi- 
dent and advisor to Vorster since their internment together 
during World War II. From the Security Police, he fashioned 
a covert organization in the early 1960s which became known 
as the Republican Intelligence. The function of this organi- 
zation was to gather information both at home and abroad, 
engage in espionage as required, and strengthen the hand of 

^K I. 65 

the government. 

In 1969, the still clandestine Republi- 
can Intelligence grew into a new department of state, known 
as the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) . While BOSS was in- 
tended as a government agency to supplement the military 
intelligence and the Security Police, it soon became 
apparent that van den Bergh, as a close associate and con- 
fidant of now Prime Minister Vorster, wielded much informal 
power. Van den Bergh became Vorster' s crisis manager, and 

BOSS became the clearing house for information gathered by 

fi 7 

the other intelligence services. 

The system for control and implementation 
of security operations which the South African government 
employed, and which BOSS exemplified, reflected a lack of 
coordination and lack of accountability which eventually 
brought Vorster, van den Bergh, and others into disrepute. 
However, in 19 72 an alternative apparatus for security deci- 
sion making was established which would later grow in impor- 
tance. This was the State Security Council (SSC) , 68 



39 



(b) The Establishment of the State Security 
Council. In 1970, partially in response to charges of BOSS 

involvement in the monitoring of the Parliamentary opposi- 

69 

tion, the Potgeiter Commission was ordered to investigate 

certain intelligence aspects of state security. As a result 
of recommendations made by this commission in 1972, the 
State Security Council was established by law, with biparti- 
san political support. 

The membership of the SSC was to con- 
sist of the Prime Minister, who would act as chairman, the 
Senior Minister of the Republic, the Minister of Defense, 
the Minister of Police, other Ministers as required, the 
Secretary for Security Intelligence, the Commandant-General 
of the SADF, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the Secre- 
tary for Justice, the Commissioner of the South African 

71 
Police, and other heads of Departments as required. 

The Act which established the SSC also 

gave it a number of important sounding functions, such as 

formation of National Policy and Strategy, and responsi- 

72 
bility for the execution of that strategy. In practice, 

however, the SSC had little impact during its early years. 

It was only one of twenty cabinet committees to which Vorster 

paid little attention. The SSC met only occasionally, its 

73 
agenda was not circulated, and no minutes were kept. The 

growth in the importance of the SSC would come later, under 

Vorster's successor, P. W. Botha. 



40 



c. The Consequences of South African Defense 
Policy 1960-1973 

During the period between Sharpeville in 1960 
and the eve of the Portuguese collapse in 1974, South Africa 
underwent many changes. Internally, non-white opposition 
was suppressed by means of draconian security laws, and 
new organizations such as BOSS grew up to further combat 
internal and external threats. More important, however, 
was the growth of the defense establishment in South Africa. 
During this time the SADF grew from a militia-type organiza- 
tion with little influence in the domestic government to 
a force which made South Africa the preeminent regional power, 
with important internal and external effects. 

Externally, the implications were clear. As 
South Africa's military power grew and the domestic arms 
industry provided a larger portion of the SADF's hardware 
requirements, the Republic's ability to withstand political 
pressures brought to bear by the United States and other 
Western nations grew. This marked the beginning of a poten- 
tial divergence in the interests and policies of South Africa 
on one hand and of the West on the other. While South Africa 
would continue to unsuccessfully seek alliances committing 
the West to the Republic's defense, once South African 
officials had identified the threat as being mainly internal 
unrest and externally supported guerrilla war, and decided 
that threat could be controlled with domestic resources, the 
need for an outside alliance was lessened. As a consequence, 



41 



the ability of the West to influence South Africa's internal 
and external policies was also lessened. 

South Africa's growing military might also had 
implications for the region. South Africa first deployed 
forces outside its borders in September 1967 against ANC 
elements involved in operations with the Zimbabwe United 
People's Union (ZAPU) in Rhodesia along the Zambezi River. 
In 1968, Minister of Defense P. W. Botha warned Zambia 
publicly that acting as a base for guerrillas could provoke 

South African response against military targets (such as 

74 
those employed by the Israelis against the PLO) . This was 

the first time that South Africa made clear that the defense 

of its borders recognized no frontiers. By 1969, the number 

of South African paramilitary police in Rhodesia reached 

75 
2700. 

In 19 70, at the height of the Outward Movement, 
Prime Minister Vorster offered black states a non-aggression 
pact, saying South Africa's intentions were purely defensive 
The move was indeed defensive, for if countries such as 
Zambia would agree, then guerrillas would lose their bases 
and training facilities. However, this offer was reinforced 
by more sinister definitions of South Africa's "defensive" 
options. The Republic's actions in Rhodesia and Botha's 
threats of Israeli-style reprisal raids were an implicit 
part of South Africa's defensive strategy, as was the state- 
ment of Vorster to Parliament in 1970, when he said that if 



42 



guerrillas invaded South Africa from other countries, "...we 
shall resist them. If they take to flight we shall chase 

them and we shall do so right into those countries from which 

-.76 

they came." 



43 



II. TOTAL ONSLAUGHT/TOTAL STRATEGY 

A. 19 7 3 AND AFTER: THE INWARD TURNING 

1 . Effects of the Portuguese Coup and South African 
Intervention in Angola 

On 25 April 19 74, the Armed Forces Movement in Portu- 
gal overthrew the government of that country, and installed 
in its place the revolutionary government of General Antonio 
de Spinola. In May 19 74, less than one month after the 
coup, Portuguese leaders began conferring with independence 
leaders from Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola, and on 
25 July 19 74, General Spinola officially recognized the right 
of Portugal's overseas possessions to total independence. 

Although the guerrilla wars in the Portuguese colonies 
had been in progress for some time, South Africa was not 
prepared for the rapid collapse of what had been a vast, 
white-controlled northern buffer zone which had separated 
the Republic from independent black Africa. Pretoria was 
especially concerned by the establishment of self-proclaimed 
Marxist states on its borders , providing sanctuary for anti- 
South African movements and access to Namibia, where fighting 
against the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) 
had been in progress since 19 66, Rhodesia, and South 
Africa itself. 

The South African response to the independence of 
Angola and Mozambique was different in each case. On the 



44 



one hand, Mozambique was heavily dependent economically on 
South Africa, therefore when that country gained independence 
in June 19 75, South Africa quickly moved to renew economic 
ties. Prime Minister Vorster saw a free Mozambique as of 

little threat and even declined to support a short-lived 

7 8 
takeover attempt by unhappy whites . 

Angola, on the other hand, was a different situation 

for Vorster. South Africa had little economic leverage 

there, and growing strife among the three nationalist 

groups seemed to indicate the risk of spill-over of violence 

into South West Africa. There was also the concern that a 

radical government in Luanda would actively support SWAPO. 

As fighting intensified in Angola among the former guerrilla 

groups, South Africa resisted the impulse to intervene 

79 
directly until October 19 75. Then, between October and 

December 19 75, the SADF undertook three ground operations 

in Angola. The objectives of these operations, which were 

80 
conducted without significant mechanized or air support 

were unclear, but the result was a catastrophe for South 

8 1 
Africa for several reasons: x (1) the intervention may have 

resulted in bringing a large Communist (Cuban) presence 

onto the border of Southwest Africa in response to South 

African involvement (although it seems likely the Cuban 

build-up was at least planned prior to South African involve- 

82 
ment) ; (2) potential Angolan leaders such as Savimbi were 

discredited through association with South Africa while 



45 



the most radical elements of the MPLA, the group which came 
to power, were strengthened; (3) hostility by Angola towards 
South Africa was assured, so there was little hope of a 
Mozambique-like rapprochement with Angola; and (4) lack of 
international support for the South African intervention made 
it clear to South Africa that it could not count on the West 
to come to its aid even in time of crisis. 
2 . Rhodesia 

From the time of the Portuguese collapse in 1974, 
Prime Minister Vorster was faced with the prospect of rising 
violence and increased South African involvement in Rhodesia. 
From Pretoria's standpoint, the least desirable occurrence 
in Rhodesia would have been a Communist inspired, black-led 
take over. Internationalization of the war in Rhodesia would 
have presented South Africa with the possible need for in- 
erased intervention, and left the Republic open to a possible 

upswing in black urban violence and worsening relations with 

8 3 
Angola and Mozambique. It is not surprising, therefore, 

that South Africa supported a negotiated settlement leading 

to a moderate black government in Rhodesia as opposed to 

further racial strife. In spite of the fact that Vorster 

had a domestic political tightrope to walk over the question 

of support for Rhodesia, it was clear by 19 75 that South 

Africa was supporting a negotiated settlement and pressuring 

the regime of Ian Smith to go to the bargaining table. 



46 



Once the Geneva Conference on Rhodesia had broken 
down in 19 77 , South Africa backed Smith's attempts at inter- 
nal settlement. The government of P. W. Botha, which suc- 
ceeded Vorster's, provided financial, military and logistic 
aid to the Muzorewa regime which came to power as a result 

of the Rhodesian internal settlement. During this period, 

84 
two SADF battalions operated in southern Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. 

However, a lack of international support and growing diplo- 
matic pressures brought all parties back to the conference 
table in 1979, and in March 1980, as a result of British 
observed elections, Robert Mugabe, leader of the Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZANU) was elected to head a new 
government. 

If the Portuguese withdrawal was South Africa's major 
shock of the mid-1970s, Mugabe's victory was the disappoint- 
ment of 19 80. South Africa had supported Muzorewa in the 
election, but would have preferred even the election of 
guerrilla leader Joshua Nkomo to the Mugabe victory. Appre- 
hension over Mugabe's assumption of power in Zimbabwe led 
P. W. Botha to issue a familiar warning to the new government 
in that country: "Any neighbor which allows its territory 
to be used for attacks on or the undermining of South 

Africa and its security will have to face the full force of 

8 5 
the Republic's strength." 

3. Confluence of Pressures: Other Events 19 74 and After 

Although the Portuguese withdrawal and the failure 

of the Angolan intervention was a major turning point for 

47 



South Africa's foreign relations, other events which occurred 
after 1974 internationally and regionally heightened South 
Africa's feeling of isolation, 
a. Arab Oil Embargo 

While the oil embargo called for by the OAU was 
initiated by oil producing states late in 19 73, it had no 
real effect on South Africa until 19 78, due to the non- 
observance of the embargo by Iran. Iran and South Africa 
had maintained friendly relations since World War II, when 
Iran's exiled Reza Shah Pahlavi resided in South Africa. 
After the 19 73 embargo was imposed, Iran continued to meet 

90% of South Africa's oil requirements until 1978, when 

8 6 
Iranian internal difficulties halted these supplies. 

The effects of the embargo were also ameliorated 

by the fact that South Africa depended upon oil for less than 

25% of its energy needs. The balance was met by hydro- 

87 
electric power, coal, and gas. After the loss of Iranian 

supplies, the Republic was still able to satisfy its needs 
through purchases on the spot market. 

The real effect of the embargo was to reveal to 
South Africa the vulnerability of its economy to interrup- 
tion of energy supplies. The oil which was imported was 

critical to communications, defense, and to the chemical 

8 8 
and fertilizer industries. In addition, less obvious but 

at least as important, the oil embargo had the potential 

effect of weakening Western opposition to further sanctions 



48 



against South Africa, for Western nations were now forced 

to take into account both the Afro-Arab alliance against 

89 
South Africa and their own vulnerabilities to oil sanctions. 

b. South Africa and the United Nations 

Pressures on South Africa in the United Nations 

dated back to the 1960 's. In 1961, the General Assembly 

called for states to take "separate and collective action" 

90 
against South Africa. In August 1963, a resolution was 

passed calling for a voluntary arms embargo against South 

Africa, and a coordinated effort by black countries also 

resulted in South Africa being forced out of the Food and 

Agricultural Organization (FAO) in 1963, and from the 

International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Health 

Organization (WHO) in 1964. 

United Nations pressure also grew against South 

Africa's continued occupation of Southwest Africa. In 

1973, the General Assembly recognized SWAPO as the "authen- 

91 
tic representative of the Namibian people," and appointed 

a UN Commissioner for Namibia. During 19 74, the UN enacted 

a decree prohibiting exploitation of the resources of 

Namibia without UN approval. Finally, on 17 December 19 74, 

the Security Council unanimously passed a resolution demand- 

92 
ing that South Africa withdraw from the territory. 

In 1974, after a number of attempts, the UN was 

finally able to reject the credentials of the South African 

delegation to the General Assembly, although a further attempt 



49 



to remove South Africa from the United Nations altogether, 
sponsored by the OAU members, was vetoed by France, Great 
Britain, and the United States. Since 1974, South Africa 
has maintained its delegation to the UN, but its ambassador 
has not taken his seat in the General Assembly except when 
the Namibia question was under debate. 

Further important action by the United Nations 
against South Africa occurred in November 1977, when a 
resolution banning arms sales to the Republic, previously 

vetoed in 1975, 1976, and October 1977, was supported by 

93 

the Western powers. This unprecedented ban by the UN 

against a member country was not only intended to cut South 
Africa off from its traditional sources of arms supplies, 
but also to send Pretoria a message that its domestic poli- 
cies were unacceptable. The unintended message which was 
also conveyed was that South Africa was marked for further 
international isolation, and the Republic became more deter- 
mined to carry on alone. 

94 
c. Internal Unrest 

In June 1976, South Africa was struck by racial 
disturbances which surpassed those which followed Sharpeville 
in 1960 in violence and intensity. The issue which touched 
off the trouble was the continued use of Afrikans for instruc- 
tion in black high schools, but the violence which ensued 
revealed the extent of suppressed discontent among non- 
whites. By the time the protests had subsided in November 



50 



19 76, the disorders had spread to almost every non-white 
township and university in the country. 

The response of the government to these internal 
disorders was to conduct a massive security campaign, enlarg- 
ing SAP and other police reserves, further tightening security 
laws, and conducting a wave of arrests, detentions, and 
bannings . In spite of the fact that the unrest was even- 
tually suppressed, the so-called Soweto period of turmoil 
had major implications for South Africa. First, coming on 
the heels of the abortive Angolan venture, the internal dis- 
turbances were a further shock to the white population. 
Second, the violence of the demonstrations and the repression 
with which they were met reminded the world of the inequitable 
nature of apartheid and the sense of black frustration which 
the system had led to. Finally, and most importantly, the 
blacks who fled the country during and after the riots 
became the new guerrilla fighters of the PAC and ANC. These 
organizations, in turn, became increasingly militant. It 
was after Soweto that armed guerrilla incidents inside South 
Africa began to increase. For its part, the SAP explicitly 
linked Soweto and the rise in urban terrorism, and used these 
incidents to win public support for new counterinsurgency 
campaigns . 

4 . South African Foreign Policy 1974-1978 

Realization of the implications of the Portuguese 
coup brought a new phase to Vorster's Outward Movement. This 



51 



phase came to be known as detente. The essence of this policy 
was that South Africa should assert leadership in southern 
Africa and win the cooperation of black African states in 

providing regional stability and preventing the spread of 

95 

radicalism. Detente, in practice, proved to be short 

lived. It effectively ended with South Africa's interven- 
tion in Angola and with the collapse of the South African- 

. . 96 

Zambian initiative in Rhodesia. Further, President Nyerere 

of Tanzania had already undermined any chance of detente 
with the Dar es Salaam declaration, signed by sixteen nations 
in April 19 75. While this statement did not reject South 
African involvement in the settlement of the Rhodesian prob- 
lem, it did rule out any concessions towards South Africa 
itself. It further stated that black Africa must be prepared 

for armed struggle if a peaceful transition to majority rule 

97 
failed in South Africa. 

The remainder of Vorster's administration was 
spent mainly on the defensive. As 19 76 brought a new wave 
of internal unrest, which in turn led to new government 
repressions, new waves of black South Africans entered ANC 
camps in neighboring countries. In 1977, the U.S. Carter 
administration came to office, and brought with it new ten- 
sions to South Africa's relations with the West. The death 
in September 1977 of Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko 
while in detention in South Africa, followed by new crackdowns 
on political organizations, individuals, and newspapers by 



52 



Vorster, cost South Africa's foreign relations heavily, 

and led directly to the 19 77 UN arms embargo against the 

ul . 98 
Republic. 

In September 1978, Vorster was forced to resign 

due to a scandal within his government. He was succeeded 

by P. W. Botha, his Minister of Defense. 

B. P. W. BOTHA: TOTAL ONSLAUGHT/TOTAL STRATEGY 99 
1 . The Total Onslaught—Background 

Upon his assumption of power in 19 78, P. W. Botha 
found South Africa faced with distinctly hostile internal 
and external positions. Internally, the aftermath of the 
racial unrest of 1976 was still being felt. In addition, 
the white population was still reeling under the impact of 
revelations of scandal in the upper ranks of both the govern- 
ment and the National Party. Externally, the country's 
position had become increasingly less secure with the loss 
of the Portuguese buffer and the escalating conflict in 
Rhodesia. In addition, the rising level of violence along 
the Namibia-Angola border led to increasing pressure from 
the United Nations and concurrent loss of South African con- 
fidence in the other parties involved in that dispute. 
Finally, the Republic's relations with the West had deteri- 
orated to new lows due to the impasse over Namibia, the 
pressures in the UN, and the failure of Western support 
during the Angolan affair. 



53 



It is not surprising, considering the pressures felt 
by South Africa, that the government would believe the coun- 
try was faced with a "total onslaught" of internal and external 
attack aimed at the overthrow of the existing order. Botha 
realized revolution in South Africa was possible, and he 
was the first to acknowledge this fact publicly. He also 
realized that revolutions fail when met by an effective 
counter-revolutionary strategy which eliminates or diffuses 
those forces threatening the existing order. Botha was 

determined to mobilize the society to implement such a strategy. 

102 
2 . Total Onslaught Defined 

As can be seen from previous discussion, South Africa 

has for some time seen itself as the target of external 

threats. Since 1945, the country has perceived a Communist 

10 3 
inspired threat to its security. As the perception of 

threat grew through the internal unrest of the 19 60s and the 

increasing pressures of the 1970s, the onslaught was still 

perceived as Communist inspired, but the threat was no longer 

seen as confined to Communist sources. 

General Magnus Malan , Defense Minister and former 

head of the SADF saw the onslaught as being directed against 

the whole Western World, of which South Africa is a part. 

He defined the onslaught as 

...an ideologically motivated struggle .. .the aim 
(of which) is the implacable and unconditional 
imposition of the aggressor's will on the target 
state. The aim is also therefore total, not only 
in terms of the ideology, but also as regards the 
political, social, economic, and technical areas.^ 4 



54 



In the onslaught, South Africa was seen as a key due to its 
strategic location, mineral wealth, strong economy, and 
highly developed infrastructure. 

The threats against South Africa posed by the total 
onslaught were seen to be many. The conventional military 
threat was believed by Prime Minister Botha to be limited, 
as the SADF ' s strength would exact too heavy a toll on an 
enemy. Therefore, the military threat was mainly an indirect 
one of Communist backing for terrorists and guerrillas. This 
threat perception was similar to that developed by Botha in 
the early 1960s and refined in 1971. This did not, 
however, mean that the threat of conventional war could be 
discounted. General Malan has stated that while "it is pri- 
marily an unconventional war, . . .the threat of a conventional 

i n fi 
war in the near future can by no means be excluded." 

In addition to the threat of military action against 
the Republic, the onslaught also envisioned anti-South African 
actions in the political, diplomatic, religious, psychologi- 
cal, cultural, social, and sports spheres. In General 
Malan' s view, the onslaught is directed at South Africa's 
four "power bases:" (1) the political/diplomatic; (2) the 
economic; (3) the social/psychological; and, (4) the security. 

While the Communists were still seen as the main 
force behind the total onslaught, they were not seen as the 
only one. The OAU, the UN, and other groupings of black 
states figured in the onslaught. Also considered was the 



55 



threat posed by South Africa's neighbors due to the harboring 
of terrorists and the build up of Soviet supplied conventional 
arms in Angola, Mozambique, and Zambia. 

As the West pressured South Africa for internal re- 
forms, Western nations also came to be seen as an indirect 
part of the onslaught. In General Malan's words, in order 
to protect their interests in black Africa, "it can be... 
justifiably claimed that the Western Powers make themselves 
available as handymen of the communists and they are indirectly 

contributing to the destruction of capitalism and the estab- 

107 
lishment of world communism." 

There are two important points to be taken from this 
distillation of South Africa's multifaceted threat into the 
"Total Onslaught." First, the threat appraisal ignores the 
possibility that South Africa's internal policies could be a 
cause of the country's internal tensions, instead rationaliz- 
ing the cause for internal unrest as the external onslaught. 
This is consistent with South African appraisal of domestic 
problems since the 19 60 Sharpeville disturbances. Secondly, 
and what is more important for South Africa's policies, is 
that the concept of "Total Onslaught" can be used to justify 
the implementation of the "Total National Strategy." 

C. TOTAL NATIONAL STRATEGY 
1 . Background 

The concept of the Total Onslaught assumed more 
importance and was further defined as P. W. Botha came to 



56 



office, for it was a concept which had grown from the strate- 
gic thinking of the defense establishment and the SADF. In 
the 1977 Defense White Paper, the Total National Strategy was 
defined as "the comprehensive plan to utilize all the means 
available to a state according to an integrated pattern in 
order to achieve the national aims within the framework of 
the specific policies. A Total National Strategy is not, 

therefore, confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable 

10 8 
to all levels and to all functions of the state structure." 

Just as Botha defined the onslaught, he also devised the 
counter-revolutionary strategy to meet it. In May 1979, 
Botha, while holding high level meetings to devise his 
strategy, said that "a country which is facing a total on- 
slaught has to have a total strategy to combat it..." and 
"...it was essential that South Africa's strategy should be 

a total one in which military, political, and economic 

109 
factors could all play a part." 

2 . The Twelve-Point Plan 

Throughout the first half of 19 79, Botha and his 

main spokesman, General Malan, continued to expand upon the 

total conflict and the need for a strategy to combat the 

110 
threats it posed. In June, Malan called for cohesion of 

population groups to face the communist conventional, uncon- 
ventional, and psychological threats. In July, P. W. 

Botha raised the "Total Conflict" issue with regard to South 

112 
Africa's position in Namibia. 



57 



By August, 19 79, Botha was ready to unveil his new 

strategy. Speaking at the Natal National Party Congress, 

113 

he outlined what has come to be known as the 12-point plan. 

This plan as it was stated and fine-tuned over the following 
months, was an attempt to define policy objectives for the 
government over a wide range of interests. Botha presented 
the plan as one to which the government was totally committed, 

and as the only hope for salvation in the face of the Total 

114 
Onslaught. (See Appendix A for the specific points of the 

plan. ) 

The first six points of the plan dealt with what were 
mainly domestic political matters. In short, these six 
stated the ideological foundation of the plan, making it 
clear that the plan is a restatement of National Party policy, 
committing South Africa to separate development. The seventh 
point recognizes the economic integration between the races 
which had already occurred, and can be seen as a government 
move to remove ideology from economic activity. 

The eighth point declares what had already become a 
major foreign policy initiative of the Botha regime: the 
creation of a "peaceful constellation of states in southern 
Africa." The formation of this constellation was seen as 
inevitable as conditions, especially economic conditions, 
but also political and security considerations, drew the 
states of the region into closer relationships. In short, 
the constellation was a South African attempt to detach 



58 



pressures concerning its internal policies from its external 

relations, and to draw its neighbors closer through mainly 

115 
economic means. 

The ninth, tenth, and eleventh points deal with South 

Africa's defense policies. The ninth states South Africa's 

determination to defend itself from all outside interference 

in all ways. The tenth calls for a policy of neutrality in 

the East-West conflict. The eleventh concerns the "maintenance 

of effective decision making by the state, which rests on a 

strong Defense Force and Police Force to guarantee orderly 

1 l fi 
government as well as efficient, clear administration." 

This point reflects Botha's style of governing and his up- 
coming reorganization, and the increasing role of the military 
in South Africa's government. 

Point twelve commits the South African government to 
the maintenance of free enterprise as the economic basis of 
the country. This point reflects Botha's attempt to draw 
the economic sector into his plans for both the constellation 
and internal change, and thus relates to points seven and 
eight. 

3 . The Mechanics of the Total National Strategy 

As can be seen from the diverse areas covered in the 
12-point plan, it is obvious that the Total National Strategy 
would have far reaching consequences. Plans and policies 
devised under the heading of Total National Strategy (TNS) 
affected all of South Africa through the reorganization of 



59 



the government, through more repressive controls on the 
population, and through the increasing importance of the 
security establishment and the military, 
a. Government Reorganization 

In 19 78, disclosure of the now famous information 
scandal showed that government under Vorster was at worst cor- 
rupt and at best administratively sloppy, and led to Vorsters ' 
downfall. His successor, P. W. Botha, announced adminis- 
trative reforms in government beginning in 19 79, but it took 
several years for his initiatives to be fully implemented. 
This reorganization would serve to tighten up the slack prac- 
tices of Vorster' s government, however, they were not con- 
ducted solely to correct past mistakes. There were other 

118 
perceived shortcomings to be corrected. First, South 

Africa's involvement in the Angolan civil war in 19 75 had 

revealed the need for a more formalized method of government 

119 
decision making. In order to correct these shortcomings 

and to provide a better decision making process, the security 
management system was established. 

Second, Botha's concern for the internal and ex- 
ternal security of South Africa led to the development of the 
Total National Strategy in order to make better use of South 
Africa's resources in meeting the Total Onslaught. Third, 
Botha's definition of a Total National Strategy gave government 
a sense of direction which had previously been lacking. 
Finally, the scandal which had brought down Vorster 's 



60 



government left the country with the feeling that change in 
government was needed. Botha was able to capitalize on this 
feeling to institute his programs. 

In Phase I of Botha's government reorganization, 
known as the rationalization program, the number of cabinet 
committees was reduced from 22 to five> including National 
Security (the SSC), Economic Affairs, Social Affairs, Internal 
Affairs, and Finance. This number was later reduced by one 
when the Committee for Finance was merged with the Committee 
for Economic Affairs. In addition, the Committee for Inter- 
nal Affairs was renamed the Committee for Constitutional 
Affairs. Table 3 reflects the South African government 
organization as it is today. 

While all four cabinet committees are theoretically 
equal, several factors combine to set the State Security 
Council (SSC) off as the dominant committee. The SSC will 
be discussed in greater detail below. 

b. The Rise of the Security Establishment 

(1) Background . Botha's government reorgani- 
zation in the name of the Total National Strategy has had 
the effect of centralizing power in the Cabinet, and, even 
further, into a few departments informally called the inner 
Cabinet at the expense of Parliament and the National Party. 
As power has become centralized in the executive under Botha, 
and previously important institutions such as BOSS (now 
the National intelligence Service — NIS) and the Information 



61 



TABLE 3 



120 



SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH 



PRIME MINISTER - 



SECRETARY OF THE CABINET 
CABINET SECRETARIAT 



CABINET 



CABINET COMMITTEE CABINET COMMITTEE CABINET COMMITTEE STATE SECURITY 
FOR ECONOMIC FOR SOCIAL FOR CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL 

AFFAIRS — Ministers AFFAIRS — Ministers AFFAIRS — Ministers Established 
Deputy Ministers Deputy Ministers Deputy Ministers and Constituted 
Department Heads Department Heads Department Heads in terms of 

Act 64 of 1972 

I 

Working Group Working Group Working Group Working Group 

Department Heads Department Heads Department Heads Department Heads 



Interdepartmen- 
tal Task Groups; 
cooperation at 
the regional 
level 



Interdepartmen- 
tal Task Groups; 
cooperation at 
the regional 
level 



Interdepartmental 
Task Groups; co- 
operation at the 
regional level 



Int erdepartmen- 
tal Task Groups; 
cooperation at 
the regional 
level 



Department were downgraded, reorganized, or dismantled. The 
security establishment gained influence at the expense of 
other bodies . 

(2) The Security Establishment . 

(a) The South African Defense Force/ 
Department of Defense. P. W. Botha came to power from the 
defense establishment, where he had served for 14 years as 
Minister of Defense and had presided over the enlargement of 
the SADF and buildup of the defense industry. During his 
tenure as Minister of Defense, he came to admire the managerial 



62 



style of the military, and upon becoming Prime Minister, 

he brought with him high ranking SADF personnel as advisors. 

The Permanent Force officers in govern- 
ment became involved in the construction and execution of 
overall defense strategy, especially with regard to Namibia. 
In addition, these officers also became involved with other 
governmental, political, and economic elites in agencies 
such as the SSC. 

As previously discussed, the buildup 
of the SADF and the arms industry in South Africa began in 
response to the threats of the early 1960s. The events of 
the mid-19 70s acted as the catalyst for even larger increases 
in both the size of the SADF and in defense spending. After 
1974, defense spending continued to increase at a rapid 
pace (see Table 4) . 

What was even more significant about 
the rise in defense spending was the fact that it took place 
during a period of general economic slowdown. By 19 83/84, 
spending on defense had tripled over the 19 75/76 budget. 

During this period, the SADF also in- 
creased in size and changed in composition. As Table 5 shows, 
the size of the Defense Force almost doubled btween 1974/75 
and 19 83/84. As this growth began to strain available white 
manpower assets, first women and then non-whites were 
accepted in increasing numbers. Within the expansion of 
the SADF was included an attempt to increase the size of the 



63 



TABLE 4 



122 



SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE SPENDING 
1974/75 to 1983/84 



FINANCIAL 


DEFENSE BUDGET 


PERCENT 


PERCENT 


PERCENT IN- 


YEAR 


(MILLION CUR- 


OF 


OF 


CREASE OVER 




RENT RAND) 


BUDGET 


GNP 


PREVIOUS 
YEAR 


1974/75 


692 


16.0 


3.2 


47 " 


1975/76 


948 


18-. 5 


3.7 


37 


1976/77 


1,400 


17.0 


4.1 


48 


1977/78 


1,526* 


19.0 


5.1 


9 


1978/79 


1,682 


NA 


NA 


10.3 


1979/80 


1,857 


NA 


NA 


10.4 


19 80/81 


2,865 


NA 


NA 


54.3 


1981/82 


2,465 


NA 


NA 


-13 


1982/83 


2,700 


NA 


NA 


8 


1983/84 


3,090 


NA 


NA 


15.9 



*Revised downward due to the cancellation of R128 million 
shipbuilding contract by France. 



TABLE 5 



123 



GROWTH OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE 
(numbers in '000) 

74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/484 



TOTAL ARMED 






























FORCES 


47. 


,45 


50. 


5 


51.5 


55.0 


65.5 


63.25 


86. 


05 


92. 


7 


81.4 


82.4 


-Conscripts 


31. 


,75 


35. 


4 


35.4 


38.4 


48.9 


45.25 


66. 


,25 


66. 


1 


53.1 


53.1 


ARMY 


34. 


,5 


38. 





38.0 


41.0 


50.0 


48.5 


71. 





76. 





67.4 


67.4 


-White 


7 




7 




7 


7 


NA 


6 


6 




10 




10 


10 


Regulars 
-Coloured/ 
Black 


















NA 


2.5 


3 




4 




5.4 


5.4 


Regulars 
-Women 












.18 


2.1 


2.1 


NA 


2 




2 




2 


2 


-Conscripts 


27. 


,5 


31 




31 


34 


43 


40 


60 




60 




50 


50 


REQUIRED 
ACTIVE 


9-12 


1 




1 


2 


2 


2 


2 




2 




2 


2 



SERVICE 



mo. 



yr 



yr 



yr 



yr 



yr 



yr yr 



yr 



yr 



64 



Permanent Force, as the numbers of regulars in the army 
increased from 7000 whites in 1974/75 to 15,400 of all races 
in 19 83/84. Conscription policies also changed during this 
period to fuel the SADF's rising manpower demands. 

(b) The Intelligence Community. The 
influence of this community has been marked by continual 
flux. It is made up of the Department of Military Intelli- 
gence (DMI) , the National Intelligence Service (NIS) , and 
the Security Police. 

The South African intelligence apparatus 
had long been the arena for intense inter-service rivalry. 
When BOSS was established in the 1960 's, its head, General 
van den Bergh, had Prime Minister Vorster's confidence, 
and was appointed Security Advisor to the Prime Minister in 
1968. When this happened, DMI suspected that BOSS intended 
to assume some of the duties assigned to military intelli- 
gence. This led to an intense rivalry between BOSS and DMI, 
and clashes between van den Bergh and Minister of Defense 
Botha. However, van den Bergh fell from power with Vorster, 
and Botha chose to consolidate central intelligence functions 
under DMI . 

To date there is still rivalry between 
all three security services. BOSS has evolved through a 
name change to Department of National Security (DONS) to 
become NIS and now functions mostly as an intelligence think 
tank rather than as a gatherer of intelligence. DMI seems 



65 



to have assumed the function of external intelligence 
gathering, with policy advice coming from SADF personnel. 
The position of the Security Police was also enhanced with 
the demise of BOSS/DONS/NIS , and the former head of the 
Security Police is now Commissioner of Police. 

(c) The Intellectual Community. This 
group consists of the segments of South African society 
which serve the defense establishment on an ad hoc basis. 
There are centers of strategic studies at Rand Afrikaans 
University, the University of Pretoria, and the University 
of South Africa. There are also independent bodies such 

as the Terrorism Research Center in Capetown, and individual 
academics on call to the government. 

(d) Arms and Associated Industries. The 
leading defense related industries are the large parastatal 
corporations, such as the Armament Corporation of South 
Africa (ARMSCOR) and the State Petroleum firm (SASOL) . 
ARMSCOR is South Africa's largest industrial venture with 
1.2 billion Rand in assets. As a result of ARMSCOR' s 
actions, South Africa is now the tenth largest producer of 
armaments in the world. ARMSCOR directly employs 29,00 
workers and provides employment for nearly 100,000 through 

its subsidiaries and private subcontractors. Its subsidiaries 

124 
and their products include: 

1. Atlas Aircraft Corporation — aircraft manufacture, 

maintenance, and service. 



66 



2. INFOPLAN--computer services. 

3. Kent ron- -guide weapons and optical equipment. 

4. Lyttleton Engineering Works--small arms and guns. 

5. Mus grave Manufactures and Distributors — commercial 
small arms and shotguns . 

6. Naschem, Lenz , and Potchef stran—heavy ammunition 
and bombs . 

7. Pretoria Metal Pressing--small calibre ammunition. 

8. Swartklip Products — pyrotechnics, detonators, mines, 
hand grenades and commercial ammunition. 

Through these subsidiaries and 
their subcontractors ARMS COR has ties with every area of the 
country and with every industry. In addition, since his 
tenure as Minister of Defense, P. W. Botha utilized leading 
industrialists as advisors and to head ARMSCOR and its sub- 
sidiaries. He has continued this practice as Prime Minister. 
For example, in 1980, the ARMSCOR Board of Directors included 
as members the Executive Director of Barlow Rand, South 
Africa's largest corporation, the South African Resident 
Representative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) , 

and the Chief General Manager of the Industrial Development 

125 
Corporation of South Africa, just to note a few. 

ARMSCOR also reaches into the 

country's educational system by providing scholarships and 

apprentice training to students and workers in various 

*■ n^ 126 
fields . 



67 



Other parastatals, such as ISCOR. 
and SASOL have defense and security links through planning 
bodies, sales to security forces and other state depart- 
ments. Finally, the Total National Strategy ties the 
businss community in general to the government by the inclu- 
sion of economic factors in the 12-point plan. The Defense 
Advisory Board, whose members are business elites, provides 
further links between business, defense, and the government. 

(e) The South African Police (SAP) . 127 
The South African Police developed from the variety of 
security forces established over the years in response to 
different conditions and perceived threats. After the Act 
of Union in 1910, the police forces of the provinces of South 
Africa were consolidated into two law enforcement agencies. 
These were the South African Mounted Riflemen, detailed to 
rural areas, and the SAP, responsible for urban areas. The 
SAP subsequently absorbed the Mounted Riflemen and, in 19 36, 
were given jurisdiction throughout the country. In 1939, 
SAP responsibilities were extended to include Southwest 
Africa, and later amendments to the Police Act permitted 
the SAP to be employed outside the country when requested 
by friendly governments, and when these operations were 
deemed to be in the best interest of South Africa's internal 
security. In the 1960 's and 1970 's SAP units were involved 
in counterinsurgency operations in Rhodesia and Portuguese 
Mozambique . 



68 



As it exists today, the SAP is a 
paramilitary organization, the primary function of which is 
the maintenance of internal security. SAP operates under 
the authority of the Minister of Police and is administered 
by the Commissioner of Police, who holds the rank of general. 
In 1983, the South African budget allowed 546 million 

Rand for the SAP, and increase of 17.1% over the previous 

*•*. 128 

year s expenditures. 

In 19 83, the SAP had a strength 

of 35,500, of which 19,500 were white and 16,000 were non- 
129 
white. In addition, the Police Reserve consisted of about 

20,000 men who had received paramilitary training, and an 
amendment to the Defense Act allowed military reservists 
and Commandos to be mobilized on short notice to assist the 
SAP in emergencies. 

Organizationally, the SAP is 
divided into three branches. (1) The Uniformed Branch 
is mainly concerned with routine police work and crime 
prevention, as well as with clerical duties, overall SAP 
administration, and supply and maintenance of police equip- 
ment and transport. (2) The Detective Branch operates 
from SAP headquarters and is subdivided into the Criminal 
Investigation Division, which is reponsible for the assign- 
ment of plainclothesmen, and the Special Branch, which is 
responsible for police intelligence gathering, surveillance, 
and investigation of subversive activities. (3) Finally, 
the Security Branch is responsible for border patrol and 



69 



internal security activities in South Africa and Namibia 
which are not otherwise assigned to the SADF. All Security 
branch units are self-sufficient in weapons, transport, 
communications, and logistic support. These units have 
operated in Namibia with the SADF. 

The SAP conducts its own train- 
ing and recruiting. Personnel are enlisted on a voluntary 
basis from throughout South Africa. Most white police are 
Afrikaners, while most blacks are from rural areas. Since 
the passage of the Group Areas Act in 1950, non-white police 
personnel have been made responsible for duties in non-white 
areas . Black police were normally brought in from different 
parts of South Africa to avoid any sympathy for the local 
population. Whites enlisting in the SAP are exempted from 
National Service with the SADF. A women's contingent was 
established in 1972. 

(f) The State Security Council. 
Many of the organizations discussed above are brought to- 
gether by the State Security Council (SSC) . While tech- 
nically the SSC is only one of four cabinet committees which 
are formally equal, there is little doubt that the SSC is 
the principal of these committees. 

Several features set the SSC 
off from the other cabinet committees. (1) The SSC 
is the only cabinet committee established by law, and 
which consists of a membership established by law. (2) The 



70 



SSC is the only cabinet committee chaired by the Prime 
Minister. (3) The SSC concerns itself with a greater range 
of issues than any of the other committees. (4) The SSC's 
network of supporting bodies is more comprehensive than 
those of other committees. (5) The SSC's meetings are closed 
to the participation of non-members, who may only attend 
if specifically invited or co-opted. (6) The SSC is exempt 
from the rule that decisions of cabinet committees must be 
circulated with cabinet minutes. SSC decisions are not 
subject to confirmation by the full cabinet. 

Even if the membership and scope of 
the SSC did not give it a preeminent status, it would still 
assume enhanced importance due to its size, organization, 
and resources. The secretary of the SSC, Lieutenant General 
Andries Jacobus van Deventer, has a secretariat which is 
much larger than those employed by the other cabinet com- 
mittees. The Secretariat of the SSC (SSSC) consists of 
three branches: National Intelligence Interpretation, 
Total Strategy, and another, the name of which is classified. 
While technically the SSC reports administratively to the 
NIS, it is directly responsible to the Prime Minister. 

In addition, General van Deventer 
possesses a large amount of bureaucratic influence. Besides 
serving as Secretariat of the SSC, he also sits as a member 
of the working groups of the other three cabinet committees 
(see Table 3) , and is also involved in the distribution and 



71 



channeling of all policy papers destined for cabinet con- 
siderations due to the fact that he also holds the position 
of cabinet secretariat jointly with John H. Huyser, a retired 
intelligence officer. 

Also subordinate to the SSC working 
committee are some 15 interdepartmental committees (IDC's) 
which are the originators of nearly all policy recommenda- 
tions. The IDC's cover a wide range, including the Political 
Action Committee, the Coordinating Economic Committee, the 
Manpower Committee, and the Transport Coordinating Committee, 
to name just a few. IDC membership consists mainly of heads 
of departments, senior deputies, legal advisors, and an 
SADF representative on each committee who reports directly 
to van Deventer. 

Finally, the SSC network includes a 
series of Joint Management Centers (known as GBS for the 
Afrikaans GESAMENTLIKE BESTUURSSENTRUMS) . There are nine 
GBS which serve geographical areas of South Africa and which 
coincide with the area commands of the SADF, and there is 
a tenth for Walvis Bay. There are also four GBS ' s for 
certain southern African countries, including Namibia. All 
are based within South Africa and all are designed to carry 
the Total National Strategy throughout the country in an 
organized manner. 

It is apparent that the SSC has become 
the preeminent governing body within the South African 



72 



government. All questions with security implications are 
brought to it, and through the Total Onslaught/Total National 
Strategy concept almost every aspect of government can be 
interpreted as having security implications. In addition, 
through its influence over the cabinet secretariat and its 
membership, the SSC can influence many of the decisions 
of the other cabinet committees. Not only is the SSC the 
principal cabinet committee, it also serves as an inner 
cabinet of the Prime Minister and his highest ranking experts. 
When the SSC recommends policy, the full cabinet is not 
likely to deny that policy. 

c. Constitutional Change 

(1) Background . Recently, talk of reorganizing 
the government by constitutional change has been much dis- 
cussed by the elite of the National Party. As the expression 
of Western European political liberalism, the Westminister 
system made it difficult to maintain government secrecy, and 
was not in consonance with the harsher security measures 
taken after 1960. The National Party had been considering a 

constitutional alternative more in keeping with the visions 

132 
of a plural society. 

In 1976, the Theron Commission, which had 

been investigating Coloured matters since 19 73, suggested 

133 
that the Westminister system of government be reconsidered. 

This report led to the appointment of a cabinet committee 

chaired by P. W. Botha, then Minister of Defense, to consider 



73 



whether a new political formula could be found. Botha's 
proposals in 19 77 included power sharing between white, 
coloured, and Asian peoples, and were later approved by 
provincial congresses of the National Party and submitted 
to Parliament as a draft bill in 19 79. This draft bill 
was in turn submitted to the Schlebusch Commission. 

The 19 80 report of the Schlenbusch Com- 
mission led to the appointment of a President's Council to 
draft a new constitution. This President's Council in- 
cluded white, coloured, and Asian representatives, but 
excluded blacks. The President's Council submitted its 
recommendations in May 19 82. 

(2) The Constitution . P. W. Botha slightly 
modified the recommendations of the President's Council in 

forming his constitutional plan. This plan envisioned a new 

134 
structure of government in South Africa, laid out as follows: 

1. A President as executive head of state, combining 
the former offices of State President and Prime 
Minister, to be elected by an electoral college. 

2. An electoral college of 50 white, 25 coloured, and 

13 Asian members appointed by their respective chambers 
in Parliament. 

3. A tricameral Parliament for the three population 
groups, white, coloured, and Asian, each to determine 
policy on matters affecting its own group. 

4. A cabinet appointed by the President, to include 
members of all three racial groups. 

74 



5. A President's Council of 20 whites, 10 coloured, and 
5 Asians, elected by their representative chambers, 
and 25 members appointed by the President, to act as 
final arbiter in disputes. 

The new constitution was approved on 2 
November 19 83 by a 66% majority of white voters. No referen- 
dum was held for coloured or Asian voters, and blacks were 
excluded from participation. 

( 3) The New Constitution and the Total National 
Strategy . Viewed in the context of Botha's Total National 
Strategy, the new constitution has several potential goals. 
First, including population groups other than whites has 
the effect of co-opting those groups and weakening their 
support for potential opposition movements. It also has 
the potential to garner international support due to indica- 
tions of reform. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the 
system embodied in the new Constitution was very adaptable 
to the strong leader, thus completing the movement towards 
the consolidation of power in the executive begun by Botha 
in his reorganization of the cabinet. It seems apparent 
that the SSC would assume even greater importance in acting 
as the de facto secretariat of the President, while other 
cabinet committees and even the Parliament became less 
important. Finally, as an additional strength, inclusion 
of Asians and coloureds in the government would probably 
make members of those groups liable for the same compulsory 
military service to which whites are subjected. 

75 



d. Government, Business, and Defense 

The Total National Strategy was intended to be 
concerned with more than the reorganization of government 
in order to better meet the onslaught against South Africa. 
In an analysis of the Total National Strategy as a counter- 
revolutionary strategy, Philip Frankel of the University of 
Witwatersrand recognized the role of the private sector in 
the TNS , saying the TNS is "sociologically deeper than 

government reorganization. . .and actually involves reforming 

135 
the elite coalition." This reformation includes an 

alliance between business, government, and the military on 

one hand, and the inclusion of racial groups other than 

whites in government on the other. This was discussed in 

point seven of the 12-point plan, which recognized the role 

and importance of non-whites in the economy and condoned 

official moves towards the de-idealization of the economic 

136 
sector . 

Business was seen to act as a source of mana- 
gerial skills and capital in support of the Total National 
Strategy. The Botha style of government as reflected in 

his reorganizations since becoming Prime Minister resembled 

137 
the style of a corporate president, and he included 

important business leaders in the governmental decision 

making processes (see the discussion of ARMSCOR, above) . 

In addition, Botha also saw private capital as a source of 

funds for rural and urban development. In rural areas, 



76 



capital was to be employed through actions of large corpora- 
tions or through government sponsored institutions designed 
to stimulate regional trade cooperation. In urban areas, 

the government looked to organizations such as the Urban 

13 8 
Foundation to absorb some of the costs of apartheid. 

The response of business to this proposed role 
in the Total National Strategy was generally favorable. In 
the past, the enforcement of apartheid rules led to govern- 
ment intervention in the economic sector, curbing private 
ventures and constraining productivity. The 12-Point 
Plan's emphasis on the free market and its moves towards the 
deregulation of the economy was encouraging to South African 
businessmen. In addition, the eighth point of the 12-Point 
Plan called for a "Constellation of States in southern 
Africa, which included the promise of work towards closer 
economic ties between the Republic and neighboring states, 

and it was expected South African businessmen would assume 

139 
the lead in cementing these relationships." 

Finally, there was also the desire of the govern- 
ment to link the private sector and the Defense Force, 
especially in the field of arms development and production. 
As previously discussed, a Defense Advisory Board composed 
of South African business elites was established to further 
involve the private sector in defense activities. The fact 
that ARMSCOR made maximum use of the private sector further 
indicates the growing links between business and defense. 



77 



The defense establishment looked to private industry for 
the manufacture of 70% of all of the country's domestic 
arms production, while defense in turn provides leadership, 
research and development, and access to a small but growing 
export market. 

e. Other Racial Groups 

The 12-Point Plan in the area of relations between 
the races adheres to the tenets of separate development, 
but with a difference. Points one through three reconfirm 
the commitment of South Africa to apartheid. Point four 

assigns some political power in the newly reorganized govern- 

141 
ment to coloured and Asian peoples. In addition, adminis- 
trative exemptions in the Group Areas Act now allow Asians 
and coloureds the right to house black servants, and Asians 
and coloureds to receive general preference over blacks in 
the expenditure of government money. In these and other 
matters, it is apparently the intention of the government 
to blur the racial boundary between coloureds, Asians, and 
whites while widening the inequalities between these groups 
and blacks. This can be seen as an attempt to pull two 
ambiguously situated groups into the white camp, thereby 
denying their support to the black majority. 

Under the Total National Strategy concept, blacks 
are dealt with in a two- fold strategy. First, rural blacks 
are handled by the homeland policy, the goal of which is to 
create a system of semi-independent, semi-autonomous states 



dominated by South Africa. Political development in these 

states is carefully monitored to ensure that these states 

143 
remain dependent on and under the control of South Africa. 

Second, urban blacks receive a new deal which 
allows them some local political power, limited rights of 
citizenship and property holding, and the promise of partici- 
pation in the constellation of states. Moves to accommo- 
date urban blacks have resulted in new reform measures and 
greater responsiveness to the needs of this group. However, 
when considered in the light of the Total National Strategy, 
it seems that these moves are intended to further split 
opposition to white dominance by separating rural and urban 
blacks. Just as the "political dispensation" accorded to 
Asians and coloureds is intended to split these groups from 
blacks, giving urban blacks a stake in the system is intended 
to separate them from rural blacks. As Frankel states, 
"...Total Strategy is also devoted to realizing the old 
liberal belief that the existence of a 'stable' black middle 

class committed to the ideals of free enterprise capitalism 

144 
is an important ingredient in the maintenance of the system. " 

D. EFFECTS OF THE TOTAL NATIONAL STRATEGY 

The Total National Strategy, as discussed above, has had 
major impacts on the internal organization and operation of 
the South African government, on South African society, and 
on the Republic's relations with other countries. 



79 



1 . Internal Effects 
a. Government 

As noted above, the impact of the Total National 
Strategy on the government has been profound. Internally, 
Botha's reorganization of the cabinet and his elevation of 
the importance of the SSC has tended to short-circuit the 
influence of the full cabinet and increase the power of 
the Prime Minister over the policy making and implementation 
apparatus. In addition, his streamlining of the cabinet has 
provided for a more administratively sound system. As a 
result of this accretion of influence to the SSC, the real 
control of power has slipped away from the elected members 
of Parliament and other departments of government. 

The new constitution, approved in November 19 83 
and now in the process of being implemented, also had a 
major impact on how the Republic is governed. For one 
thing, for the first time non-whites will be included as 
elected representatives in the South African government, 
although how much real power and influence the coloured and 
Asian chambers will possess is still questionable. Further, 
and more importantly, the new constitution supports the 
centralization of power begun by the reorganization of the 
government. The new system provides for a strong executive 
president. It is further assumed that in serving as the 
secretariat to the presidential system, the SSC will gain 

even more in importance at the expense of the other cabinet 

145 
committees and the Parliament. 

80 



b. The Militarization of Society 

There is no doubt that the influence and impact 
of the SADF in South African government has been rising as 
the Defense Force becomes more important to the defense of 
white South Africa. This increasing influence and its 
actual extent has been much discussed, and it is important 
to note where it has affected South African society itself. 

(1) Impact on Government . The Total National 
Strategy is mainly a creation of P. W. Botha, developed and 
fine-tuned during his days as Minister of Defense, and 

implemented through the military as a solution to the "total 

146 
war" being conducted in Namibia. As Minister of Defense, 

Botha was influenced by military management efficiency and 

planning, and when he became Prime Minister, it was natural 

that he bring with him to government the administrators 

whose skills he admired, and whom he had promoted in the 

SADF. For example, General Magnus Malan was appointed by 

Botha as the youngest ever Chief of Staff of the Army, 

Chief of the Army, Chief of the SADF, and finally Minister 

147 
of Defense. Malan has often served as Botha's communi- 
cator, stumping the country to keep the Total Onslaught/ 
Total National Strategy before the population. 

The military influence has also increased 
with the rise of the SSC. All military and security matters 
are concerns of the SSC, and the SADF is involved in all 
decisions on these matters through the SSC. Further, the 



81 



secretary of the SSC, Lieutenant General van Deventer, is a 

military man, and the staff of the secretariat draws heavily 

148 
on the SADF for 70% of its personnel. In addition, van 

Deventer also serves as the secretary to the cabinet and 

as such has much influence over what issues are dealt with 

by which cabinet committees. Finally, SADF representatives 

sit on all fifteen interdepartmental committees of the SSC. 

No other ministry can claim inclusion on more than four of 

149 
these committees. 

(2) Economic Issues . The relation between 

defense, government, and industry has already been discussed, 

and the fact that the Total National Strategy requires a 

healthy economy and infusions of private money to succeed 

domestically already recognized. However, there are other 

security issues which have an economic impact. 

First, great effort and resources have been 
expended to make South Africa self-sufficient in areas which 
are deemed of strategic importance. This includes the South 
African nuclear program, the oil-f rom-coal program and the 
efforts of the defense industry. These programs have often 
had negative economic impacts, as economy and sophistication 
are sacrificed for local content in the name of self-reliance 
and national security. 

Secondly, and even more important to the 
discussion of the militarization of society, is the cooptation 
of many industries through government security planning, 



82 



including legislation such as the National Key Points Act 
of 19 80, the Atomic Energy Act, the National Supplies Pro- 
curement Act, and the Petroleum Products Amendment Act. 
These acts involve private industry, including subsidiaries 
of foreign transnational firms, in secrecy about their 
operations. They also provide for the militarization of 
employees through the establishment of "industrial commandos" 

4-V, ' 4- 4. ' 151 

for their protection. 

(3) Social Issues . The permeation of military 
influence through ARMSCOR and the armament industry, and 
through the involvement of industry in security matters has 
already been noted. However, there are other, more profound 
ways in which the military influences South African society. 

First, as more demands for manpower are 
made upon white society by the SADF, more men and women 
are exposed to military training of some kind. In addition, 
the demands of the Defense Force on society are growing, 
as the amount of time spent in uniform by the average white 
male increases. In 19 73, this average white male could expect 
to spend 9 to 12 months on active duty and then another 7 8 
days on three call-ups during a nine-year reserve commit- 
ment. In 19 83, the average time spent in uniform for the 
same person had increased to two years on active duty, 
followed by a reserve commitment of alternate 30 and 90 
day callups for twelve years, for a total of 720 days in 
service (see Table 6) . 



83 



TABLE 6 
SADF Service Requirements 

1973 1974 1978 1983 

Initial National Service 

Requirements (Months) 9-12* 12 24 24 

Active Reserve Duty 

Period (Years) 9* 5 8 12 

Number of Callups 3* 5 8 12** 

Standard Callup Period 

(Days) 26* 19 30 60 

Total Active Reserve 

Duty (Days) 78 95 240 720 

Controlled Reserve 

Duty Period (Years) 4 



* 

Figures are for those National Servicemen who joined the Citizen's 

Force. Those who joined the Commandos were obligated to spend 30-90 
days on active duty for the first year and then 19 days a year for 
the next 15 years for a total of 285 days. 



** 



Upon completion of 12 years in reserve, National Servicemen are 
then transferred to the Commandos where they are eligible to be 
called up for 12 days a year to age 55. 



Second, the need for manpower has led to 
the utilization of men of other races and of white women in 
the Defense Force on a voluntary basis. Further, it can be 
expected that now that coloureds and Asians have been in- 
cluded in the government and given a limited franchise, 
pressure to include them in mandatory conscription schemes 
will increase. Both Asians and coloureds have maintained 

they will not serve in the SADF on other than a voluntary 

152 
basis until blacks are included in the government. 

84 



Finally, military influence even reaches 
into the country's educational system. In 1977, the number 
of "school cadets" receiving military training at school 
was doubled to 300,000, and a year later the decision was 

made to conduct cadet training on school holidays and to 

153 
make attendance obligatory at cadet "adventure camps." 

In October 19 82, it was announced that the Defense Force 

would establish military units at colleges of education and 

154 
technicons . 

As the above discussion illustrates, the 
military influence and military service follows the white 
male South African from his early school years right up to 
retirement, and his obligation to the military system has 
grown significantly in the past ten years, 
c. The Nature of Society 

Frankel has argued that the Total National 
Strategy is bringing about fundamental changes in the make- 
up of South African society. Including some areas already 
discussed, these changes are: 

1. Reforming the elite coalition through the inclusion of 
coloureds and Asians and through the strengthening 

of the government-military-business alliance. 

2. A "new deal" for urban blacks in an attempt to create 
a black middle class interested in maintaining the 
system as it exists. 

3. The rise in non-partisan civilian and military 
specialists to positions of political decision 



85 



making, weakening the traditional power of the 
National Party. 
2 . Regional Effects 

The main regional thrust of the Total National 
Strategy was centered in points eight and nine of the 
twelve-point plan. Point eight calls for a constellation 
of southern African states "with respect for each other's 
cultures, traditions, and ideals...," while point nine 
addresses "South Africa's firm determination to defend 
itself against interference in every possible way." 

The constellation concept predated the Twelve Point 
Plan by some time. P. W. Botha made it a major foreign 
policy initiative upon succeeding Vorster in 1978. The 
basis of the concept and objectives of the constellation 

as it was developed were based on a set of critical assump- 

157 
tions : 

1. A constellation would offer the opportunity to find 
regional solutions to regional problems. 

2. The "moderate" countries of southern Africa all face 
a common Marxist threat and cannot rely on the West 
for support. 

3. The Marxist threat would lead to military cooperation. 

4. Mutual interest in trade, agriculture, health, trans- 
portation, and so forth would act to bring southern 
African nations together. This cooperation in turn 
would yield positive political results for South Africa 



86 



5. The constellation would include South Africa's 
neighbors and the newly independent homelands. 

6. The constellation would be based on the political 
realities of South African society. In other words, 
international cooperation among states would not in- 
volve South Africa's internal commitment to apartheid. 

Through the constellation initiative, Botha hoped 
to rely on economic forces and mutual security needs to 
pull southern Africa together. This cooperation would, in 
turn, lead to positive political gains in the international 
arena for South Africa. This was a strategy which can be 
traced back to the time of Verwoerd, when South Africa 

canvassed Africa for technical cooperation and a live and 

15 8 
let live attitude from others, and has so far met with 

just as little success in its current form. No black state 

is likely to associate with the non-recognized homelands, 

or compromise itself with regards to the OAU ' s stand against 

separate development. When nine countries of southern 

Africa formed the Southern African Development Coordination 

Council (SADCC) to promote independence, it appeared that 

the constellation concept had failed. As Dr. Geldenhuys 

recently stated, the Republic "has not succeeded in creating 

159 
exactly the kind of regional environment it desired. " 

In light of the failure to gain regional support for 

the southern African constellation in a form resembling the 

original concept, the other regional impact of the Total 



87 



National Strategy to be considered is the military impact. 
The military aspect of the Total National Strategy has had 
the greatest effect on South Africa's neighbors. South 
Africa's proclivity to intervene in the affairs of other 
countries in the interest of its own national security pre- 
dates the Total National Strategy. Yet the growing strength 
of the SADF, the growing influence of the military in South 
African government decision making, the centralization of 
power under Botha, and the failure of the constellation 
initiative are all events which have coincided with a growing 
use of South African military might in support of political 
objectives. As Dr. Geldenhuys states, "the grandiose scheme 

for a regional constellation of states has given way to an 

j- '^u ■*. ..160 

overriding concern with security. 

3 . International Effects of the Total National Strategy 

In defining the Total National Strategy, P. W. Botha 

pointed out that there are five strategic options open to 

l fi 1 
South African interests: 

1. Alignment with the West, which has been the option 
traditionally selected by South Africa. 

2. Qualified neutrality. 

3. Alignment with the East. 

4. Alliance with middle-ranked powers with similar 
political philosophies (the so-called "pariah" option). 

5. Concentration on regional relations. 

From the thrust of the Twelve-Point Plan, it seems 
that South Africa considers these five options as not 

88 



mutually exclusive. In his analysis of the Total National 
Strategy, Geldenhuys points out that in fact only the 
first option has been totally rejected, although it seems 
unlikely that little of value could come of the third. 

Point ten of the Twelve-Point Plan calls for, "a 

policy of neutrality in the conflict between the superpowers, 

1 c 2 
with priority given to South African interests." Yet, 

South African movement away from the West predates the Total 
National Strategy. Suggestions that the Republic assume 
a more neutral stance between East and West were very much a 
product of the mid-19 70' s. South African disenchantment 
with the West grew as Western criticism of South Africa's 
domestic policies increased. In 1977, this pressure cul- 
minated in the UN mandatory arms embargo. Prior to the arms 
embargo, however, P. W. Botha had already raised the possi- 
bility of a more neutral stance for South Africa. After the 
arms embargo was enacted, South Africa informed the West 
that responsibility for the protection of the Cape sea route 
would no longer be South Africa's. Significantly, it was 

once again P. W. Botha who made the announcement, saying, 

if.') 
"no arms, no service." Therefore, it is not unexpected 

that the neutral option was given new prominence when Botha 

became Prime Minister. There is also an apparent relationship 

between the neutral option and the constellation, as South 

Africa attempts to focus on regional issues. In March 19 79, 

Foreign Minister R. F. Botha stated "our sole commitment ought 



89 



to be towards the security and advancement of our own 

southern African region. Southern Africa could steer a new 

164 
course of its own midway between East and West." 

While talk of the increased emphasis on neutrality 
and regional considerations has increased, the effect of the 
invocation of this theme in the international forum has been 
slight. As Geldenhuys points out in his analysis, most non- 
aligned states enjoy a measure of acceptance from both East 
and West. South African non-alignment would be a new varia- 
tion on the non-alignment theme: "based not on its accepta- 
bility. . .but instead on its unacceptability . " 

The fourth strategic option, alliance with other 
middle ranked powers, has some international benefits for 
South Africa. Between 19 76 and 19 80, South Africa exchanged 
visits with both Israel and Taiwan, and signed a variety 
of. agreements for cooperation with these nations. While 
the possibility or usefulness of mutual defense arrangements 
between these countries appears slim, South Africa has gained 
useful economic, technical and military benefits from these 
relationships . 

Another facet of the fourth option does not involve 
the other so-called "pariah" states, but is the culmination 
of what has been a major strand in South African strategic 
thought dating back to the 19 50's: the idea of a treaty 
organization covering the southern Atlantic Ocean. As dis- 
cussed earlier, it was this concept which involved South 



90 



Africa in the Simonstown Agreement in 1955, and which led to 
the first purchases of modern warships for the South African 
Navy. Since then, South Africa has continued to work to 
make itself an attractive defense partner, stressing the 
importance of the Cape sea route, and building naval facili- 
ties far in excess of its own needs in hope of attracting 
an alliance with a Western nation. 

Failure to attract a Western partner probably caused 
South Africa to look elsewhere for security arrangements. 
It has been reported that in the early 19 70 's South Africa 

entered into a secret pact with Israel, Taiwan, Argentina, 

1 ft fi 
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Whether or not this 

arrangement ever existed, the talk of it is significant in 

that it indicates that South Africa is moving away from the 

West in its search for security. 

In addition, as South African power and confidence 

in its expanding military might grew, the Republic began to 

look more towards itself for not only self-protection, but 

for regional protection. In a radio commentary entitled, "A 

"I (-> 7 

Monroe Doctrine for Southern Africa," parallels were drawn 
between the role of the United States in the Americans and 
South Africa in southern Africa. "As the most advanced and 
powerful state in the region, South Africa as a special 
responsibility towards it, as the United States has long had 
towards its own continent." 

In summary, then, it is apparent that through the 
Total National Strategy, P. W. Botha has brought together 

91 



several strands of South African strategic thought. These 
are a movement away from the West, the quest for alliances 
among other middle power nations, and an expanding military 
role for South Africa in the southern African region. 
Internationally, the effect is probably seen as a very limited 
increase in diplomatic flexibility for South Africa through 
ties to other countries, and a further decrease in Western 
influence as South Africa downplays (but not eliminates) 
attempts to gain a western alliance and becomes militarily 
more powerful and regionally more dominant. Most importantly 
for Western interests, this redefinition of South African 
strategy indicates a growing divergence between Western and 
South African interests in southern Africa. 



92 



Ill . SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE POLICY 

A. THE THREAT 

1 . Background 

South Africa's perception of the threat has developed 
in a logical progression from 1960. As discussed in Chap- 
ter I, the early 1960 's were seen as the "Years of Crisis," 
and the specific threats were seen to derive mainly from 
two sources: internal unrest, or externally supported 
terrorism and guerrilla activity. Initial fears of an 
external conventional military threat from black states 
diminished as the strength of the SADF grew. Consequently, 
prior to the Portuguese withdrawal, the organization and 
training of the landward defense forces were aimed primarily 
at counterinsurgency operations. 

Once these initial threat assessments had formed, 
there was little apparent change in South African thought 
until the 19 73 White Paper on Defense, which introduced the 
"Total Strategy" defensive doctrine. The initial develop- 
ment of this strategy was done by P . W. Botha during his 
tenure as Minister of Defense, and refined considerably by 
him when he became Prime Minister. In spite of the new 
widened perspectives put forward by the "Total Strategy," 
however, the major threat during the period 19 73-19 75 was 
still seen to be guerrilla activity in Namibia and Rhodesia, 



93 



and SADF training and organization continued to reflect the 

1 C O 

major role assigned to unconventional warfare methods. 

As in many other areas of South African history, 
19 75 proved to be a watershed year for defense policy. The 
independence of Angola and Mozambique put radical, black, 
leftist governments associated with the Soviet Union not 
only in southern Africa, but directly on South Africa's 
borders. At the same time, Britain abrogated the Simonstown 
agreement, which had for years been the Republic's only 
defense relationship with the West. While SADF training 
during this turbulent time continued to emphasize counter- 
insurgency tactics, preoccupation with a perceived Soivet 
threat began to become apparent in South African defense 
writings, and preparations were begun to meet a more conven- 
tionally oriented outside threat. The Army was reorganized 
under separate conventional and counterinsurgency commands 
as* a new strand of thought on conventional warfare was 
developed. 

Since 19 75, it has been apparent that South African 
strategic thought envisions a two-fold threat. The 19 82 
Defense White Paper discusses the threat in broad terms of 
the Marxist-Leninist onslaught against Africa, but specifically 
assigns both conventional and counterinsurgency roles to the 
combat branches of the SADF. 

2 . The Conventional Threat 

In June 19 79, then Chief of the South African Defense 
Force, General Magnus Malan, stated that "the possibility of 

94 



a conventional military threat to South Africa in the not 

170 
too distant future cannot be ruled out." However, a 

review of the forces which could be involved in a confron- 
tation between South Africa and any one or combination of the 
Front-line States show that with regard to equipment alone, 
South Africa is at least equal to, and in many areas, 
superior to all potential regional adversaries (see Table 7) . 



171 
TABLE 7 

The Military Balance in Southern Africa 

South 
Angola Botswana Zambia Mozambique Zimbabwe Total Africa 

Total Armed 

Forces 37,500* 3000 14,300 12,650 41,300 108,750 82,400** 

Tanks 375 34 195+ 28 632+*** 250 



Scout Cars 


200 


Some 


130 


35 


43 


408 


1400 


APC/MICV 


150 


30 


13 


200 


20 


413 


1700 


Artillery 
(over 76mm) 


200 





128 


250 


34 


612 


230 


Missile Armed 
Naval Vessels 


2 














2 


11 


Submarines 




















3 


Combat 
Aircraft 


67@ 


5 


51 


35 


30 


188@@ 


313 


Helicopters 


51 





21 





36 


108 


167 



*Some 25,000 Cubans and 450 East Germans operate aircraft/heavy equipment. 
There are also Portuguese and 700 Soviet advisors. 
**Potential for over 404,000 upon total mobilization. 
***Includes some 385 T-34s of questionable value. 
@Equipment totals and serviceability uncertain. 
@@60 are MIG-17s of questionable value. 



95 



In addition to material considerations, a brief review of 
many other areas related to the armed forces of these nations, 
including sources of recruitment, military traditions and 

backgrounds, defense infrastructure, and reserve organi- 

172 
zations would also indicate the superiority of the SADF . 

Another consideration in addition to the threat 
posed solely by South Africa's neighbors is the perceived 
conventional threat of the Soviet Union and its proxies. 
South Africa has within the past several years expanded its 
concept of the conventional threat to include the possi- 
bility of an attack by Soviet, Cuban, or Eastern European 
troops staging through neighboring countries and utilizing 
prepositioned military equipment. In February 19 81, General 
Malan, now Minister of Defense, stated, "there is an unpre- 
cedented buildup of conventional heavy armaments in Southern 
Africa and should these be manned and used by Communist proxy 

forces, it could very rapidly lead to a conventional on- 

173 
slaught against South Africa." Further, in 19 82, General 

Malan said, "The presence of sophisticated weaponry of 

Russian origin in South Africa's neighboring states indicates 

that South Africa and Southwest Africa/Namibia could become 

174 
targets of a conventional onslaught." 

Finally, the possibility of a conventional attack 

is seen in conjunction with other pressures. This type of 

conventional threat could come in the form of conventional 

force raids conducted in coordination with terrorist tactics, 

and might include maritime actions. 



96 



These themes have been discussed from 19 79 on, and 
have received even more attention since 19 81. Yet while 
planning to meet the threat of a conventional attack is 
apparent in the composition and training of the current 
SADF, it is also apparent that the possibility of a conven- 
tional attack has been used, in part, to justify rising 
defense expenditures, new security legislation, and in sup- 
port of a new conscription law. It was in support of this 
law, which was introduced in 19 82, that General Kalan 
stated "the possibility of a conventional attack against 

South Africa is the main reason for the country's new 

..175 
national service system... 

This use of the threat of conventional attack makes 

sense when viewed within the framework of justifying the 

implementation of various facets of the Total National 

Strategy, and in part explains the difference between South 

African statements and the real military potentials of the 

Republic's neighbors. What is probably a more accurate 

description of South African defense planners estimates of 

the conventional threat faced by South Africa was put 

forward by General C. L. Viljoen, Chief of the SADF, in 19 83 

In examining the conventional threat, he concluded that 

In light... of factors such as poor economic conditions, 
internal instability, relatively deficient physical 
infrastructures, the inability to properly maintain 
or to replace advanced military equipment and discord 
arising from old regional conflicts, the African 
countries (individually and collectively) pose no 
real offensive military threat to the RSA.1^6 



97 



According to General Vilojen, the real threat of 
conventional weapons in South Africa's neighbors is in the 
possibility of these weapons being provided to "terrorist" 
organizations, and in the use of these weapons by host coun- 
tries in defending "terrorist" bases and headquarters against 
South African pre-emption and reprisals. The real threat 
of conventional conflict in southern Africa is the threat 
of South African reaction against "terrorist" operations with 

conventional arms, or in the case of a "drastic escalation 

177 
of the East-West conflict..." 

3 . The Terrorist Threat 

Many observers of South African affairs see two 

other types of threat to the Republic in addition to the 

17 8 
conventional threat. The first of these is the threat 

presented by internally and externally supported guerrilla 
movements, such as UMKONTO WE SIZWE. The second is the 
threat of internal unrest in response to the repression of 
apartheid, such as occurred during the 19 76 Soweto distur- 
bances. However, it is clear that South African defense 
planners do not make a differentiation between these two 
types of threat. This tendency to group all non-conventional 
threats under the general classification of a "terrorist" 
threat can be seen in the statements of South African 
government officials. For example, in 19 81, the Chief of 
the Army, Lieutenant General J. J. Geldenjuys, defined two 
types of modern warfare, "insurgency or terrorist warfare, 



98 



179 
and conventional warfare." Further, the missions assigned 

to the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the 19 82 White Paper on 
Defense were divided between conventional and counterinsur- 
gency (see Appendix B for a discussion of these missions) . 
Two points should be made about the South African definition 
of the threat. First, the terms terrorism, insurgency, 
insurrection, and guerrilla warfare are all used inter- 
changeably by South African government officials. Secondly, 
missions assigned to the armed forces also make no distinction 
between meeting externally supported and mounted threats 
and assisting the SAP in the enforcement of internal 
security regulations. It is all assigned as counterinsur- 
gency duties . 

The tendency in South Africa not to differentiate 
between the external non-conventional threat and internal 
unrest, and instead to lump all forms of unconventional 
threat under the heading "terrorism" is significant for two 
reasons. First, this view allows, within the framework of 
the Total Onslaught/Total National Strategy, a logical con- 
nection between the communist threat, "terrorist" organiza- 
tions, and internal unrest in South Africa. Once this 
connection is made, it is possible to see internal unrest, 
such as boycotts and the actions of labor unions, as occurring 
not as a result of South Africa's internal apartheid policies, 
but as a result of external interference from black Africa 
and the Soviet Union. In 1981, Prime Minister Botha stated, 



99 



"...that within South Africa, Russia was providing the finan- 
cial support for revolutionary organizations such as the 

banned ANC and, in addition some neighbor states were allow- 

180 
ing terrorist bases on their territory." 

Second, this view of the terrorist threat as one 
inspired by external interference as opposed to internal 
policies has implications for South Africa's neighbors. 
Ever since the initial involvement in Angola, South Africa 
has justified crossborder operations as a reaction to dis- 
turbances within South Africa. "It is the clear and repeatedly 
stated policy of the South African government that it will 
take whatever measures are necessary to counter political 

violence. That policy includes striking at terrorists in 

181 
their bases wherever they may be." 

As long as internal unrest can be linked by South 
Africa to intervention by its neighbors in the Republic's 
internal affairs, justification can be made by South Africa 
for a wide range of responses in self-defense. These 
responses include escalation of violence from hot pursuit 
operations, through pre-emptive strikes, up to actual occu- 
pation of territory and the destabilization of neighboring 
governments . 

B. CONSTRAINTS 

South African strategic thinking is influenced by a 
number of important constraints. These constraints act to 
limit the range of actions open to South Africa in responding 



100 



to perceived threats. These constraints include those 
imposed by population, border vulnerability, international 
opposition, resource vulnerability, economic constraints, and 
by the perceptions of South African government officials 
themselves . 

1. Population 

South Africa is one of the most heavily populated 
nations in Africa, with a population of over 28 million 
reported in 19 80. However, as Table 8 shows, the majority 
of this population is black. In addition, black population 
as a percentage of total population is increasing. The 
fact that whites make up less than 20% of the country's 
population has serious consequences when considered together 
with the National Party's apartheid policies. 



TABLE 8 



182 



Population by Racial Composition 
19 70 and 19 80 





19 70 




Race 


Population 


% of Total 


Black 


15,339,975 


70.4 


White 


3,773,282 


17.3 


Coloured 


2,050,699 


9.4 


Asian 


630,372 


2.9 


Total 


21,794,328 


100.0 



1980 

Population % of Total 

20,609,000* 72.5 

4,453,273 15.7 

2,554,039 9.0 

794,693 2.8 

28,410,951 100.0 



Includes Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda. 



101 



18 3 

a. The Civilian Workforce and Apartheid 

Upon coming to power in 1948, the National Party 
institutionalized policies which were based on the view that 
black workers had no place in the white area beyond certain 
work levels. As a result, only limited training facilities 
were made available for blacks. As the South African 
economy expanded in the 19 70's, the supply of white skilled 
workers dried up, and the resulting shortage of skilled 
workers led to the beginning of the abolishment of job reser- 
vations for whites. However, despite increasing acceptance 
of blacks in the skilled workforce and a depressed economy, 
by 19 80, it was estimated that professional and semi- 
professional work sectors were short on the order of 5.6%, 
with the biggest deficiencies in middle management, artisan, 
and other specialist vocations. 

b. Military Manpower 

By the beginning of the 19 80's, it was estimated 
that South Africa had a potential military manpower pool of 
more than 5 million men of all races of military age. How- 
ever, the Defense Act of 1957 limited mandatory military 
service to whites, reducing this pool to about 1.2 million 
men aged sixteen to sixty-five, of which 750,000 were of the 
prime military ages eighteen to thirty-five. As the SADF 
was built up to provide for both a larger conventional 
force and to meet the demands of the long term war in Namibia, 
South Africa's white manpower resources were strained almost 



102 



to the limit. The 19 77 Defense White Paper placed primary 
emphasis on manpower problems and on drawbacks in the man- 
power system. In 19 79, some Citizens Force reservists 
returning from active duty were ordered to report for an 
additional tour due to an insufficient supply of new recruits. 

In addition to an inadequate number of draftees, 
other manpower shortages have affected the SADF. The Per- 
manent Force has continually fallen short of its authorized 
strength. In 19 80, with 20,000 regulars in uniform, Permanent 
Force strength was only 80% of its authorized level, with 
the most acute shortages in the ranks of junior officers and 
experienced NCO ' s . Continued shortages caused plans for the 
formation of a Permanent Force brigade to act as a standing 
force, scheduled for 19 80, to be postponed. 

The military and the economy in South Africa also 
interact in two ways involving manpower. First, the SADF 
suffers from the same skills shortages which affect the 
private sector. The Defense Force must compete with business 
and industry for scarce, technically trained personnel. In 
1981, then Chief of the Air Force Lieutenant General A. M. 
Mueller noted that the skills shortage in the armed forces 
was affecting the ability of the services to conduct even 
routine equipment maintenance. General Mueller pointed out 

that much maintenance must be conducted by the private sector, 

18 7 
resulting in a further loss of skill by military technicians. 

In addition, much of the skills shortage in the military, 



103 



especially among pilots and aircrews, were due to the 
ability of trained personnel to earn more in business than 
in the SADF. 

Second, serving National Servicemen were being 
forced to do longer duty in operational areas in order to 

limit the disruptive effects on the economy of mobilizing 

188 
Commando and Citizen's Force units. In 19 78, a SADF 

spokesman said, "We are doing everything in our power to 

cause as little disruption to the economy as possible. To 

call up a member of the Commandos or the Citizens Force who 

is already economically active will obviously cause far 

greater disruption than by using men who are as yet not 

189 
actively engaged in the country's economy." 

2 . Border Vulnerability 

Today South Africa's borders are less secure than 

at any time in the country's history. These borders cover 

over two thousand miles from Atlantic to Indian Oceans, 

and are shared with countries which have exhibited hostility 

toward South Africa. The Portuguese withdrawal put a black 

Marxist government directly on the Republic's borders when 

Mozambique gained independence in 19 75, and the election of 

Mugabe in Zimbabwe in 19 80 added another. Only in the west, 

where South Africa borders Namibia, can the country said to 

be bordered by a "friendly" neighbor, and even this could 

change rapidly as a result of ongoing negotiations over the 

fate of Namibia. 



104 



In reality, however, South Africa is not extremely- 
vulnerable over the entire length of its borders. In the 
event of Namibian independence under a hostile SWAPO-dominated 
government, South Africa's border with Namibia would be 
protected in part by the natural barrier of the Orange River. 
In addition, the sparsely inhabited desert and steppe 

topography of this area would pose a serious obstacle to 

19 1 
off- road penetration by any sizable guerrilla force. 

In the east, the Mozambique -South African border near the 

coast is swampy and undeveloped, posing similar problems to 

guerrilla penetration, and making Swaziland a preferred 

192 
passage for guerrillas from Mozambique. 

More dangerous are the Republic's borders with Zim- 
babwe and Botswana. While the border with Zimbabwe is pro- 
tected for 125 miles by a thirteen foot high double fence 
topped with barbed wire on the South African side, the 
frontier with Botswana is easily crossed, especially in the 

winter months of June to September, when the Limpopo River 

193 
is fordable at many points. Any enemy force entering 

through Botswana would have easy access to - South Africa's 

industrial heartland. 

The vulnerability of Souty Africa's border with 

Botswana and Zimbabwe is of concern to South Africa for 

two other reasons. The first is the dwindling number of 

white settlers in this area. It has been feared that the 

departure of whites from this border would lead to the 



105 



opening of the much-feared "second front," as ANC guerrillas 

would be able to move from one black farm to another towards 

19 4 
the country's northern urban industrial areas. To counter 

this movement of whites, the government proposed a law re- 

19 5 
quiring at least one white person live on each border farm. 

Further, it has been proposed that a chain of fortified 

farms, settled by ex-servicemen, be established as defensive 

strongholds along these borders. To these ends, interest 

free loans have been offered to men with military experience 

to take up farming in key areas, and existing farmers given 

credits for occupying their property and managing it in 

19 6 
accordance with Defense Force guidelines. 

The second concern is that presented by the "inde- 
pendent" homelands. As parts of South Africa near the borders 
are given over to the homelands, tough problems of border 
defense are raised. The homelands occupy strategic terri- 
tory on the borders of South Africa, forming a semi-circle 
around the industrial and mining heart of the Republic. In 

addition, they are populated by ethnic groups that flow into 

197 
neighboring states. 

3 . International Opposition 

As can be seen from previous discussions, South 
Africa's apartheid policies cause constraints to be placed 
on its foreign policies through the linkage between internal 
policies and external relations. Attempts to separate inter- 
nal policies from foreign affairs, while a major focus of 
South Africa, have met with little success. The Outward 



106 



Movement, Detente, and the Constellation schemes made few 
international gains. In fact, South Africa's international 

options narrowed during the periods these plans were being 

19 8 

implemented. 

Internal opposition to internal policies have had 
effects on South Africa in ways almost too numerous to 
count. These include sports, commercial relationships, 
diplomatic relations, and international recognition, to 
name but a few. However, several areas can be singled out 
for further discussion due to their impacts on South African 
defense planning. 

a. Lack of Defensive Alliances 

A strand which has run through South African 
foreign policy since 1948 has been the attempt to obtain 
a Western commitment to the defense of South Africa. In 
the 1950 's it was support for MEDO, participation in the 
Nairobi and Dakar conferences with the colonial powers, 
and the execution of the Simonstown agreement with Britain. 
Since then, South Africa has continued to work toward ob- 
taining a NATO commitment or the organization of a NATO 
style alliance in the South Atlantic. In doing so, South 
Africa is quick to point out its key position on the Cape 
sea route and its economic importance to the West. Naval 
facilities in the Republic have been expanded far in excess 

of domestic requirements and new command and control networks 

19 9 
utilizing NATO-compatible equipment have been built. 



10 7 



South Africa's Angolan intervention was a turning 
point in defense planning with regard to alliances. In 
spite of the fact that the efforts of the 1950' s and 1960's 
did not result in any formal alliance with the West, until 
this time South African planning assumed the West would 
still provide aid if the Cape sea route were threatened. 
However, the lack of Western support in 19 75 brought this 
assumption under question, and South Africa began to look 
elsewhere for security arrangements. On one hand, the 
growing military strength of the Republic caused it to become 
more self-reliant and less in need of Western assurances. 
Discussion turned towards the so-called "neutral" or regional 
options of South Africa. On the other hand, options with 
regard to security arrangements with South American nations, 
such as Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay were discussed. 

And yet, in spite of the fact that South Africa 
seems to be charting a more independent course in defense 
affairs, it appears the SADF would still desire a Western 
defense commitment, if the price were not too high. As late 
as May 19 82, as the Falklands War brought new attention to 
the South Atlantic, the head of the SADF, General Viljoen, 
called for a revision of Western naval policy towards South 
Africa, offering to resume the protection of the Cape sea 

route which South Africa had renounced in 19 78 in response 

201 
to the 19 77 UN arms embargo. 



108 



b. The United Nations Arms Embargo, 19 7 7 

By the time the UN's mandatory arms embargo was 
enacted in November 1977, South Africa had had a program to 
develop arms self-sufficiency for nearly 15 years. The 
South African response to the embargo was that it had a 
strong enough arms industry to surmount its effects. Minis- 
ter of Defense P. W. Botha stated at the time, "We are self- 
sufficient enough, without great effort, to fight any non- 
conventional war against us, and with special effort, we 

can sustain anything of a conventional nature they can throw 

• - „202 
against us . 

In spite of this bravado, it is apparent that 
the embargo placed some limitations on South Africa. First, 
arms-related equipment and especially spare parts for equip- 
ment already in hand had now to be acquired through the 
black market, leading to higher costs and unreliable sources 
of supply. Second, the embargo denied to South Africa a 
narrow type of military equipment which it could not build 
for itself, but still desired to have. This included heli- 
copters, long-range maritime patrol aircraft, large naval 
vessels and submarines, modern artillery, and some types of 
rockets and missiles. With regard to these types of equip- 
ment, South Africa was faced with the choice of doing without 
or of going to the expense of trying to develop variations 
of their own. 

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the arms 
embargo made the replacement of military equipment nearing 

109 



the end of useful life difficult at best. In retiring old 
Shackleton maritime patrol aircraft, South Africa was 
forced to modify some of a limited number of C-130 trans- 
ports to fill the maritime patrol function due to the 
lack of a suitable replacement aircraft. As other equipment 
gets older, this problem will become more important to the 
SADF. 

c. Resource Vulnerabilities 

South Africa has always been quick to point out 
its importance to the Western world due to the great mineral 
wealth it possesses. However, there are two important re- 
sources which the Republic is lacking in: water and oil. 
Supplies of these two items either have been or could be 
subject to outside interference. 

(1) Water. Water is needed in South Africa 
for irrigation, mineral exploitation, and the generation 
of hydroelectric power. Due to the fact that the region 
experiences frequent drought and possesses negligible sur- 
face water, large portions of South Africa are unsuitable 
for irrigation. This lack of surface water also affects 
trade patterns, as there are no navigable rivers in the 
Republic . 

To make up for these shortcomings in water 
resources, South Africa has invested heavily in two major 
hydroelectric programs in what was at the time Portuguese 
territory. The Cunene River project, located in Angola 



110 



nine miles north of the Namibian frontier, and the Cahora 
Bassa project deep in Mozambique on the Zambeze River both 
serve South Africa today. As South Africa becomes more 
dependent on these projects for power, it becomes more 
vulnerable to threats against them. 

However, South African dependence on power 
from these sources outside its borders also has implications 
for Angola and Mozambique. In the case of the Cunene River 
project, concern over the security of this project led to 
the initial South African presence in southern Angola in 
19 75 on the grounds of protecting its investment there. 
In the case of Mozambique, South Africa, Mozambique, and 
Portugal have recently signed the Cahora Bassa agreement 
whereby electricity will be supplied to South Africa by 
Mozambique. At the signing ceremony, P. W. Botha pointed 

out that the Cahora Bassa agreement was made possible by the 

204 
Nkomati agreement signed six weeks earlier. When it is 

considered that the Nkomati agreement was made possible in 

part by South Africa's destabilization of Mozambique, it can 

be assumed that South Africa would consider further destabili- 

zations against Angola or Mozambique to protect Cunene or 

Cahora Bassa. 

205 
(2) Oil . The 1973 Arab oil embargo against 

South Africa had less effect on the Republic than did the 
Portuguese withdrawal. In fact, the oil embargo was re- 
sented by the black states of southern Africa, which relied 
on South Africa for refined petroleum products, and was 



111 



not implemented by Iran, which supplied 90% of South 
Africa's oil requirements. The cut in Iranian production 
in 19 79, followed by the overthrow of the Shah cut off 
supplies of Iranian oil to South Africa, but by 19 80, it 
appeared that all of South Africa's needs were being met 
thorugh the spot market at higher prices. In fact, produc- 
tion of petroleum products went up between 19 79 and 19 80, 
the last year energy related production figures were pub- 

9 A £ 

lished by South Africa. 

In spite of the small short-term impact of 
the loss of traditional oil supplies, the cutoff had the 
effect of revealing a vulnerable aspect of South Africa's 
economy. The more than 100 million barrels of oil imported 
annually are crucial to communications, transportation, and 
defense. In addition, the higher price of oil initially 
available on the spot market increased the price of economic 
growth, although this influence has probably been lessened 

by the fall in oil prices in the early 1980 's. 

207 
4 . Economic Constraints 

South Africa has a strong economy based mainly on 

a super-abundance of minerals. Despite a dependence on 

Western capital, technology, and markets, South Africa is 

the most developed economy on the African continent, and 

possesses the potential to become a leading middle economic 

power. Yet, since 1948, the government's apartheid policies 

have placed serious handicaps on the economy, and many of 



112 



the economic constraints under which the Republic labors are 
either directly or indirectly a result of these policies. 
In some cases, the effects of apartheid are obvious, and 
in others, not so. In addition, there are other economic 
constraints not related at all to separate development. 

The following is a survey of some of the more impor- 
tant economic constraints which affect the strategic policies 
of South Africa. 

a. Investor Confidence 

The relationship between the economy and the 
political environment is important in all countries, but it 
is especially so in South Africa. Potential investors, 
foreign and domestic, must evaluate the impact of the various 
internal racial, social, and political tensions and divi- 
sions, together with the military and political position of 
South Africa in southern Africa before even considering the 
economic viability of the potential investment. 

Moreover, the relationship between economic 
variables and the political environment in South Africa is 
seldom straightforward. When the economic and political 
environment are healthy, growth in the economy seems assured. 
Conversely, when both are not favorable, as during the 19 75- 
1978 time period, growth is inhibited. In periods where 
economic and political signals are mixed, such as after 
Sharpeville in 1960, and in the early 1980 's, economic growth 
has ensued, although the chance of risk was higher. 



113 



b. Balance of Payment Concerns 

Due to the limited size of its domestic markets, 
South Africa is dependent upon maintaining a flow of exports. 
The economy is vulnerable to reduced earnings and to shortages 
of foreign capital, in that the South African government 
has preferred to inhibit growth 'when faced with balance of 
payments difficulties rather than rely on loans through 
international money markets. Export growth is required for 
continued expansion of import consumption and investment 
expenditures . 

An important factor in South Africa's import- 
export equation is the international price of gold. One of 
the major factors responsible for the recession in South 
Africa in the latter 1970 's was the drop in gold prices. 
Gold fell from $161 an ounce in 1975 to less than $110 an 

ounce in 1976, costing South Africa at least $575 million 

20 8 
in annual revenues. Again, between 19 80 and 19 82, a 

drop in the international price of gold from $613 an ounce 

to $357 an ounce in part caused South Africa to experience 

a large trade deficit and high inflation due to balance of 

209 
payments difficulties, and ultimately led to a devaluation 

of the Rand and cutbacks in government spending. 

c. The Labor Force 

As an industrialized, populous country, South 
Africa's labor force should be an economic asset, and yet 
there are a number of constraints put on the Republic by 



114 



the combination of the composition of the work force and 
government policy. 

First, as discussed above under manpower con- 
siderations, there is the effect of the shortage of skilled 
workers both in the economy and in the SADF. In addition to 
the considerations already touched upon, it is also important 
to note that as the SADF and the economy continue to compete 
for skilled labor, and as more whites are involved for 

longer periods in the military, the economy becomes more 

210 
dependent on the black work force. 

Second, as the need for skilled workers grows, 
the government is forced to amend the apartheid system to 
allow the utilization of the black majority of the work 
force. In 19 79 the Wiehahn Commission recommended the 
abolition of the color bar and the training of black appren- 
tices in white urban areas. The political significance of 
these changes is two-fold. First, these changes have the 
effect of blurring apartheid in economic areas, altering 
relationships between workers, and potentially providing 
spillover in political areas. Second, as black workers' 
become skilled and gain more income, their expectations grow 
as they gain more economic leverage. 

Third, and related to the economic leverage 
being acquired by blacks, is the rise in black trade unions. 
The Wiehahm Commission conceded that all workers should have 
union representation, and the government has allowed the 



115 



provisional registration of black unions. While these 
unions are heavily regulated, the implications are clear 
and potentially disruptive. They include the use of black 
union power for political ends and the danger of backlash 
from white unions. 

Fourth is the economy's dependence on foreign 
African labor to work in gold mines where South African 
blacks are reluctant to go. In 19 76, foreign workers 
composed a full third of the black labor force. The govern- 
ment has tried with little success to reduce this dependence 
by encouraging South African laborers to take jobs normally 
held by foreigners. 

Finally, the inability to absorb the rising 
number of black workers into the work force has led to an 
estimated unemployed black population of between one and two 
million, or about 10-20% of the work force. It is estimated 
that South Africa would have to maintain a growth in GNP 
of 8% a year to fully utilize this mostly unskilled excess. 
This paradox of unemployment amid worker shortage does not 
in itself inhibit economic growth, but has great potential 
to be politically destabilizing. 

d. The Effect of Government on the Economy 

The recent trend in South Africa has been away 
from government interference in the economy. P. W. Botha, 
as part of the Twelve-Point Plan, committed South Africa 
to a free enterprise philosophy. Import controls were 



116 



dismantled, foreign exchange controls relaxed, rent controls 
abolished, and limited labor reforms undertaken. And yet 
there are still government actions which have had major nega- 
tive effects on the economy which must be noted. 

First, the economic costs of apartheid has acted 
as a major inhibitor of economic growth. The effect of the 
lack of training programs and educational opportunities for 
non-whites and the effects of these shortcomings on the 
labor force has already been discussed. In addition, the 
actual monetary cost of supporting apartheid must be con- 
sidered. The Rand cost of maintaining separate facilities 
for the races, enforcing security and influx control laws, 
and maintaining separate homelands which are not economically 
viable has never been fully calculated. However, one author 

estimated that in 19 77 the cost of operating the pass system 

212 
alone was 112,825,327 Rand a year. 

Second, the rising cost of defense has become 

an increasing drain on the economy. Even in 19 81-82, in what 

was described as a "moderately contractionary" budget, de- 

213 
fense spending rose 30% over the previous year. Govern- 
ment officials justify these continuing increases by pointing 
to the threats arrayed against the country. In 19 81, the 
SADF Chief of Staff for Finance, Lieutenant General W. J. 
Berg, stated, "It is important that certain matters in the 
budget must enjoy priority. Defense is one of these. The 
economy cannot be placed on a healthy basis if there is no 



117 



peace and tranquility in the country and its inhabitants feel 

214 
insecure." In addition, the South African government 

has been quick to point out that at 3.5% of the GNP , defense 

215 
spending is actually comparatively low. However, the 

important points to be made are not related to the size of 

South Africa's defense expenditures when compared to other 

nations, rather how rapidly that spending has risen, and 

how it continues to rise in the face of poor economic 

conditions. The 19 81 defense budget was 860% higher than 

216 
that of ten years before. 

A final area which must be considered is the cost 

of stockpiling strategic materials. While statistical data 

on South Africa's oil consumption are classified under the 

Petroleum Products Act, it was estimated in 19 83 that South 

Africa's strategic oil reserve equaled about three years 

consumption and represented the largest reserve of crude 

217 
oil relative to size of economy of any oil-importing nation. 

The cost of stockpiling, when added to the costs of other 
projects related to strategic materials, such as SASOL's 
coal-to-oil project, the continued search for domestic 
sources of oil, and the cost of the nuclear program, repre- 
sents another significant drain on the country's economic 
resources . 

5 . Perceptual Constraints 

As discussed by K. J. Holsti in his consideration of 

218 
the foreign policy output of nations, different policy 



118 



makers faced with the same choices under similar circum- 
stances will react differently. This is the result of the 
fact that many variables besides the immediate situation 
affect the images of the decision maker. These variables 
are the policy maker's beliefs, values, attitudes, and 
ideology, and they are important in providing the framework 
within which events are analyzed and decisions are made. 
With respect to South Africa, the framework for 
analysis and formation of policy is based upon the percep- 
tions and beliefs of white South Africans. The ideology 
which forms the basis for their perceptions is that of the 

volk as an ethnic group with its own distinct religion, 

219 
culture, and political sovereignty. 

It is the survival of the volk which has occupied 
Afrikaners for 150 years. The assumption of power by the 
National Party in 1948 did not allay the feelings of concern 
over the preservation of this identity. Instead, having a 
majority in Parliament meant that for the first time Afri- 
kaners would be able to control the government and ensure 
the survival of the volk. As internal and external pres- 
sures on South Africa have grown since 19 60, the focus of 
the South African response has remained the preservation of 
their identity. The debate between verligte (enlightened) 
and verkrampte (closed off) among Afrikaners is not a 
struggle between liberal and conservative, but a more narrow 
dispute over the means utilized to accomplish the same end. 



119 



Religious and legal principles form an important 
part of the Afrikaner world view. Maintenance of Christian 
values in the face of Western materialism and communist 
atheism is a real concern of the Dutch Reformed churches of 
South Africa, and a concern which is shared with many South 
African English-speaking churches. Regard for law and 
morality in international relations is included in Afrikaner 
University instruction. Non-interference in the internal 
affairs of other countries is an often-quoted legal princi- 
ple, reflecting South Africa's disinterest in the affairs 
of other nations and the desire of South Africa to detach 
its own domestic affairs from its dealings with other countries 

Another facet of the concern with law and religion 
is a preoccupation with the view that South Africa stands 
alone as an isolated outpost of Western Christian civiliza- 
tion against a growing onslaught against these values. The 
communists of the Soviet Union are responsible for this at- 
tack, but they are unintentionally supported by other forces 
which weaken the Western world, including liberalism, 
materialism, secularism, and socialism. South African 
leaders take seriously the idea that the ultimate goal of 
the Soviet Union is world domination, and also apparently 
view other communist states, such as the Peoples' Republic 
of China, as acting as Soviet agents. The 19 82 Defense 
White Paper defines the threat in these terms: 

The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union and its allies 
is to overthrow the present body politic in the RSA 
and replace it with a Marxist-oriented form of 

120 



government to further the objectives of the USSR, 
therefore all possible methods and means are used to 
attain this objective. This includes instigating 
social and labor unrest, civilian resistance, 
terrorist attacks against the infrastructure of the 
RSA and the intimidation of Black leaders and mem- 
bers of the Security Forces. This onslaught is 
supported by a world-wide propaganda campaign and 
the involvement of various front organizations, such 
as trade unions and even certain church organiza- 
tions and leaders. 220 

It can be seen in a number of instances that South 
African perceptions have led to faulty assumptions about 
the country's strategic situation. These assumptions, in 
turn, have led to defense policies which, in light of real 
world events, did not best meet South African needs. As 
already discussed, during the period 1948-1960, many of 
the key strategic assumptions upon which the country's 
foreign policies were based, turned out to be faulty. 
Further, it was probably South Africa's perception that the 
Republic could count on support from the United States and 
from moderate black countries which led to increasing in- 
volvement in the Angolan civil war, with results which were 

221 
plainly not in South Africa's best interests. 

C. ASSETS 

1 . The South African Defense Force 

a . The Army 

222 
(1) Organization . The strength of the 

standing army of South Africa in 19 83 was 6 7,400, including 

5,400 non-white regulars, 2,000 women, and 50,000 National 

Servicemen completing two years of required active duty. 



121 



This number is supplemented by reservists called up for 
periods of active duty of up to three months from an Active 
Citizens Force pool of at least 130,00 men. Reservists serve 
in the Citizens Force for 12 years, during which they spend 
720 days in uniform, and after which they may be allocated 
to the Commando Force, where they are liable to serve 12 
days a year to age 55. 

In the early 19 80 's, the Army was restruc- 
tured in order to counter all forms of insurgency while at 
the same time maintaining a creditable conventional force 
(see Table 9) . To meet these requirements, the Army is sub- 
divided into conventional and counterinsurgency forces. 
The counterinsurgency forces are further divided into nine 
territorial commands, each of which is responsible to the 
Chief of the Army. This force consists of members of the 
Permanent Force, Commandos, and a few selected Citizens 
Force units. 

The Citizens Force provides the organiza- 
tion for conventional defense. For the most part, the 
Citizens Force is organized conventionally as a corps made 
up of two divisions (see Table 9) , each with a number of 
brigades. Corps headquarters is at Pretoria and divisional/ 
brigade headquarters are staffed by Permanent Force per- 
sonnel in main population areas. These units provide the 

cadres around which full scale mobilization of the Citizens 

225 
Force can be accomplished. 



122 



TABLE 9 
Army Order of Battle 19 79 
Conventional Forces 



224 



7th Division (Johannesburg) 

71st Motorized Brigade (Capetown) 
Capetown Highlanders (Capetown) 
Capetown Rifles (Capetown) 
Western Provinces Regiment 

(Stellenbosch) 
72nd Motorized Brigade 
( Johanne sburg) 
Johannesburg Regiment 

( Johannesburg) 
1st Battalion Transvaal 

Scottish (Johannesburg) 
2nd Battalion Transvaal 

Scottish (Johannesburg) 
73rd Motorized Brigade 
Rand Light Infantry 

( Johanne sburg) 
Regiment Louw Werpner 

(Landbrand) 
Kimberley Regiment 

(Kimberley) 
Division Troops 

Light Horse Regiment (AC) 

(Johannesburg) 
Capetown Field Artillery 

(Capetown) 
14th Field Artillery 

( Potchef strcom) 
7th LAA Regiment 



8th Division 

81st Armored Brigade (Pretoria) 
Pretoria Highlanders (Pretoria) 
Pretoria Regiment (Pretoria) 
Regiment Boland (Pretoria) 
82nd Mechanized Brigade 
( Potchef s troom) 

Regiment de la Rey (Germiston) 
Regiment de Wet (Kroonstat) 
Witwatersrand Regiment 

(Germiston) 
84th Motorized Brigade 

1st Battalion Royal Durban 

Light Infantry (Durban) 
2nd Battalion Royal Durban 

Light Infantry (Durban) 
Prince Alfred's Guard (Port 

Elizabeth) 
Divisional Troops 

Umvoiti Mounted Rifles (AC) 

(Greytown) 
Transvaal Staats Artillery 

(Greytown) 
Transvaal Horse Artillery 

(Greytown) 



Counter ins urgency Forces 



Western Province Command (Capetown) : 
Cape Garrison Artillery (Capetown) 
101st Signals Squadron (Capetown) 
Cape Corps Service Battalion 

(Eerste River) 
6th BOD (Capetown) 
Command Workshops (Capetown) 
2nd Military Hospital (Wynberg) 
3rd Field Ambulance (Wynberg) 
11th STD (Wynberg) 
Cape Flats Commando (Wynberg) 
Worcester Commando (Wynberg) 
Stellenbosch Commando (Wynberg) 
10th AA Regiment (Youngsfield) 
4th Electronic Workshops 

(Youngsfield) 



Orange Free State Command 
(Bloemfontein) 
2nd Field Engineering Regiment 

(Bethlehem) 
17th Field Squadron (Bethlehem) 
35th Engineering Supplementary 

Unit (Kroonstat) 
Tank Squadron 1st Special 

Service Brigade (Bloemfontein) 
1st South African Infantry 

(Bloemfontein) 
1st Parachute Battalion 

(Bloemfontein) 
3rd Military Hospital 

( Bloemfontein) 



123 



TABLE 9 (CONTINUED) 



Eastern Province Command 
(Port Elizabeth) : 
6th South African Infantry 

( Grahamstown) 
84th Technical Service Corps 

(Grahamstown) 
11th Commando (Kimberley) 
East Cape Province Commando 

(Kimberley) 
Port Elizabeth Commando 

(Kimberley) 
Danie Theron Combat School 

(Kimberley) 

Natal Command (Durban) : 

5th South African Infantry 

(Ladysmith) 
15th Maintenance Unit 

(Durban) 
Tugela Commando (Durban) 
Umvoiti Commando (Durban) 



Parachute Commando (Kroonstat) 
School of Engineering (Kroonstat) 

West Transvaal Command ( - ) : 
2nd Signals Regiment 

(Voortrekkehoogte) 
5th B.O.D. (Pretoria) 
61st Brigade Workshop (Lyttleon) 
81st Brigade Workshop (Lyttleon) 
Pretoria Cos Commando ( - ) 
Horse and Dog Centre 

(Voortrekkehoogte) 
South African Military College 

( Voortrekkehoogte ) 
Technical Service Centre 

(Voortrekkehoogte) 
Services School (Voortrekkehoogte) 
SAMS Training Centre 

( Voortrekkehoogte ) 
School of Technical Training 

(Pretoria) 



Northern Transvaal Command ( 
Command Workshop ( - ) 
Frankfort Commando ( - ) 

North Western Command 
( Potchef s troom) 
3rd South African Infantry ( 
Command Workshop ( - ) 

Witwatersrand Command 
( Johanne sbur g) 

Johannesburg Noord Commando 
( Johannesburg) 

South West Africa (Windhoek) 



- ) 



124 



In addition to organic formations, the 
SADF has been involved in the establishment and training of 
territorial forces in Namibia and in the "independent" 
homelands. In Namibia, the Southwest Africa Territorial 
Force (SWATF) was established on 1 August 19 80 as a separate 
force under South African control. It consists of four area 
commands, North, Eastern, Central, and Southern, comprising 
26 area force units organized along the lines of South 
Africa's Commandos. Air elements consist of one Citizens 
Force squadron equipped with light aircraft. In addition, 
the North Area force consists of six regular SWATF light 
infantry battalions and one mounted unit, and there is a 
mobile reserve brigade of mixed regular and Citizens Force 
units . 

The first Homelands Defense Force created 
was that of Transkei. Upon "independence" the Transkei Defense 
Force (TDF) consisted of one battalion of 254 men, along with 
30 seconded SADF Permanent Force officers . Relations between 
the TDF and the SADF were close until Transkei broke diplo- 
matic relations with South Africa in 1978. Afterward, to 
counter a decline in the efficiency of the TDF after the 
departure of seconded SADF personnel, Transkei appointed 
Lieutenant Colonel Ron Reid-Daly, formerly commander of 
Rhodesia's Selous Scouts to rebuild the TDF. In 19 82, the 
TDF consisted of a Permanent Force brigade of two battalions. 
The SADF still provides assistance with supplies, logis- 
tics, intelligence, and coastal defense. 

125 



Bophuthatswana , as the second "independent" 
homeland also fielded an armed force upon independence. 
The Bophuthatswana National Guard consists of about 220 
men trained by the SADF. Relations between Bophuthatswana 
and South Africa remain close, and the first Bophuthatswana 
Minister of Defense was Hennie Riekert, a former Brigadier 
with the SADF. The BNG is effectively a unit of the SADF ' s 
Northwestern Command. 

Upon "independence" in September 1979, the 
Venda National Force combined the functions of army, police, 
traffic police, and detention services. This force is com- 
manded by a former South African policeman, Lieutenant 

Colonel T. R. Mudautzi. In 19 80, the VNF numbered about 
226 



450 men. 



(2) Army Equipment. 



227 



Tanks 
Armored Cars/ 

Armored Personnel 
Carriers 



Artillery 



200 OLIFANT (CENTURION) MBT 
140 ELAND Mk IV/VI (Panhard AML- 
60/90) Armored Cars 

1200 RATEL Armored Cars 
500 RHINO/HIPPO Armored Personnel 

Carriers 
2 80 SARACEN Armored Personnel 

Carriers 
230 FERRET Armored Cars (in reserve) 
50 M3A1/STAGHOUND Armored Cars 
(In reserve) 

125 25pdr Field Guns 
75 5.5" Towed Guns 

50 Sexton 25pdr Self-Propelled Guns 
40 155mm Towed Guns 
40 G5 155mm Towed Guns/G6 155mm 
Self-Propelled Guns 
Some VALKIRI Self-Propelled 127mm 

Multiple Rocket Launchers 
Some 81mm Mortars 



126 



200 120mm mortars 

900 6pdr, 17pdr, M-67 90mm 

Antitank guns 
Some 106mm Recoiless Rifles 
55 K63 Twin 35mm Antiaircraft 

Guns 
24 L70 Twin 40mm Antiaircraft 

Guns 
15 3.7" Antiaircraft guns 

Missiles • 54 Tigercat Surface to Air Missiles 

54 Cactus (CROTALE) Surface to 
Air Missiles 
120 ENTAC Antitank Guided Weapons 

b. The South African Air Force 

(1) Organization . In terms of training, main- 
tenance, and quality of personnel, the South African Air 
Force (SAAF) is the most powerful in subsaharan Africa. It 
has a complement of 10,000 men, including 9,000 Permanent 
Force regulars and 1000 National Service personnel. The 
Citizens Force reserve numbers 25,000, including many experi- 
enced pilots and maintenance crewmen who are regularly called 
to active duty. 

The SAAF is organized tactically into four 
operational commands: (1) Main Threat Area; (2) Southern 
Air Command; (3) Western Air Command; and (4) Training Command 
In addition, the Citizens Force operates six reserve squad- 
rons with about 100 aircraft that can be adapted to strike 
and Counterinsurgency missions, and the Commandos maintain 
another thirteen squadrons of light aircraft. Air Force 
personnel are also responsible for the South African air 
defense alert system and man early warning radars. 



127 



(2) SAAF Equipment. 



228 



Bombers 



Fighters/ 
Ground Attack 



Interceptors 
Reconnaissance 

Trainers 



Helicopters 



Transports/ 
Liaison 



5 CANBERRA B(I) 12 

3 CANBERRA T-4 

6 BUCCANEER S-50 

32 MIRAGE F-lAZ 

22 MIRAGE III CZ/EZ 

57 MB 32 6 M/K IMPALA I/II 

13 MIRAGE F-ICZ 

6 MIRAGE RZ/R2Z 

5 SHACKLETON MR- 3 (being retired) 
18 PIAGGIO P-166S ALBATROSS 

60 MB 32 6 M/K IMPALA I/II 

2 6 MIRAGE III (10 EZ , 10 D2Z, 
6 R2Z) 

100 HARVARD T-6G 

12 C-4 7 DAKOTA 

30 ALOUETTE II/III 

12 SUPER FRELON 

4 8 PUMA 

40 ALOUETTE II 

10 HAS-1 WASP 

2 7 ALOUETTE III 

7 C-130B HERCULES 
9 TRANSALL C-160Z 
7 DC- 4 

2 4 C-4 7 DAKOTA 

4 HS-125 MERCURIUS 
1 BAC VISCOUNT 7 81 

6 MERLIN IVA AIR AMBULANCE 
15 AM-3C BOSBOK 

25 C-4M KUDU 

20 CESSNA CE-185 



Citizen Force 



Commandos 



9 6 MB 326 M/K IMPALA I/II 

15 L-100 HERCULES in civil service 

13 Air commando squadrons with 
registered private aircraft 



Air-to-Air 
Missiles 



R530 

R550 Magic 
SIDEWINDER 
KUKRI V-3 



128 



c. The South African Navy 

229 
(1) Organization . Originally formed to aug- 
ment the Royal Navy in the defense of the Cape sea route, the 
South African Navy (SAN) attempted to assume this role alone 
after the British pullback from east of the Suez. However, 
creditable development of a blue water navy became impossible 
after 19 78 when France observed the UN arms embargo and can- 
celled the delivery of two corvettes and two submarines. 

Without access to more powerful ships and, 
more importantly, with the shift in emphasis from open 
ocean ASW to a mission of counterinsurgency patrols against 
the possibility of hostile landings, sabotage, and attacks 
on coastal traffic, the complexion of the SAN has changed in 
the past five years. British supplied destroyers and frigates 
have been retired in favor of smaller vessels, and a 900 
man marine force added to assist in harbor security. In 
19 83 the SAN was manned by 5000 men, including the marines, 
of which 2100 were conscripts, and 2000 Citizens Force 
reservists . 

The Navy infrastructure has also undergone 
a period of improvement since the Simonstown naval base was 
transferred from Britain in 1957. In November 1969, the 
SAAF transferred Langebaan air base to the SAN, and it 
became SAS Flamingo air-sea rescue base. In 19 72, a new 
base, SAS Hugo Biermann, was opened to accommodate South 
Africa's new submarine force, and in March 19 83 the new 



129 



maritime headquarters at Silvermine was opened. In 19 80, 

SAS Hugo Biermann was enlarged, and the naval base at 

Salisbury Island, Durban was reopened after being closed for 

23 years. Finally, establishment of the Marines in the early 

19 80's brought the development of a new marine base at 

Simons town, called SAS Simonsberg. 

(2) SAN Equipment. 230 

Submarines 3 DAPHNE Class 

Frigates 1 PRESIDENT Class 

Fast Attack 8 MINISTER OF DEFENSE Class 

boats (missile) (6 SKERPIOEN SSM) 

3 (2 SKERPIOEN SSM) 

Patrol Boats 5 FORD Class 

2 Modified TON Class 
30 NAMACURRA Class Harbor Patrol 
Craft 

Mine Warfare 6 TON Class Minesweepers 

2 TON Class Minehunters 

Auxiliaries 1 Fleet Replenishment Ship 

1 Ocean Hydrographic Ship 
1 Inshore Hydrographic Ship 

2 . The South African Arms Industry 
a. Background 

As has been previously discussed, the growing 
pressures of the early 1960 's, culminating with the 1963 
voluntary arms embargo, had the effect of increasing the 
desire of South Africa to become more self-sufficient in 
defense equipment. By the eve of the 19 77 mandatory arms 
embargo, the combination of South Africa's arms production 
using local design, license production, and embargo evasion, 



130 



coupled with weapons procured prior to 19 77, offered South 

Africa a moderate level of independence from external sources 

231 
of supply. 

b. Sources of Arms 

After the second United Nations arms embargo, 

South Africa continued to work towards self-sufficiency 

in arms production. In 19 77, according to estimates of the 

South African Defense White Paper of that year, South Africa's 

defense industry could produce military equipment adequate 

for internal protection, but not that required to repel a 

232 

"conventional external threat." At that time it was 

estimated that foreign sources of supply were still required. 
By 19 80 new estimates showed that as a result of the con- 
certed effort to mobilize the economy as a part of the 
Total National Strategy, South Africa was considered to be 
80% self-sufficient in overall arms requirements, and 100% 

independent in infantry arms up to and including armored 

233 
cars . 

Since 1977, South Africa has utilized a number 

of methods to manufacture or otherwise obtain end-product 

weapons which could not be manufactured in the country. 

234 
These methods include: 

1. Transfer of Technology — In order to acquire the capa- 
bility to produce an end-product weapon domestically, South 
Africa could procure a license for production, and build 
the capability with design and technical assistance from 



131 



the weapon's original manufacturer. Once the ability to 
produce a weapon is acquired, it cannot be withdrawn, even 
if the seller cancels the license. The Atlas Aircraft 
Corporation was built with British and Italian personnel 
and technical assistance. 

2. Establishment of a subsidiary — A weapon supplier can 
evade the arms embargo by transferring an entire industry 
rather than just a weapon or license. This can be done by 
opening a subsidiary or branch office in South Africa. 

For example, this method was used by the British Imperial 
Chemical Industries, which owns 43% of the South African 
Explosives and Chemical Industries. South African Explo- 
sives and Chemical controls two munitions plants whose entire 
production is geared towards SADF needs. South Africa has 
also stated that, under South African law, foreign indus- 
tries in South Africa can be ordered to convert production 
to military purposes if required. 

3. Investments in producer countries--By underwriting the 
cost of weapons research and development in another country, 
South Africa acquires weapons and technology. The link be- 
tween the South African CACTUS air drfense system and the 
French CROTALE are well known. The systems' characteristics 
were specified by South Africa, and the Republic paid for 
85% of the development costs, working in conjunction with 
Matra and CSF in France. Other South African links with 

the French defense industry include procurement of MIRAGE 

235 
aircraft and associated equipment. 

132 



4. Defining military equipment as civilian—Suppliers 
continue to deal successfully with South Africa in material 
which lies in the gray area between civilian and military 
use. This equipment includes electronics, radar and com- 
munications equipment, computers, and dual use aircraft, 
such as the Lockheed L-100/C-130. Utilizing "civilian 
equipment," South Africa installed a communications system 
useful in reporting guerrilla activities. In addition, 

in 19 80, air commando squadrons flying light aircraft pro- 
vided aerial reconnaissance for army units. 

5. Exports of spare parts and equipment for maintenance 
of military equipment—Although spare parts were covered in 
both the 1963 and the 19 77 arms embargos, no exporting coun- 
try considered it possible or practical to adhere to these 
restrictions. Not only was it regarded as contrary to normal 
commercial practice, but enforcement was difficult at best. 

6. Re-exporting of arms by way of a third party — Many 
exporters of arms insist on provisions against re-export of 
weapons in their contract. Some, such as Sweden and 
Switzerland, do not. The Bofers and Oelikon antiaircraft 
guns possessed by South Africa were not bought directly from 
the manufacturer, but through a third party. This was true 
for South Africa's TIGERCAT surface to air missile system 
(UK via Jordan) , Centurion tanks (UK vie Jordan, UK via 
Israel, UK via India via an arms broker), and Rolls Royce 
Viper engines for IMPALA aircraft (UK via license to Italy). 



133 



7. Dealings with other international "pariah" states-- 
It is interesting to note that the only major end-product 
weapons acquired by South Africa since the arms embargo came 
from another nation which has suffered a degree of inter- 
national isolation. Israel provided three RESHEF class 
guided missile patrol boats and the technology to build 
more of these craft in South Africa. In addition, Israel 
has transferred the GABRIEL surface to surface missile 
(called the SKERPIOEN in South Africa) to arm these craft. 

While relations between South Africa and Israel remain low 
key, there have been reports that South Africa is interested 

in acquiring the KFIR aircraft and other military equipment 

237 
from Israel in exchange for raw materials. 

8. Smuggling--There are a number of ways of smuggling 
arms throughout the world, with or without the involvement 
of the governments. While it is difficult to trace, it 
seems that rather than drying up South Africa's sources of 
arms, the 19 77 arms embargo had the effect of driving the 
market underground. There have been sufficient reports of 
smuggling to South Africa to indicate that South Africa 

is able to acquire most of the military equipment it requires 
with little trouble. 

9. Use of captured weapons—As the late 1970 's and 1980 's 
brought a growing proclivity of South Africa to conduct 
crossborder, offensive operations against groups such as 
SWAPO, large amounts of military equipment began to fall 
into the SADF ' s hands. Some of this equipment proved useful 

134 



enough, or was captured in great enough quantity, to allow 
its adoption for use by the SADF . It has been reported 
that SADF units in the operational area have been issued 

with Soviet RPG-7 rocket launchers as an anti-vehicle 

2 3 8 
weapon. It has also been reported that South African 

artillery units. have been issued with Soviet made antiair- 
craft artillery and that a training course in the use of this 

type of equipment had been instituted in South Africa in 

239 
1982. Finally, it has also been reported that South 

Africa had captured a number of SAM- 3 , SAM-6 , and SAM- 7 

240 
missile batteries in raids into Angola. 

c. The South African Arms Industry and Self-Suf f iciency 

An examination of the SADF ' s requirements and 

the country's ability to meet these requirements leads to 

a categorization of weapons types and the steps South Africa 

has taken to acquire them: 

1. Items which South Africa is producing, either as its 
own design or as a modification of imported designs. This 
includes armored vehicles, soft-skinned vehicles, small arms, 
explosives, artillery, most ammunition, and some types 

of missiles. 

2. License built items incorporating imported designs 
and components. This includes light aircraft, combat air- 
craft up to the MIRAGE Fl, missile patrol boats, and some 
types of missiles. 

3. Items in which major investments are now being made 
to design, develop, and produce local models. These may 



135 



be based on existing models produced elsewhere, but which 
can be built by South Africa, including helicopters, heavy 
artillery, large naval vessels, and multiple artillery 
rocket systems. 

4. Items which were acquired abroad and modified for 
South African use, but which South Africa is not attempting 
to build either because further procurement is not required 
or because production of the item is clearly beyond South 
African capabilities. This includes gray area items which 
can be acquired as civilian use material, such as communi- 
cations and electronic equipment. 

5. Items which South Africa does not possess and is not 
contemplating production of due to lack of production capa- 
bility or lack of a requirement. This includes long range 
maritime patrol aircraft, advanced avionics, electronic 
countermeasure equipment, and major naval vessels beyond 
corvettes and submarines . 

It seems that, with some important limitatios, 
South Africa produces or is able to acquire sufficient arms 
to meet any credible or likely threat. Further, a good 
indication of the country's self-sufficiency is the fact 
that for the first time in 1982, South Africa attempted to 
enter the arms export market. At first, during the Falklands 
conflict, there were rumors that South Africa had supplied 
Argentina with weapons and spare parts. Then, in October 
19 82, South Africa made a surprise appearance at the Greek 



136 



Defendory Exposition as the beginning of a major effort to 

241 
increase the foreign sale of arms. South Africa offered 

armored vehicles, artillery, missiles, and a wide variety 
of small arms, ammunition, and electronic equipment. 
3 . Economic Assets 

In spite of the economic constraints on South Africa 
discussed above, the country's economy remains in many ways 
a valuable asset. Natural and human resources, commitment 
to growth-oriented free enterprise, and the ability to 
attract substantial foreign capital have resulted in great 
economic advances in spite of the limitations imposed by 
apartheid and growing defense expenditures. Further, the 
Botha government's attempts to mobilize the economy to sup- 
port the Total National Strategy, as embodied in points 7, 
8, and 12 of the Twelve Point Plan, have made the business 
sector a valuable ally in meeting the Total Onslaught. 
This economic viability has been useful in a number of ways 
as South Africa attempts to meet the "onslaught" and improve 

its international position. 

242 
a. Transportation Infrastructure 

South Africa has the most highly developed trans- 
portation system on the African continent. Internally rail- 
roads link all main population centers and are capable of 
moving large quantities of bulk goods over long distances. 
In addition, except in the lightly populated northwest, 
South Africa is criss-crossed by a dense system of modern, 



137 



all weather roads. Externally, the country is served by six 
major ports — Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth, Capetown, 
Richards Bay, and Saldanha Bay--and a number of smaller 
ones. South Africa also maintains a claim to Walvis Bay, 
the only deepwater port in Namibia. 

The transportation infrastructure is strate- 
gically important to South Africa for two reasons. First, 
the highly developed transportation system allows the rapid 
movement of SADF units in response to threats. Second, all 
of the states of southern Africa rely on South African trans- 
port facilities for the import and export of goods. 
Swaziland, for example, is dependent on the ports of Durban 
and Richards Bay for nearly all exports. This dependence 
gives South Africa a lever to use in relations with its 
neighbors. It also provides a buffer for South Africa 
against the threat of sanctions. As South Africans are 
quick to point out, any sanctions against South Africa 

would be just as damaging to the rest of southern Africa 

243 
as they would be to South Africa. 

b. Strategic Resources 

While lacking in oil and water, South Africa 

has proved to be a storehouse of valuable minerals. Mining 

accounted for 12% of GDP between 1972 and 1977. By 1979, 

this share had risen to 19% of GDP. Gold, Platinum group 

metals , and diamonds are especially important to the South 

African economy as major sources of income. In addition, 



138 



large reserves of coal and urnaium give the country an 
alternative to oil in the production of energy. Finally, 
South Africa possesses major shares of the free world's 
known reserves of many important minerals, such as chromium, 
manganese, antimony, copper, and titanium. 

Maintaining access to strategic minerals has long 
been a concern of the industrial states of the West, and 
this in itself is an asset to South Africa. In addition, 
these resources provide other benefits to the Republic. 
For example, the value of gold exports in the 19 70s in part 
financed the military buildup of that period. In addition, 
the employment of large numbers of foreign workers in the 
mining sector provides the Republic as host country with a 
certain amount of leverage over the countries which supply 
these laborers. Mozambique, for example, is dependent upon 
the income earned by expatriate workers for foreign currency, 
c. Economic Strength 

In spite of the economic constraints discussed 
earlier, the fact that South Africa has the most developed, 
strongest economy in southern Africa remains a valuable 
asset for two major reasons. First, South Africa's strong 
economy has allowed economic integration with Western 
economies. Some 350 American companeis had a total of 
more than $1.7 billion in direct investments in South 
Africa in 19 78, with outstanding loans and credits of U.S. 
banks totalling another $2.2 billion. During the same time 



139 



period, South Africa was the recipient of 20% of all of the 

244 
United Kingdom's foreign investment. This closeness to 

Western economies is important in providing South Africa 

with sources of international capital, and in providing 

further protection against the threat of sanctions. 

Second, South Africa's economic influence in 

southern Africa gives the Republic further ways in which to 

influence the actions of its neighbors. By 1978, South 

Africa's trade with the rest of Africa totalled $1 billion 

in exports and $1/2 billion in imports annually, accounting 

245 
for 70% of the GNP of the nations of southern Africa. 

In addition, South Africa is the primary source of imports 

by neighboring countries, the main supplier of investment 

funds and management skills, and a key user of both goods 

and labor from black southern Africa. 

4 . Population Assets 

While the fact that an oppressed, majority, black 

population is a constraint upon South Africa, there is also 

an important population asset which must be considered. 

That is the unity of the white population when issues of 

defense are involved. This is not to say that all the whites 

in South Africa will be united behind the government on 

every issue. There is a traditional split between Afrikaner 

and English-speaking South Africans to be considered, and 

the newer split between the National Party and the recently 

formed Conservative Party. What is important within the 



140 



context of South African Defense policy is how white 
South Africans support the government on defense matters and 
how willing white South Africans are to endure military 
service in support of, as they see it, their way of life. 

With regard for white support for government defense 

policies, it is useful to examine a public opinion survey 

246 
taken by Geldenjuys in 19 82. This survey found that the 

government's explanation of the communist threat was shared 
by the majority of the white population. Further, there 
were also indications that the majority of the white popu- 
lation supported government defense policies such as cross- 
border operations in opposing the threat. 

In addition, white South Africans have endured an 
ever-increasing burden with regard to military service with 
little outward display of opposition. The amount of time 
spent in uniform by the average white male has already been 
discussed, but what is important to this discussion is the 
fact that this increasing commitment has been accepted with 
little opposition and minimal evidence of draft evasion. 

This does not mean that opposition to government 
defense policies and conscription could not increase in 
response to increased pressure on South Africa, as happened 
in Rhodesia in the waning days of the Smith regime. It does 
mean that as long as the government can redirect, diffuse, 
or effectively respond to these pressures, white approval 
will probably remain high, allowing the government to rely 



141 



on a continued high level of support from the nation's 
white population. 

D. RESPONSES — SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE POLICY 

In meeting the perceived threats to its security, 
South Africa has taken a number of actions to ensure its 
continued security. These actions are devised within 
parameters defined on one hand by the constraints under 
which South Africa must operate, and on the other by the 
assets and strengths which South Africa possesses. These 
actions in total make up South Africa's defense policies. 

It is important to note that, in the case of South 
Africa, these policies are not only designed to ensure the 
survival of the regime, but the survival of the government 
of the National Party and, by extension, the survival of the 
Afrikaner volk. This includes ensuring the supremacy of 
whites in South Africa. 

For conveneince, actions taken by South Africa are divided 
below into military, political, and economic areas. In 
many cases it is problematical whether an action is classi- 
fied under one heading or another, for all of these actions 
are related and interdependent, in many cases overlapping 
into all three areas. The classification is done for 
convenience of discussion only. 

1. Military Actions 

a. Maintenance of a Strong Defense Force 

The historical connection between the growing 
perception of threat to South Africa which rose out of the 

142 



early 1960's and the increasing strength and influence of 
the SADF has already been discussed. Also discussed was 
the changing organizational and training orientation of 
the SADF in response to changing threat perceptions. 
Finally, the strength of the SADF in comparison with the 
armed forces of the rest of southern Africa has also been 
noted. 

Maintenance of a strong defense force is important 
to South Africa for several reasons: 

1. In view of the possibility of internal unrest, the 
SADF performs important functions in support of the SAP in 
enforcement of internal security laws. 

2. In view of the hostility of the rest of Africa to 
South Africa's internal policies, the Defense Force provides 
protection against external attack, either conventional or 
unconventional . 

3. The SADF is also capable of carrying out a variety of 
operations either directly against or in support of dissi- 
dents operating against neighboring governments in support 
of the political or economic objectives of the South African 
government. These types of operations will be discussed 

in greater detail below. 

4. The strength of the Defense Force protects South 
Africa from outside interference in South Africa's internal 
affairs, allowing the Republic to institute its own brand 
of internal reform without regard for the opinon of the 
rest of the international community: 

143 



Another vital reason for the strength of the South 
African Defense Force is that this country is 
bringing about far-reaching changes in its Con- 
stitution and is abandoning the Westminister form 
of government. It wishes to do so without outside 
interference, and today the South African Defense 
Force is providing this country with the umbrella 
of confidence it requires to bring about this 
reform. "247 

b. Offensive Warfare — Crossborder Operations 
In 19 83, General J. J. Geldenhuys told a 
seminar on revolutionary warfare that it was more economi- 
cal to fight a terrorist war offensively than defensively. 

"You don't win any war through defense... it is generally 

248 
more economical to fight a war offensively." 

Since 1975, the SADF has acted offensively by 
crossing into the territory of South Africa's neighbors. 
A variety of crossborder operations have been conducted 
to achieve a variety of different results. 

(1) Goals of Crossborder Operations . Attacks 
on the territory of South Africa's neighbors can be seen as 
having a number of different goals. First, and probably 
most importantly, these actions are intended to cripple 
the ability of guerrilla forces to conduct raids into South 
Africa or Namibia by attacking guerrilla bases. In 19 83, 
General Vilojoen, Chief of the SADF, said he believed it 
possible to prevent the ANC from intensifying a sabotage 
campaign in South Africa by shuting the group's military wing 
out of neighboring black countries, saying, "...if we deny 
them bases in our neighboring states either through the 



144 



cooperation of the states themselves .. .or by military action 

against them, then they have only two ways to come in, by 

249 
air or by sea. It makes it almost impossible for them." 

Therefore, preemption to delay or destroy an insurgent 
military capability is an important consideration. 

Second, and related to attempts to shut 
guerrillas out of neighboring states, South African cross- 
border operations are intended to make a state which harbors 
anti-South African groups pay a price for their actions. 

...any government so misguided as to offer its terri- 
tory as a launching pad for terrorism against the 
south must accept the inevitable consequences ... there 
has never been any doubt about these consequences. 
It is the clear and repeated stated policy of the South 
African government that it will take whatever measures 
are necessary to counter political violence. That 
policy includes striking at terrorists wherever they 
may be. The internationally recognized right of 
preemptive strike is a firmly established element of 
South Africa's defense strategy. 250 

In this context, then, crossborder operations are used not 

only to hinder guerrilla operations, but to serve as a warning 

to neighboring states not to harbor anti-South African 

groups through offensive deterrence. 

Third, crossborder operations are intended 

to punish guerrilla groups and neighboring countries for 

attacks conducted within South Africa. The Republic has 

stated that lack of response to terrorist attack merely 

encourages further attacks, and it is against this background 

that South Africa has warned its neighbors against providing 

sanctuary from which these attacks can be made. Therefore, 



145 



crossborder attacks in response to attacks on South Africa 
are another use of this strategy. 

A fourth rationale for pursuing crossborder 
operations is to demonstrate to South Africa's white popu- 
lation that action can be and is taken against the forces 
arrayed against the country. While this remains more an 
implied than a stated strategy, the National Party government 
from the time of Verwoerd has remained concerned about the 
confidence of the white population. Therefore, policies 
such as the growing strength and successful employment of 
the SADF, the growing independence of the South African arms 
industry, and the general ability of the country to "go it 
alone" are well reported in the South African press. As 
General Malan has stated, "no self-respecting country that 
had the welfare and security of its people at heart could 
allow terrorist organizations to try and jeopardize its 
future. 

A fifth reason for the use of crossborder 
operations is in the "hot pursuit" of guerrillas who have 
carried out attacks on South Africa or South African forces, 
and have fled into a neighboring state. South Africa main- 
tains it has a legal right under international law to con- 
duct "hot pursuit" operations as part of its right of 
self-defense . 

Finally, crossborder operations have been 
conducted in support of political goals, such as in assisting 



146 



anti-government guerrillas in neighboring states, in support 
of South Africa's campaigns of destabilization, and to damage 
the economic infrastructure of other countries to ensure 
their continued dependence upon South Africa. 

(2) Types of Crossborder Operations . Just as 
South Africa sees a number of different purposes associated 
with the conduct of crossborder operations, so too does the 

Republic utilize a number of different types of crossborder 

252 
operations. These can be classified as follows: 

1. Reconnaissance flights over neighboring countries, such 
as those conducted routinely over the southern Angolan 
provinces of Mocamedes, Huila, and Cuando-Cubango . The 
purpose of this type of operations is to gather information 
about guerrilla bases and movements. On at least one occa- 
sion these flights have resulted in an air-to-air encounter 
with the Angolan Air Force, resulting in the destruction 

of an Angolan MIG-21 by an SAAF MIRAGE. 

2. Air attacks and associated battle damage assessment 
flights, either as operations in their own right, such as 
the air raid on Maputo, or in support of ground operations, 
such as during various operations in Southern Angola. 

3. Small scale, commando type ground actions by the 
Army, such as the raid into Maseru, Lesotho in December 
19 82, or the dramatic long-range attack on the Petrangol 
State oil refinery in Luanda in November 19 81. These opera- 
tions are conducted by a combination of air, sea, and land 
forces . 

147 



4. Large-scale, combined arms operations in neighboring 
countries, conducted so far only in Angola. Recently, the 
forces involved in these types of operations have grown 
tremendously in size and capability. For example, Operation 
Protea in August 19 81 involved the largest mobilization of 
the SADF since World War II. The force involved was made 
up of three infantry brigades totalling 11,000 men, three 

squadrons of MIRAGE and BUCCANEER aircraft, 90 OLIFANT tanks, 

253 
heavy artillery, and 250 armored cars. 

c. Maritime Strategy 

Landward defense has always received the major 
share of the attention and budget due to South Africa's 
perception of the threats it faced. Due to the lack of naval 
capabilities among South Africa's neighbors, it was logical 
that the Army and Air Force take precedence. 

However, the role assigned to the Navy has 
changed the most drastically of any branch of the SADF since 
19 75. This change has been due more to necessity rather 
than choice. First, the unilateral abrogation of the Simons- 
town agreement by Britain in 19 75 meant South Africa no 
longer needed to maintain a British style, blue water, anti- 
submarine warfare oriented naval force. Second, the 19 77 
arms embargo cost South Africa its sources of larger naval 
vessels and submarines, and caused the navy to turn to 
smaller, missile-armed craft which could be domestically 
produced. 



148 



Under these changing conditions, the SAN has 
evolved into a force oriented towards coastal defense, 
harbor security, support of counterinsurgency and cross- 
border operations, and protection of South Africa's offshore 
economic zone. Protection of the Cape Sea route was 
renounced in 19 7 8 as a response to the UN arms embargo, 
although South Africa has since offered to reassume this 
responsibility as a consideration for Western favor. In 
19 81 the Navy added a Marine force to perform duties asso- 
ciated with harbor security and counterinsurgency operations. 
2 . Political Actions 

South Africa has instituted a number of actions 
internally and externally which can be grouped under the 
general heading of political actions. Some of these actions 
were taken in response to a threat. Others were intended 
to deal with perceived constraints. Some have been achieved 
through military action, but are still part of a political 
program. 

a. Effective Mobilization of Manpower for Defense 
As discussed previously, manpower shortages 
affect the SADF ' s military capabilities in a number of ways. 
The nation's limited white manpower reserves limit the strength 
of the SADF, causes competition between the military and 
civilian sectors for available skills, and place a heavy 
burden of military service on the white male population. 
In order to efficiently utilize the existing 
manpower pool, and to increase the size of that pool, the 

149 



government of South Africa has taken a number of positive 
steps to ensure the manpower requirements of the SADF 
can be met. 

(1) Conscription . In 19 82, a new law affecting 
National Service was enacted. In this law, National Service 
requirements were increased from 240 total days to 720 
total days spread over 12 years instead of over eight. In 
addition, all men below age 55 who had not previously been 
drafted or who had only one year of National Service became 
liable for 30 days basic training and 12 days call-up a 
year until age 55. As a result, it has been estimated that 

the pool of white males available for call-up would increase 

254 
by 800,000. " See Table 6 for a survey of the changing 

service requirements for white males. 

(2) Utilization of Non-Whites . In recent years, 
the South African government has taken steps to expand the 
participation of other population groups in the military. 

As already mentioned, coloureds have served in the SADF 
since 1963, when the Cape Coloured Corps was reestablished. 
By 19 77, the government had accepted in principal the recom- 
mendation of a special commission of coloured affairs which 

255 
called for National Service and a cadet force for coloureds. 

In the creation of an Indian training battalion in 1975, 

Asians were also admitted into the SADF. However, induction 

of men of these groups remains limited due to shortages in 

facilities. In 1983, for example, the SADF accepted 153 

n c r 

of 60 8 Asians, and 1600 of 2300 coloured volunteers. 

150 



The arming of blacks has proceeded at an 
even slower pace. It was noted previously that, in the 
1970 's, while Minister of Defense P. W. Botha was opposed 
to the involvement of blacks in combat training. However, 
by 19 75, training for black volunteers had been instituted 
in the SADF. By 19 78 the Army's black complement had grown 
to battalion strength, and the 21st South African Infantry 
Battalion of 515 men with white officers had been formed. 
This battalion has served on the Angolan border with 
distinction. 

In addition to the 21st, the SADF has also 
trained six ethnic battalions of Namibians, which have also 
served border duty. These battalions now form the SWATF. 
Finally, the SADF has been involved in the training of the 
defense forces of the 'independent" homelands , which, in some 

cases, are closely integrated with the Army's counterinsur- 

257 
gency forces. 

The issue still to be reoslved with regard 

to the inclusions of non-whites in the SADF is that of 

required National Service for Asians and coloureds now that 

these groups have received their "political dispensations" 

under the new constitution. In this question, Botha is 

faced with a political tightrope. On one hand, he will be 

pressured by whites to include these groups in mandatory 

service once they have been given political rights. On 

the other, prominent coloured and Asian groups, such as the 



151 



Coloured Labor Party, which will have to support the new 
Constitution if it is to have any credibility, have already 

rejected mandatory military service until "all people are 

25 8 
free in a new South Africa." 

259 
(3) Immigrants . As the manpower demands of 

the SADF increased, the government also began to look towards 
immigrants as a source of men for military service. Until 
recently, an immigrant to South Africa could declare he did 
not want South African citizenship and thereby not be eligi- 
ble for conscription without losing permanent residence 
status. Pressures to involve immigrants in the SADF began 
in the 19 70 's. In 19 78, the South African Citizenship Act 
was amended to reduce the period required for naturalization 
from five years to two to make naturalized citizens available 
to the Defense Force sooner after their arrival. 

In 19 84, the final step was taken in closing 
what was perceived as the immigrant loophole with the intro- 
duction of the South African Citizen Amendment Bill. Under 
this bill, all aliens who have been permanent residents of 
South Africa for more than five years obtain South African 
citizenship automatically by naturalization. In addition, 
the bill also provides that such aliens may declare they do 
not want to become naturalized citizens, but by doing so they 
will lose their permanent residence benefits. "Now immigrants 

will have to make the same sacrifices as South African 

. . ,,260 
citizens . 



152 



2 61 
b. The Search for Security 

As South Africa is a moderate sized power, 
seemingly surrounded by potential enemies, a common element 
of all past South African defense policies has been the 
search for allies. As previously discussed, South Africa 
has made strenuous efforts to find foreign allies. Since 
I960, significant -resources have been expended in enlarging 
and modernizing naval communications, docking, and repair 
facilities in hopes of attracting allies and gaining entrance 
into a Western defense alliance. During the same period, 
South Africa made attempts to persuade moderate African 
states to enter into regional security arrangements, and to 
advance the idea of southern hemisphere security among poten- 
tial Latin American allies. 

Undoubtedly, South Africa's preference would 
still be a defense alliance with the West. The advantages 
of such an arrangement would be the deterrent effect it would 
have on the Soviet Union and Cuba, and on the anticipated 
"Total Onslaught" directed against South Africa. It would 
also show black Africa that white rule in South Africa was 
underwritten by the Western powers. Finally, such an alliance 
would have a beneficial effect on white confidence within the 
Republic, and give South Africa access to Western arms and 
military technology. However, it is apparent that potential 
Western allies would demand a higher price in the form of 
internal change for such an arrangement than South Africa 



153 



would be willing to pay. Only the prospects of imminent 
collapse or a massive invasion would cause South Africa to 
agree to any major dismantling of apartheid. 

While South Africa has apparently written off 
any chance of a closer alignment with the West for the time 
being, the prospects for regional arrangements appear to be 
improving. South African efforts in this direction have 
followed two different tracks. The more recent of these is 
Botha's Constellation of States, which was originally in- 
tended to include eight to ten southern African countries. 
This mainly economic approach also hoped for positive 
spillover into political and security functions. At present, 
the Constellation plan seems to have narrowed to include 
only South Africa and the homelands. 

The other track was perceived before the Con- 
stellation, and can be seen as a logical continuation of 
programs aimed at black states beginning in 19 70 with the 
offer of non-aggression pacts by South Africa, and continuing 
through the Outward Movment and Detente programs. These 
programs of contact with other African countries on the basis 
of economic and technical programs have continued at low 
levels all along. Further, as recent events have shown, when 
South Africa added destabilization in earnest to its programs 
in the 1980 's, it was able to extract even greater contacts 
from its neighbors. The Nkomati Accord and Cahora Bassa 
treaty with Mozambique and the reported non-aggression pact 



154 



with Swaziland are good examples of this new Outward Move- 
ment conducted by force of arms. 
c. Destabilization 

(1) Background . In early 1983, The New York 
Times quoted P. W. Botha as saying that South Africa would 
consider giving aid to anti-communist guerrillas in southern 
Africa if they asked for it, saying that if "fellow Africans 
were threatened by the evils of communism, then South Africa 
would assist them if assistance was required." Further, 
in the same interview, he said South Africa would be willing 
to enter into non-aggression pacts with neighbors, irrespec- 
tive of their political systems. These agreements would not 
allow either country to be used as a point of attack for 
insurgents. Finally, Mr. Botha denied reports South Africa 
was trying to destabilize governments in neighboring coun- 
tries, but hinted that, if neighboring countries allowed 
terrorists to use their territories as points from which to 

T C "3 

attack, South Africa could do the same. 

This interview provided an insight into 
South Africa's destabilization programs. The instruments 
used by the Republic in carrying out these programs were 
aid to an ti- communist guerrillas and the use of South 
African territory as points from which to attack. South 
Africa's goal was to push the bases of potential adversary 
groups back from its borders: thus the offer of mutual 
non-aggression pacts. 



155 



The pressures on South Africa grew in the 
19 70's as its neighbors acted in support of internal and 
external opposition to apartheid. South Africa rightly saw 
these pressures as attempts to destabilize the Republic. 
According to one South African analyst, the ANC made no 
secret of its aims to seize power in South Africa, and six 
black states in the region, Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, 

Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Tanzania, were members of the 

264 
frontline group dedicated to assist in this attempt. 

However, South Africa also came to see destabilization as a 
two-way street, and became involved in actions aimed at 
improving its own security at the expense of its neighbors. 
As one observer of South Africa wrote, "The South African 
political system is under challenge, and the challengers of 
such a powerful system must accept the consequences of 
'declaring war 1 against it... there should therefore be no 
surprise when Pretoria flexes its military and economic 
muscle against weaker organized opposition." 

(2) The Destabilization Program . The destabili- 
zation of its neighbors has become one of the most important 
South African concerns since 19 78. However, it was in 19 81 
that this program apparently came to the fore. The increas- 
ing importance of this program was probably due to three 
separate considerations. First, the end of the 19 70's 
brought P. W. Botha to power, which had the effect of in- 
creasing the military influence, through the new importance 



156 



attached to the SSC, in the South African government. In 
addition, Botha came to power with much of his potential 
opposition discredited by the scandal which deposed Vorster. 
This allowed Botha much leeway in the implementation of the 
Total National Strategy. 

Second, the defeat of the South African 
supported forces of moderation in the form of Bishop Muzrwa 
and the victory of Mugabe in Zimbabwe completed the encircle- 
ment of South Africa and Namibia by potentially unfriendly 
countries. Finally, the events of the 19 70 's had shown 
South Africa that not only could the west and the moderate 
African countries not be trusted, as exhibited by their 
failure to support South Africa in Angola in 19 75, but that 
the SADF was fully capable of handling itself in confrontation 
with black armies and the Cubans. 

While crossborder operations from Namibia 
into Angola had been conducted for some time, 19 81 brought a 
new dimension to the use of these operations. Operation 
Protea in that year was more than a campaign to harass SWAPO. 
It was a major invasion of southern Angola which established 
South African military supremacy over much of southern Angola, 

and allowed UNITA to expand its operations against the Angolan 

o C\ a. 
government. After 19 81 it seems likely that South African 

actions in Angola were not aimed at overthrowing the MPLA 

regime or at installing a friendly UNITA government in its 

place. It is more likely South Africa's interests lay in 

economic dislocation aimed at keeping Angola on the defensive. 



157 



For its part, Zambia has been described by 
South Africa as a center for subversion and as a "Marxist 

satellite state engaged in Soviet-inspired conspiracy against 

2 6 8 
the Republic." In response to the alleged Zambian threat, 

South Africa has reportedly trained up to 600 Zambian dissi- 
dents and been involved in at least two conspiracies in that 
country since 19 80. In addition, South Africa has also 
engaged in economic destabilization against Zambia. Since 
19 80 direct attacks have been made against Zambian economic 
targets from the Caprivi Strip, including one in April 1982 
by two battalions of the SADF resulting in a decline in 
agricultural production and a deterrence of mineral pros- 
pecting in the area. In July 19 82, southern Zambia was 
declared a disaster zone, partly due to these deprivations. 

Most incidents involving Botswana have 
been clashes between Botsawanan and South African forces 
around the Caprivi Strip, and attacks on South African 
refugrees in Botswana. Protests by Botswana have elicited 
little response from South Africa or, in some cases, simply 
flat denial that any incident ever occurred. In spite of 
these incidents, Botswana has not suffered the same kinds of 
attacks that other neighbors of South Africa have. One 
possible reason for this is that Botswana keeps tight control 
over South African refugees and is careful to discourage 
any attempts either to smuggle arms across the border to 
South Africa, or to allow armed attacks against South Africa 
or Bophuthatswana to originate in Botswana. 

158 



Zimbabwe is a special case for South Africa. 
It is the only state in the region in which there appeared 
there was a chance a stable, multi-racial society could be 
established. It has also been seen by South Africa to be 
the only state in the region outside of the Republic capable 
of becoming an industrial power. Shortly after Zimbabwean 
independence, South Africa transported a number of former 
black Rhodesian troops and ZIPRA guerrillas to camps in the 
northern Transvaal, from where the Ndebele language "Radio 
Truth" operates. In Zimbabwe, South Africa has also appar- 
ently been involved in sabotage, such as the destruction of 
two-thirds of the country's air force at Gweru in July 19 82, 
and the heavy handed use of economic pressures, such as the 
withdrawal of railroad equipment needed to haul the country's 
record harvest in 19 81. South Africa could hardly deny 
involvement in the so-called "month of the hawks" in December 
1982, when the destruction of the oil depot at Beria by 
commandos, sabotage to the rail route between Maputo and 
Chicualacuala, and a suposed labor dispute on the South 
African railway lines to Zimbabwe all combined to put a 
serious economic squeeze on Zimbabwe. While fuel supplies 

eventually reached the country , South Africa made a point 

269 
of just how much pressure it could apply. 

In Lesotho, collusion between the Lesotho 

Liberation Army (LLA) and South Africa is an open secret. 

LLA personnel shelter in South Africa and must cross its 



159 



territory to make their attacks. South Africa has also 
conducted crossborder operations into Lesotho against pur- 
ported ANC targets, such as the 9 December 19 82 raid on 
Maseru in which 37 people were killed. Economic pressures 
on Lesotho, which as a land locked country entirely surrounded 
by South Africa is highly vulnerable, have resulted in the 
expulsion of ANC personnel. 

Swaziland has, like Botswana, always been 
careful in not giving unnecessary offense to South Africa. 
Alarmed by the Maseru raid, Swaziland reacted by rounding 
up ANC refugees and either expelling them or removing them 
to a detention camp at Makerns . 

Finally, South Africa's attitude towards 
Mozambique has been ambivalent. On one hand, when Mozambique 
achieved independence South Africa moved to help run Port 
Maputo and to upgrade its facilities. In addition, South 
Africa continues to accept 60,000 Mozambiquan workers, 
remitting up to $30 million a year in foreign exchange. On 
the other hand, however, South Africa has conducted raids 
into Mozambique, such as those in January 19 81 on Matola 
and in May 1983 on Maputo itself. Further, there is little 
doubt South Africa supports the Mozambique National Resistance 
(MNR) . At the time of Zimbabwe's independence, the MNR 
headquarters, personnel, and radio station was moved from 
Zimbabwe to a camp at Phalaborwa in the northern Transvaal. 
Since its connection was established with South Africa, the 



160 



MNR has concentrated not on establishing "liberated zones," 
but in the disruption of Mozambique's economy. It has con- 
centrated its attacks on the rail line from Maputo to Zimbabwe, 
on the oil pipeline and railway connection between Beria 
and Mutri , and on the rail and road routes from Malawi to 
the sea. These attacks, coupled with the current drought in 
southern Africa and the mismanagement of the Mozambique 
economy have all but ruined Mozambique, and in great part 
led to the conditions which caused the consumation of the 
Nkomati accord between that country and South Africa. 

(3) The Benefits of Destabilization . In con- 
ducting its widespread campaign of destabilization against 
its neighbors, South Africa achieves a variety of benefits. 
These include: 

1. Improved security for South Africa as the countries 
on its borders are put on the defensive and are unlikely 
to be able to conduct any type of coordinated conventional 
attack on South Africa. In addition, potential guerrilla 
groups are pushed back from South Africa's borders, losing 
support as countries such as Mozambique can no longer afford 
the cost of supporting them imposed by South Africa. 

2. Keeping South Africa's neighbors weak and economically 
dependent on South Africa. Disruption of economies also 
serves to discredit Marxism in Africa, thereby short- 
circuiting the "Marxist onslaught." Finally, keeping its 
neighbors weak and dependent on South Africa brings about 

P. W. Botha's Constellation by other than voluntary means. 

161 



3. The negotiation of the long-offered non-aggression 
pacts with black states is achieved. These pacts have been 
signed with Mozambique and Swaziland, and high level nego- 
tiations have been underway with Angola for over a year. 
These pacts not only increase South Africa's security, but 
give the Republic a measure of long-desired international 
legitimacy. It is not coincidence that a major Botha trip 
through various European countries followed on the heels 

of the Nkomati/Cahora Bassa agreements. 

270 
d. The South African Nuclear Program 

Whether or not South Africa has a "bomb in the 
basement" has been the subject of much speculation since the 
late 1970 's. The alleged detection of a nuclear explosion 
in the South Atlantic in 19 79 has alternately been blamed 
on India, South Africa, Israel, and Israel and South Africa 
acting in concert. Conflicting statements by South African 
government officials and the country's refusal to sign the 
nuclear non-proliferation treaty serve only to further muddy 
the issue. However, on at least one aspect of South African 
nuclear development there is agreement. That is, that South 
Africa has the capacity to design and produce nuclear 
weapons . 

Taken within the context of the Total National 
Strategy, there could be two possible answers to the question 
of whether South Africa does or does not have nuclear 
weapons. First, evidence indicating possession of such a 



162 



weapon could be a South African hoax, designed to instill 
doubt in the minds of potential enemies. Second, that South 
Africa does indeed have nuclear weapons . With the Total 
Strategy in mind, it seems likely that if South Africa 
were able to add yet another weapon to its arsenal it would 
do so, and if it were threatened enough, it would use it. 
If it is assumed that South Africa possesses 
nuclear weapons, it becomes necessary to speculate on how 
and when it might use them. The following possible employment 
options are possible: 

1. To meet the worst case conventional scenario, that of 
a massive Soviet intervention in support of groups opposing 
the government. 

2. To use in a maritime environment against forces possi- 
bly blockading South Africa. 

3. To use as a demonstration deterrent. 

4. To break up large enemy troop concentrations threaten- 
ing South Africa's industrial and population centers. 

5. To use as a weapon of last resort, if the survival of 
Afrikanerdom were threatened. 

6. To use as a tactical battlefield weapon in conventional 
warfare. 

7. To use as a strategic deterrent to threaten its 
neighbors in the event of attack. 

3 . Economic Actions 

There are three main thrusts to South Africa's 
economic actions taken in support of strategic doctrine. 

163 



These are to maintain government integration with the economic 
sector as called for by the Total National Strategy, to 
increase the economic dependence of southern Africa on South 
Africa, and to ensure self-sufficiency in strategic materials, 
i.e., oil . 

a. The Economy and the Government 

Much has already been said concerning the 
importance of the economy to the South African government 
and the attempts of the government to further utilize the 
business sector through the Total National Strategy. The 
government relies on the private sector to increase economic 
integration with Western economies, to provide contacts with 
Western technologies and capital, to provide skill and capital 
for the development of the Homelands and for economic con- 
tacts with the rest of Africa, and to provide the research 
and development for the growing arms industry. In addition, 
within the context of the Constellation of States, the strength 
of the economic sector is vital to provide economic links 
within the southern Africa region. 

In order to encourage the participation of business 
in required programs, the government, under the Twelve-Point 
Plan, has committed itself to a free enterprise economy. 
Economic growth is stimulated by government action, with 
recent trends towards a welcome deregulation of the economic 
sector. Government action has also encouraged foreign 
investment through programs such as the 19 79 introduction 



164 



of the financial Rand, designed to permit nonresidents to 
import investment capital. 

The Botha government realizes it requires the 
assistance of the economic sector to carry out its programs, 

and business has responded to this challenge. 

271 
b. The Economic Dependence of Southern Africa 

As seen previously, a major thrust of South 
African foreign policy for over two decades has been the 
attempts of the government to build economic ties to other 
African states and hope for positive spillover in other 
areas, such as political and security. To this end, South 
Africa has offered aid, capital, and skilled assistance to 
neighboring countries. It has also used the force of the 
most powerful economy on the continent to increase the 
dependence of other countries .on the South African economy. 

South Africa's regional domination is as per- 
vasive economically as it is militarily. The Republic pro- 
duces 77% of the Gross National Product of Africa south of 
Zaire and Tanzania, and makes up two thirds of the output 
of coal, iron, wheat, maize, electrical power, and rail 
transport. About 90% of the regions' energy consumption 
occurs in South Africa, and South Africa's per capita GNP 
of $2200 a year is three times the regional average. 

The trade of all SADCC countries depends heavily 
on South Africa. More importantly, this dependence is all 
one way. South Africa has no reciprocal dependence on its 



165 



neighbors, as its trade is widely diversified, exporting 
less to all of Africa than to Britain or Switzerland and 
importing an insignficant amount from its neighbors. 

As a result of the economic power of South Africa, 
the dream of an anti-South African regional economic community 
will remain a dream. South Africa will continue to dominate 
the region's economic activity, and will continue to possess 
and use powerful economic weapons against its neighbors in 
the context of the Total National Strategy. 

c. Self-Sufficiency in Strategic Materials 

As the 19 73 Arab oil embargo pointed out, South 
Africa was vulnerable to disruption in its energy supply. 
Since the enactment of that embargo, South Africa has taken 
steps to reduce its dependence on foreign sources of energy. 
These steps have been varied, and include several major 
programs . 

The first response to the embargo was stockpiling 
of oil. As previously noted, in 1983 it was speculated that 

South Africa had amassed a strategic oil reserve equal to 

272 
three years normal consumption. This meant that South 

Africa had more oil in reserve relative to the size of its 

economy than any other oil importing nation. 

Second, South Africa has continued to seek 

domestic sources of oil. For several years the government 

has financed the exploration of the SOEKOR company, which 

has been drilling both within the country and in offshore 

waters. In 19 82, these efforts resulted in the discovery 



166 



of a "promising" find at an offshore site south of Mossel 

273 
Bay in the Indian Ocean. However, the search for a 

commercially exploitable discovery has still failed to reveal 

a reliable source of oil. 

To counteract the lack of domestic oil sources, 

South Africa has turned to alternative forms of energy. As 

a large producer of coal, the Republic has established a 

large coal fired power industry. Additionally, new sources 

of hydroelectric power have been obtained through deals with 

neighboring countries for South African investment, such as 

the Cahora Bassa project in Mozambique. Finally, South 

Africa has long been involved in programs to obtain oil from 

coal. In 1950, SASOL I was constructed, and production of 

4500-5000 barrels of oil a day was begun in 1955. SASOL II, 

announced in 19 74, was recently scheduled to come on line 

with a capacity of 45,000 barrels a day. In 19 79, further 

274 
plans were announced for the construction of SASOL III. 

SASOL I and II are expected to provide one third of the 
country's fuel needs by the mid-19 80' s. 

South Africa has also turned to nuclear power. 
A nuclear power station was begun at Koeburg in 19 76, con- 
sisting of two French-built 922 megawatt reactors. In 

spite of sabotage to the installation in 19 82, the Koeburg 

275 
station was able to start up on 14 March 19 84. 

Finally, in its quest for energy sources, South 

Africa has turned to new technologies beyond the coal to oil 



167 



conversion process. In 1981, it was announced that the 
country would install the largest solar energy system in 
the southern hemisphere at Betty's Bay to power telecommuni- 
cations installations. 



168 



IV. CONCLUSIONS 

South African strategic doctrine developed in response 
to a set of threats, constraints, and assets which are 
inherent in the nature of the South African physical, social, 
economic, political, and defense situation. While the roots 
of this doctrine can be traced back to the 1950* s and 19 60's, 
its present character has been shaped primarily by rapid 
changes in the country's position caused by the increasing 
pressures of the 1970 's. 

The pattern of South Africa's actions over the past 
36 years is one of both constancy and change. The constants 
of strategy derive from enduring constraints and threats, 
such as manpower limitations, the country's population 
makeup, and its geographic position, and in the white commit- 
ment to apartheid. Changes have been linked to new percep- 
tions of threats, assets, or constraints. These include the 
growing strength of the SADF , changes in the political shape 
of southern Africa, and the success of some of South Africa's 
policies, such as destabilization. 

Despite many flaws in South African strategic thinking 
over the past twenty-five years, South Africa has shown it- 
self able to rapidly adapt to changes in its position and to 
the threats and opportunities it perceives. These changes 
have ranged from the disruption of oil supplies, to growing 



169 



international pressures, to almost overnight change in the 
governments of southern Africa. Especially since the 
assumption of power of P. W. Botha, South Africa has acted 
and reacted to new threats and changing circumstances force- 
fully, vigorously, and independently, and South African 
policies have become increasingly tough, flexible, and 
aggressive. Based on the apparent success of these poli- 
cies, it seems likely that in the short term, South Africa 
will move in new, more independent directions. The impli- 
cations for the West are clear. As the Republic perceives 
its best opportunities are related to "going it alone," and 
as its capability to do so increases, Western countries 
will have less opportunity to influence the direction of 
South Africa's policies. 

For South Africa, in spite of its new aggressiveness 
and growth in capability, as long as apartheid remains the 
main factor in the country's ideology and institutions, the 
range of choices available to planners will become more 
limited, and the use of the military will probably become 
even more attractive. 



170 



APPENDIX A 
THE 12-PQINT PLAN 

The 12-point plan, as spelled out by Mr. P. W. Botha 

in his address to the National Party Congress in Durban on 

15 August 19 79, reads as follows: 

Point 1: The recognition and acceptance of the existence 
of raultinationalism and of minorities in the 
Republic of South Africa. 

Point 2: The acceptance of vertical differentiation 

with a built-in principle of self-determination 
at as many levels as possible. 

Point 3: The establishment of constitutional structures 
which make provision for the complete inde- 
pendence of the various black nations in the 
RSA, meaningful consolidation of the black 
states and areas and the acceptance of a 
socio-economic programme directed at the 
development of such black states and areas. 

Point 4: The willingness to cooperate as equals and to 
consult on matters of common interest, with a 
balance between the rights of the individual 
and those of the community, and the removal of 
hurtful unnecessary discriminatory measures. 

Point 5: The acceptance of the principle that where at 
all possible each population group should have 
its own schools and live in its own community 
as being fundamental to social contentment. 
In my view this is not discrimination, it is 
the recognition of each others' rights. The 
preparedness to consult as equals on matters 
of common interest with a sound balance between 
the rights of the individual and those of the 
community. 

Point 6: I have said that those discriminatory measures 
that are unnecessary and create bad feeling 
should be removed. . .But I am not in favour of 
a system of compulsory integration in South 
Africa, and I am not in favour of endangering 
my own people's right to self-determination. 



171 



Point 7: The recognition of economic interdependence 
and the properly planned utilisation of 
manpower . 

Point 8: Development of peaceful constellation of 
Southern Afircan states with respect for 
each other's cultures, traditions and ideals. 
To talk of a federation or a confederation at 
this stage would, in my view, be premature. 
A pact between states becomes possible only 
when the will is there. One first has to make 
all those states equal through independence, 
and then leave it to them to decide what they 
want to belong to. 

Point 9: South Africa's firm determination to defend 
itself against interference from outside 
in every possible way. And allow me to say 
here tonight, not boastfully, but we are 
better able tonight to defend South Africa 
militarily than ever before in the country's 
history. And I want to warn those who think 
that we practise our politics from a position 
of weakness: We are not speaking from a 
position of weakness, we are speaking from a 
position of decency. If they want to test us, 
our strength, we will hit back for the sake 
of South Africa's self-respect. 

Point 10: As far as possible, a policy of neutrality in 
the conflict between super powers, with 
priority given to Southern African interests . 

Point 11: The maintenance of effective decision-making 
by the State, which rests on a strong Defence 
Force to guarantee orderly government as well 
as efficient, clean administration. Clean 
administration is essential at all levels. 
And strong security forces with contented members 
are of the utmost importance in today's dangerous 
world. 

Point 12: The maintenance of free enterprise as the 

basis of our economic and financial policy. 
This also presupposes the most effective 
training and utilisation of manpower. 



172 



APPENDIX B 



MISSIONS OF THE SADF AS DEFINED IN THE 
19 82 WHITE PAPER ON DEFENSE 



Conventional 



Counterinsurgency 



¥ 



1. Maintain a balanced and prepared land force 

in order to discourage or repulse conventional, 
semi- conventional or insurgency attacks 
against the RSA and SWA. 



Other 

1. Create goodwill 
and establish & 
maintain sound 
relations with 
other population 
groups in areas 
where an Army 
presence is 
maintained. 



2. Conventional war- 
fare training to 
increase readiness 
of the conventional 
force . 



Preparation of a COIN 
Force for anti-terrorist 
operations in RSA. 

Area protection by Com- 
mandos for protection, 
intelligence, early 
warning and initial 
operations until 
additional forces arrive. 

Support of the SAP in 
combatting terrorism. 



ce 



1. Ensure safety of 
SWA Territory. 

2. Provide air cover. 

3. Air traffic, air 
defense, and air 
defense artillery 
coordination by 
air space control. 

4. Point defense of 
vital areas by 
Missile/AAA 
systems . 



1. Provide air support to 
the SA army, SAP and 

SAR Railway Police during 
COIN and other Security 
Force actions. 

2. Ensure safety of SWA 
territory . 

3. Conduct pre-emptive 
strikes . 

4. Provide air reconnais- 
sance. 



1. Carry out air- 
sea rescue in 
Southern Atlantic 
and Indian Ocean. 

2. Provide assist- 
ance to other 
government 
departments by 
providing air 
transport . 

3. Air support for 
anti-crime 
operations. 



173 



Navy 1. Ensure right of RSA 
to use surrounding 
waters and deny 
their use to 
enemies. 

2. Safeguard RSA's 
marine assets. 

3. Defense of RSA 
coastline and 
and harbors. 

4. Maritime recon- 
naissance of 
offshore areas . 

5. Exercise of 
authority in terri- 
torial waters and 
economic exploi- 
tation zone. 

6. Exercise right of 
peaceful passage 
through inter- 
national waters. 



Training of marine 
element and rotation 
of the units to the 
operational area. 

Protection of 
national key point 
harbors and harbor 
installations . 



Promote mari- 
time cooperation 
with other 
states . 



174 



APPENDIX C 



MILITARY EQUIPMENT PRODUCED IN SOUTH AFRICA 



277 



Equipment 
MIRAGE F-1AZ 



Producer 
Atlas 



MB-326M IMPALA 1/ 
MB-326K IMPALA II 

C-4M KUDU 



Helicopters 



MINISTER OF 
DEFENSE missile 
attack boats 



Harbor patrol 
craft 

AML- 60/90 (Pan- 
hard) ELAND 
armored cars 



PATEL MICV 



RHINO/HIPPO 
armored per- 
sonnel 
carrier 



Atlas 



Atlas 



N.A. 



Durban 
Shipyard 



N.A. 



Sandock-Austral 
Beperk, Ltd. 



N.A. 



N.A. 



Remarks 

Ordered from France for local 
assembly by Atlas; eventually 
to be totally manufactured in 
South Africa; run of 100 
expected. 

Built under license from 
Aermacchi of Italy. 

General purpose light transport; 
derivative of Italian Aermacchi 
AM-3C 

ARMSCOR announces in September 
1983 that South Africa possessed 
the capability to produce heli- 
copters and that Atlas aviation 
would be organized to build them 
in the near .future. 278 

Israeli RESHEF class; three 
were built in Haifa by Israel, 
eight additional to be built 
at Durban. 

9 meter patrol boats 



800 vehicles produced under 
French license 1961-72; South 
African version of French 
armored car. 

Designed and manufactured in 
South Africa; combination 
armored car and armored per- 
sonnel carrier; first introduced 
in 1976. 

Designed and manufactured in 
South Africa; Mine resistant 
armor and wheels; HIPPO is 
South African police version. 



175 



G5 155mm Towed 
Howitzer279 



Krygkor 



G6 155mm Self- Krygkor 
Propelled Howitzer 



OLIFANT MBT 



N.A. 



VALKIRI 127mm 
Multiple Rocket 
Launcher 



Kentron 



Medium towed howitzer 



Introduced September 1982. 
Designed in Canada by now 
defunct Space Research 
Corporation. 

South Africa claims all that 
remains of its obsolete 
CENTURIONS are the hull and 
turret, and that it has been 
upgunned, re-engined, and 
equipped with improved fire 
control, transmission, drive, 
and suspension . ^ 80 

Based on captured Soviet BM-21; 
designed and produced in 
South Africa. 



81mm Mortars 

120mm Mortars 

12.7mm Light 
Antiaircraft Guns 

FN 7.62mm and Rl 
Automatic Rifles 

R4 5.56mm Asault 
Rifle 

CACTUS SAM 



N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 

N.A. 

N.A. 

N.A. 



SKERPIOEN SSM 



N.A. 



KUKRI V3B Air-to- 
Air Missile 



Kentron 



Manufactured in South Africa 
under Belgian license. 

281 
Based on Israeli GALIL 



Developed and built in France 
as CRCTALE, but 85% of research 
and development funded by 
South Africa. 

Based on Israeli GABRIEL with 
equivalent performance. How 
much of SKERPIOEN is built 



domestically is unclear. 



282 



SIDEWINDER type missile; 
developed in South Africa, 
made available for export 
in 1982. 28J 



176 



Equipment 



APPENDIX D 
WEAPONS/EQUIPMENT FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES 
Origin 



BAC CANBERRA 
B(l)12, T-4 

Hawker-S idde ley 
BUCCANEER S-50 



UK 



UK 



Number in 


Remarks 


Inventory 




5 B(l)12 




3 T-4 




6 


Sixteen Delivered in 




1965. 



Dassault MIRAGE III FRANCE 
CZ/EZ 

Dassault MIRAGE FRANCE 
RZ/R2Z 



22 



Dassault MIRAGE 
F-1CZ 


FRANCE 


13 


Imported complete 
1974-75. 


Hawker- S iddeley 
SHACKLETOWN MR- 3 


UK 


5 


Have undergone service 
life extension in 
South Africa. 


Piaggio P-166S 


ITALY 


18 


9 delivered 1969, 
9 1973-74. 


Dassault MIRAGE III 
BZ/DZ/D1Z 


FRANCE 


16 




BAC VISCOUNT 781 


UK 


1 




Hawker-Siddeley 
HS-125 


UK 


4 




Lockheed C-130B 
HERCULES 


U.S. 


7 


Delivered in 1963. 



McDonne 1- Douglas 
C-47B DAKOTA 



U.S. 



36 



McDonnel- Douglas 
DC- 4 



U.S. 



Swearington MERLIN 



UK 



Delivered 1975-76, 



177 



Transall C-160Z 

Rockwell T-6 HARVARD 

Aeritala AM-3C 
BOSBOK 

Cessena CE-185 

Aerospatiale SA-316 
ALOUETTE III 



Aerospatiale SA-321L 
SUPER FRELON 



FRANCE 


9 


U.S. 


110 


ITALY 


36 


U.S. 


20 


FRANCE 


40 



Delivered 1969-70 



FRANCE 



12 



Aerospatiale SA-330 
PUMA 


FRANCE 


48 


Westland HAS-1 WASP 


UK 


10 


DAPHNE class 
submarine 


FRANCE 


3 


PRESIDENT class 


UK 


1 


Frigate 






MINISTER OF DEFENSE 
class Fast Attack 
Boat 


Israel 


3 


FORD class Large 
Patrol Craft 


UK 


5 


TON class Patrol 
Craft, Minesweeps, 
Minehunters 


UK 


10 


Replenishment 
Ship 


DENMARK 


1 


Survey Ship 


UK 


1 


Survey Ship 


UK 


1 


OLIPHANT/CENTURION 
MBT 


VArious 


200 
( approx 



Unconfirmed reports of 
an additional 20 
delivered in 1975. 

16 delivered 1966-67. 



20 delivered 1970-71; 
20 delivered 1975. 



Launched 1969-70 



Launched 1962 
of 3. 



Last 



Built at Haifa. Addi- 
tional units have been 
built by South Africa 
at Durban. 

Transferred 1954-59. 



Purchased 1957-59 



Purchased 1965. 

Transferred 1969. 

Transferred 1978. 

Reworked/regunned in 
South Africa; 168 
delivered from UK be- 
tween 1955-59; 100 
sold to Switzerland 



178 



1960-61; 32 received 
from Israel 1962; 41 
received from Jordan 
1974; 60 obtained from 
India via an arms 
broker 1978. 



COMET MBT 


UK 


20 


40 delivered 1950. 


FERRET Armored Car 


UK 


230 


Delivered 1963-64. 


M3A1 Armored Car 


U.S. 


50 


Delivered 1957-58. 


M-6 STAGHOUND 


U.S. 


N.A. 




Armored Car 








SARACEN Armored 


UK 


250 


Delivered 1956-60. Now 


Personnel Carrier 






used by South African 
Police. 


25pdr. Field Gun 


UK 


125 




SEXTON 25pdr Self- 


UK 


50 




Propelled Gun 








5.5" Field Gun 


UK 


75 




155mn Towed Gun 


UK 


40 





Oerlikon 35mm 
Antiaircraft Gun 



SWITZERLAND 55 



Bofers 40mm 
Antiaircraft Gun 



UK 



25 



Obtained early 1960*s; 
manufactured by British 
firm under license 
from Sweden. 



M67 90mm, 6pdr, UK 
17pdr Antitank Guns 



900 



CACTUS (CROTALE) SAM FRANCE 



18 



Three Batteries delivered 
1971-73. 



TIGERCAT SAM 



JORDAN 



54 



UK system; obtained from 
Jordan . 



ENTAC MGM-32 Anti- 


FRANCE 


N.A 


tank Missile 






GABRTET, SSM 


ISRAEL 


N.A 


R-530 Air-to-Air 


FRANCE 


96 



Delivered 1963. 



179 



MAGIC R-550 Air-to- FRANCE N.A. Reported to be on 

Air Missile order. 

AS-20/30 Air-to- FRANCE 60 Delivered 1965-66. 
Ground Missile 



180 



ENDNOTES 



1. Harold D. Nelson, South Africa: A Country Study 
(Washington, D.C.: American University, 1981), p. 350. 

2. Kenneth W. Grundy, Defense Legislation and Communal 
Politics: The Evolution of a White South African Nation 
as Reflected in the Controversty Over the Assignment of 
Armed Forces Abroad, 1912-1976 (Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 1978) , pp. 23-24. 

3. Kenneth W. Grundy, The Rise of the South African 
Security Establishment: An Essay on the Changing Locus 
of State Power (Braamfontein: South African Institute 
of Strategic Affairs, 1981) , p. 2. 

4. John de St. Jorre, "South Africa: Up Against the 
World," Foreign Policy , 28 (Fall 1977), p. 53. 

5. Sam C. Nolutshungu, South Africa in Africa: A Study 
in Ideology and Foreign Policy (New York: Africana 
Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 46-47. 

6. Robert S. Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options (London: International Institute of Strategic 
Studies, 1980) , p. 6. 

7. Ibid. 

8. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 82. 

9. Ibid. 

10. Robert S. Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options , p . 7 . 

11. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970 , 
p. 83. 

12. Robert S. Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options , p . 7 . 

13. Kenneth W. Grundy, The Rise of the South African Security 
E stablishment: An Essay on the Changing Locus of State 
Power , p. 2 . 

14. Robert S. Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options , p. 6 . 



181 



15. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970 , 
pp. 86-87. 

16. Robert S. Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options , p. 10. 

17. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970 , 
p . 126 . 

18. Robert S. Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options , p. 10. 

19. Ibid. 

20. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970 , 
p. 128. 

21. R. W. Johnson, How Long Will South Africa Survive 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1977) , p. 129. 

22. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970 , 
p. 143. 

23. Robert S. Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options , p. 11. 

24. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970 , 
p. 231 . 

25. Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Regional Policy," in 
Michael Clough, ed. , Changing Realities in Southern 
Africa: Implications for American Policy (Berkley: 
Institute of International Studies, 1982) , p. 129. 

26. Ibid, pp. 130-131. 

27. Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Regional Policy," 
pp. 132-147. 

28. Ibid. 

29. See, for example, John Seiler, "South African Perspectives 
and Responses to External Pressures," Journal of Modern 
African Studies 13, 3 (1975), pp. 455-458. 

30. Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Regional Policy," 
p. 135. 

31. Ibid, p. 136. 

32. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970 , 
p. 190. 



182 



33. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970 , 
p. 191. 

34. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options , " p. 11 . 

35. Ibid. 

36. James Barber, South African Foreign Policy, 1945-1970 , 
pp. 190-191. 

37. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options , " p. 12 . 

38. Michael T. Schieber, "Apartheid Under Pressure: South 
Africa's Military Strength in a Changing Political Con- 
text," Africa Today , January-March 19 76, p. 30. 

39. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options , " p. .12 . 

40. James Barber, South African Foreign Policy, 1945-1970 , 
p. 192. 

41. South African Defense Policies as Reflected in the White 
Papers 1965-79 , DIA Report DDB-2610-32-80 of June 1980, 
p. 1 . 

42. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options," p. 16. 

43. Ibid. 

44. Ibid, pp. 16-17. 

45. Ibid, p. 17. 

46. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options, pp. 12-13. 

47. Ibid, p. 13. 

4 8 . South African Defense Policies as Reflected in the 
White Papers 1965-79 , p. 3. 

49. Ibid. 

50. Robert S. Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options , p. 13. 

51. Ibid. 



183 



52. Chester A. Crocker, South Africa's Defense Posture: 
Coping With Vulnerability (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University, 1981), pp. 8-16. 

53. Ibid, p. 42. 

54. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options , " p. 14 . 

55. Harold D. Nelson, ed., South Africa: A Country Study , 
p. 344. 

56. "South African Defense Philosophy and Policies: Building 
a Strong Military Posture," Armed Forces Journal Inter - 
national , June 1973, pp. 26-35. 

57. Strategic Survey 1972 (London: International Institute of 
Strategic Studies, 1972), p. 35. 

58. Chester A. Crocker, South Africa's Defense Posture: 
Coping With Vulnerability , p. 43. 

59. "South African Defense Philosophy and Policies: Building 
a Strong Military Posture," p. 27. 

60 . South African Defense Policies as Reflected in the 
White Papers, 1965-1979 , p. 4. 

61. Ibid, p. 5. 

62 . Ibid, p. 5 . 

63. Ibid. 

64. Boss, The First Five Years (London: International Defense 
Aid Fund, 1975) , p. 7. 

65. Robert I. Rotberg, "The Process of Decision Making in 
Contemporary South Africa," CSIS Africa Notes , #22, 
28 December 1983, p. 5. 

66. "Boss, The First Five Years," p. 7. 

67. Ibid. 

68. Ibid. 

69. Ibid, pp. 18-20. 

70. "State Security Council: Not Sinister," Paratus , 
November 19 83, p. 9. 



184 



71. Ibid. 

72. Ibid, pp. 9-10. 

73. Robert I. Rotberg, "The Process of Decision Making in 
Contemporary South Africa," p. 5. 

74. Christopher Coker, "South Africa: A New Military Role 

in Southern Africa," International Institute of Strategic 
Studies Survival , March-April 1983, pp. 59-67. 

75. Ibid. 

76. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970 , 
p. 266 . 

77. For a summary of events in South West Africa prior to 
19 73, see John Reed, "Frontline Southwest Africa," 
parts 1 and 2, in Armed Forces , January 19 84, pp. 18-20; 
and March 1984, pp. 59-61. 

78. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options , " p . 21 . 

79. Robin Hallett, "The South African Intervention in 
Angola 1975-76," African Affairs , July 1978, pp. 347-386. 

80. Christopher -Coker, "South Africa: A New Military Role 
in Southern Africa," p. 60. 

81. R. W. Johnson, How Long Will South Africa Survive , 
pp. 156-162. 

82. See Robin Hallett, "The South African Intervention in 
Angola 19 75-76," for a discussion of the timing of the 
Cuban build-up in comparison to the SADF's involvement 
in Angola. 

83. Colin Legum, Southern Africa, Year of the Whirlwind 
(New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1977), pp. 28-30. 

84. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options , " p. 34 . 

85. Deon Geldenjuys, "South Africa's Regional Policy," p. 157, 

86. Harold D. Nelson, ed. , South Africa: A Country Study , 
pp. 192-194. 

87. Timothy M. Shaw, "Oil, Israel, and the OAU: An Intro- 
duction to the Political Economy of Energy in Southern 
Africa," Africa Today, January-March 1976, pp. 24-25. 



185 



88. Ibid, p. 25. 

89. R. W. Johnson, How Long Will South Africa Survive , p. 101 

90.- Harold D. Nelson, ed., South Africa: A Country Study , 
p. 90. 

91. Michael Clough , "From Southwest Africa to Namibia," in 
Michael Clough, ed., Changing Realities in Southern 
Africa; Implications for American Policy (Berkeley: 
Institute of International Studies, 1982), pp. 66-67. 

92. Ibid, p. 67. 

93. David Anable, "What Arms Ban Means to South Africa," 
Christian Science Monitor , 4 November 19 77, p. 1. 

94. Adapted from Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing 
Security Options," pp. 25-26. 

95. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options , " p. 22 . 

96. Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Regional Policy," 
p. 137. 

97. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options , " p . 22 . 

98. Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Regional Policy," 
p. 147. 

99. Ibid, pp. 148-149. 

100. Robert I. Rotberg, "The Process of Decision Making in 
Contemporary South Africa," p. 6. 

101. Philip Frankel, "Race and Counterrevolution: South 
Africa's 'Total Strategy'," Journal of Commonwealth 
Comparative Politics , November 1980, p. 274. 

102. Unless otherwise noted, material in this section adapted 
from Deon Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications 

of South Africa's 'Total National Strategy' (Braamf ontein: 
South African Institute for International Affairs, 19 81) . 

10 3. Deon Geldenhuys, South Africa's Search for Security 

Since the Second World War (Braamf ontein: South African 
Institute for International Affairs, 1978), pp. 2-9. 

104. Deon Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications of 
South Africa's 'Total National Strategy ' , p. 3. 



186 



105. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options , " p . 12 . 

10 6. "Malan Urges Cohesion of Population Groups," Capetown 
Die Burger , 13 June 1979, p. 15, quoted in JPRS 73885 
18 July 19 79, Subsaharan Africa Report #2132. 

10 7. Deon Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications of 
South Africa's 'Total National Strategy' , p. 6. 

108. Ibid, p. 9. 

109. Johannesburg International Service, 3 May 19 79, quoted 
in FBIS Middle East and Africa, 4 May 19 79, p. E4 . 

110. Capetown Die Burger, 13 June 19 79, p. 15, as quoted in 
JPRS 73885, 18 July 19 79, Subsaharan Africa Report 
#2132, p. 119. 

111. Ibid. 

112. Johannesburg International Service, 28 July 19 79, as 
quoted in FBIS, Mideast and Africa, 30 July 19 79, p. E2 

113. Information Service of South Africa, 16 August 19 79, 
as quoted in FBIS, 20 August 19 79, Mideast and Africa 
20 August 19 79, p. E3. 

114. Deon Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications of 
South Africa's 'Total National Strategy' , p. 12. 

115. Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Regional Policy," 
p. 151. 

116. Deon Geldenjys, Some Foreign Policy Implications of 
South Africa's 'Total National Strategy' , p. 37. 

117. Kenneth W. Grundy, "South Africa's Domestic Strategy," 
Current History , March 1983, p. 111. 

118. Deon Geldenhuys and Hennie Kotze, "Aspects of Political 
Decision Making in South Africa," South African Journal 
of Political Science , 10, 1 (June 1983), pp. 35-36. 

119. Robin Hallett, "The South African Intervention in 
Angola 1975-1976," African Affairs , July 1978, pp. 381- 
385. 

120. "State Security Council: Not Sinister!," Paratus , 
November 19 83, p. 11. 



187 



121. Unless otherwise noted, material in this section adapted 
from Kenneth W. Grundy, The Rise of the South African 
Security Establishment: An Essay on the Changing Locus 
of State Power , pp. 11-17, and "South Africa's Domestic 
Strategy," pp. 111-112. 

122. Compiled from a variety of sources. 

123. Compiled from a variety of sources. As the South African 
Army is the largest service of the SADF , it is used 

here for illustration. 

124. ARMSCOR: South AFrica ' s Armaments Industry, p. 83. 

125. ARMSCOR and the South African Defense Industry , DIA 
Report DDB-1920-118-80 of December 1980, p. 4. 

126. "Arms Supply Corporation's Growth in Various Fields," 
Capetown Die Burger , 12 September 19 81, p. 11, quoted in 
JPRS 19198 Subsaharan Africa #2501, 13 October 1981, 

pp. 43-44. 

127. Harold D. Nelson, South Africa: A Country Study , 
pp. 361-368. 

128. Africa Research Bulletin , Economic series, March 15-- 
April 14 1983, p. 6809. 

129. The Military Balance 19 83-84 (London: International 
Institute of Strategic Studies, 1983) , p. 74. 

130. Unless otherwise noted, adapted from Robert I. Rotberg, 
"The Process of Decision Making in Contemporary South 
Africa," Deon Geldenhuys and Hennie Kotze, "Aspects of 
Political Decision Making in South Africa," and Kenneth 
W. Grundy, The Rise of the South African Security 
Establishment: An Essay on the Changing Locus of State 
Power . 

131. Deon Geldenhuys and Hennie Kotze, "Aspects of Political 
Decision Making in Contemporary South Africa," pp. 37-38. 

132. Kenneth W. Grundy, "South Africa's Domestic Strategy," 
p. 113. 

133. Pierre Hugo, Quislings or Realists: A Documentary Study 
of 'Coloured' Politics in South Africa (Johannesburg: 
Raven Press, 1978), pp. 1-11. 

134. Kenneth W. Grundy, "South Africa's Domestic Strategy," 
p. 114. 



188 



135. Philip Frankel, "Race and Counterrevolution: South 
Africa's 'Total Strategy 1 ," p. 277. 

136. Deon Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications of 
South Africa's 'Total National Strategy' , p. 17. 

137. Kenneth W. Grundy, "South Africa's Domestic Strategy," 
p. 111. 

138. Philip Frankel, "Race and Counterrevolution: South 
Africa's 'Total Strategy'," p. 12 8-. 

139. Deon Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications of 
South Africa's 'Total National Strategy' , pp. 21-22. 

140. "ARMSCOR: South Africa's Armaments Industry," p. 49. 

141. Deon Geldenjuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications of 
South Africa's 'Total National Strategy' , pp. 13-15. 

142. Philip Frankel, "Race and Counterrevolution: South 
Africa's 'Total Strategy', p. 279. 

143. Ibid, p. 280. 

144. Philip Frankel, "Race and Counterrevolution: South 
Africa's 'Total Strategy'," pp. 2 83-284. 

145. Robert I. Rotberg, "The Process of Decision Making 
in Contemporary South Africa," p. 29. 

146. Philip Frankel, "Race and Counterrevolution: South 
Africa's 'Total Strategy 1 ," p. 38. 

14 7. Kenneth W. Grundy, The Rise of the South African 

Security Establishment: An Essay on the Changing Locus 
of State Power , pp. 10-11. 

14 8. Robert I. Rotberg: "Race and Counterrevolution: South 
Africa's 'Total Strategy'," p. 16. 

149. Ibid, p. 38. 

150. Kenneth W. Grundy, The Rise of the South African Security 
Establishment: An Essay on the Changing Locus of State 
Power , p. 21 . 

151. See, for example, "Modderfontein Commando Opens New 
Headquarters," Johannesburg Armed Forces , October 19 83, 
p. 22, quoted in JPRS 849 78 20 December 19 83, Subsaharan 
Africa #2885, p. 68. 



189 



152. See, for example, "Coloureds Divided by Military Call- 
up Issue," Johannesbura The Citizen , 16 November 19 83, 
p. 17. 

153. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options, " p. 28. 

154. "Army Wants University Military Units," Johannesburg 
Domestic Service, 2 8 October 19 82, quoted in FBIS 
Mbabane WZ 281537Z October 19 82. 

155. Philip Frankel , "Race and Counterrevolution: South 
Africa's 'Total Strategy 1 ," pp. 284-287. 

156. Deon Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications of 
South Africa's 'Total National Strategy,' p. 61. 

157. Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Regional Policy," 
pp. 149-151. 

15 8. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970 , 
p. 175. 

159. Bert Van Hees, "Academic Says Border Pact Will Not Solve 
Security Problems," Johannesburg The Citizen , 8 March 
1984, p. 15; as quoted in JPRS SSA-84-039, 29 March 
1984, p. 29. 

160. Ibid. 

161. Unless otherwise noted, adopted from Geon Geldenhuys, 
Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's 
'Total National Strategy', pp. 25-37. 

162. Ibid, p. 25. 

163. "South Africa to Drop Protection of Cape Sea Route," 
Pretoria Department of Information Broadcast, 7 April 
1978, quoted in FBIS 7 April 1978, Subsaharan Africa, 

p. E4 . 

164. Quoted in Deon Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implica - 
tions of South Africa's 'Total National Strategy' , 

p. 28. 

165. Ibid. 

166. "Government Linked with Taiwan, Israel in Pact," 
Paris AFP , 11 April 19 82, quoted in FBIS, 13 April 
19 82, Southern Africa, p. U3 . 

167. "A Monroe Doctrine for Southern Africa," Johannesburg 
Domestic Service, 7 December 19 82, quoted in FBIS 
Southern Africa 9 December 19 82, p. U10 . 

190 



16 8 . South African Defense Policies as Reflected in the 
White Papers, 1965-79 , p. 6. 

169. Ibid, pp. 8-9. 

170. Ibid. 

171. The Military Balance 1983-84 , pp. 67-81. 

172. John Keegan, ed., World Armies (New York: Facts on File, 
1979), Angola, pp. 12-15, Botswana, p. 76, Mozambique, 
pp. 475-477, South Africa, pp. 633-643, Zambia, p. 825. 

173. "Defense Chief on Arms Buildup, Terrorist Attack," 
Johannesburg International Service, 17 February 19 81, 
quoted in FBIS subsaharan Africa 18 February 19 81, 

p. U2. 

174. "Malan Sees Military Threat to South Africa," Johannes- 
burg International Service, 2 October 19 82, quoted in 
FBIS Subsaharan Africa, 4 October 19 82, p. U2 . 

175. "Attack Envisioned From Neighboring States," Johannes- 
burg International Service, 23 March 19 82, quoted in 
FBIS Middle East and Africa, 24 March 19 82, p. Ul . 

176. C. L. Vilojen, "Conventional Threat to Republic of South 
Africa/Southwest Africa," ISSUP Strategic Review (June 
1983), p. 2, quoted in JPRS 83909 18 July 1983 Subsaharan 
Africa #2822, pp. 47-48. 

177. Ibid, p. 48. 

178. See, for example, Kenneth Adelman, "The Strategy of 
Defiance: South Africa," Comparative Strategy 1, 

1 and 2, pp. 33-52. 

179. "Chief of Army Says Strong Willpower Factor Against 
Insurgency," Johannesburg Die Transvaler , 6 August: 19 81, 
p. 14, quoted in JPRS 79027 21 September 1981, Subsaharan 
Africa Report #2480. 

180. "South African Prime Minister Says USSR Using 'Terrorism 1 
by Proxy," Johannesburg International Service, 2 7 

March 1981, quoted in FBIS London UK, 272220Z Mar 81. 

181. "Johnannesburg Explains Raids on SWAPO in Angola," 
Johannesburg International Service, 7 December 19 81, 
quoted in FBIS 8 December 19 81, p. Ul. 

182. Harold D. Nelson, South Africa: A Country Study, p. 377. 



191 



183. Ibid, pp. 212-214. 

184. Bill Cain, "Manpower Crisis Worse Than Expected," 
Johannesburg Sunday Times-Business Times , 18 May 19 80, 
p. 1, quoted in JPRS 75920 23 June 1980, Subsaharan 
Africa #2258, pp. 157-158. 

185. Harold D. Nelson, South Africa: A Country Study , pp. 351- 
355. 

186 . South African Defense Policies as Reflected in the 
White Papers, 1965-79 , p. 9. 

187. "Armed Forces Suffer From Too Few Technicians," Capetown 
Die Burger , 14 November 19 81, p. 3, quoted in JPRS 

79677 17 December 1981, Subsaharan Africa #2540, pp. 41-42 

188. Gherhard Pieterse, "Longer Border Duty," Johannesburg 
Sunday Times , 24 September 1978, quoted in JPRS 72062, 
17 October 1978, Subsaharan Africa #2009, pp. 47-48. 

189. Ibid. 

190. Pauline H. Baker, "South Africa's Strategic Vulnerabili- 
ties: The 'Citadel Assumption' Reconsidered," African 
Studies Review 10 (September 1977), pp. 89-99. 

191. Harm J. de Blij , A Geography of Subsaharan Africa . 

(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 82. 

192. Herve Guilbaud, "Moves to Counter White Exodus Reported," 
Johannesburg Africa AFP , pp. 22-23, quoted in JPRS 
81102, 22 June 1982, Subsaharan Africa #2644, pp. 45-47. 

193. Ibid. 

194. Ibid. 

195. "New Law Proposed to Halt 'White Exodus'," Johannesburg 
Rand Daily Mail , 17 September 1982, p. 1, as quoted in 
FBIS Mbabane, 171143Z Sep 82. 

19 6. Richard Leonard, "Mobilizing for Total War," Southern 
Africa , January-February 19 81, p. 14. 

19 7. Kenneth W. Grundy, "South Africa's Regional Defense 

Plans: The Homeland Army," in Thomas M. Callaghy, ed. , 
S outh Africa in Southern Africa (New York: Praeger, 
1983) , p. 147. 

198. Pauline H. Baker, "South Africa's Strategic Vulnerabili- 
ties: The 'Citadel Assumption' Reconsidered," p. 97. 



19 2 



199. "Defending the South Atlantic--A Quandry for the West?" 
Armed Forces , July 1982, p. 234. 

200. See the discussions of this option in Chapter II discus- 
sions of the Twelve-Point Plan. 

201. "Viljoen Urges New Naval Strategy in Southern Atlantic, 
Indian Ocean," Paris AFP , 7 May 19 82, quoted in JPRS 
80909, 26 May 1982, Subsaharan Africa #2629, p. 102. 

202. John F. Burns, "South Africa Defies U.S. On Arms, Says 
It Can Surmount An Embargo," New York Times , 2 7 October 
1977, p. 1. 

203. Pauline H. Baker, "South Africa's Strategic Vulnerabili- 
ties: The 'Citadel Assumption' Reconsidered," p. 95. 

204. "Further on Signing of Cahora Bassa Agreement," Johannes- 
burg Domestic Service, 2 May 19 84, quoted in FBIS Middle 
East and Africa, 3 May 1984, p. U6 . 

205. Timothy M. Shaw, "Oil, Israel, and the OAU: An Intro- 
duction to the Political Economy of Energy in Southern 
Africa. " 

206. Africa South of the Sahara (London: Europa Publications, 
1983) , p. 763. 

20 7. J. P. Blumenfeld, "The South African Economy: Potential 
and Pitfalls," World Today , September 1980, pp. 334-342. 

208. Pauline H. Baker, "South Africa's Strategic Vulnerabili- 
ties: The 'Citadel Assumption' Reconsidered," p. 95. 

209. Colin Legum, ed. , African Contemporary Record 19 81-82 
(New York: Africana Publishing Company, 19 81) . 

210. "300 Years of Resistance," Southern Africa , January- 
February 19 81, p. 25. 

211. Pauline H. Baker, "South Africa's Strategic Vulnerabili- 
ties: The 'Citadel Assumption 1 Reconsidered," pp. 95-96. 

212. Michael Savage, "Costs of Enforcing Apartheid and 
Problems of Change," African Affairs , July 1977, p. 299. 

213. African Research Bulletin, August 15 — September 14 1981, 
pp. 6151-6154. 

214. "Defense Spending Comparatively Small," Capetown Die 
Burger , 14 August 1981, p. 27, quoted in JPRS 79027 21 
September 1981 Subsaharan Africa #2488, pp. 89-90. 



193 



215. Ibid. 

216. Colin Legum, ed. , African Contemporary Record 19 81-82 , 
p. B731. 

217. Simon Willson, "Prime Minister Claims Sufficient Oil 
for Embargo," Johannesburg Rand Daily Mail Business Day 
Section , 31 October 1983, p. 1, quoted in FBIS Middle 
East and Africa I November 1983, pp. U5-U6. 

218. K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for 
Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1983), 

pp. 319-330. 

219. John Seiler, "South African Perspectives and Responses 
to External Pressures," The Journal of Modern African 
Studies , 13, 3 (1975), pp. 447-468. 

220. Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Defense and 
Armament Supply (Pretoria: Republic of South Africa, 
1982) , p. 2. 

221. Robin Hallett, "The South African Intervention in 
Angola 1975-76," pp. 383-386. 

222. IISS Military Balance 1983-84, p. 74. 

223. John Keegan, ed. , World Armies , pp. 637-638. 

224. Ibid, p. 639. 

225. Ibid, p. 638. 

226. Kenneth W. Grundy, "South Africa's Regional Defense 
Plans: The Homeland Army," pp. 137-143. 

227. Compiled from a variety of sources, including IISS 
The Military Balance 1983-84 , Harold D. Nelson, South 
Africa: A Country Study , and DMS Market Intelligence 
Report (Greenwich: DMS, 1979), South Africa, p. 4. 

228. IISS The Military Balance 1983-84 , p. 74. 

229. Harold D. Nelson, South Africa: A Country Study , 
pp. 334-335. 

230. IISS Military Balance 1983-84 , p. 73. 

231. Chester A. Crocker, South Africa's Defense Posture: 
Coping With Vulnerability , p. 51. 

2 32 . South African Defense Policies as Reflected in the 
White Papers, 1965-79 , p. 12. 

194 






233. Harold D. Nelson, South Africa: A Country Study , 
p. 343. 

234. Signe Landgren-Backstrom, "Seven Methods of Evading an 
Arms Embargo/' in Southern Africa Research Group, 
Weapon Against Apartheid (Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala 
University, 1979), pp. 15-31. 

235. Ronald T. Petty, "South African KURKI Air-to-Air Missile," 
Jane's Defense Review , Vol. 4, #6, 1983, pp. 513-522. 

236. Harold D. Nelson, South Africa: A Country Study , 
p. 337 . 

237. Chester A. Crocker, South Africa's Defense Posture: 



Coping With Vulnerability , p. 51. 

238. Ian V. Hogg, "Infantry Weapons of the SADF , " Jane ' s 
Defense Weekly , 25 February 1984, p. 291. 

239. "Military Uses Captured Weapons," Johannesburg Domestic 
Service, 8 September 1982, quoted by FBIS Mbabane Wz 

81410Z September 19 82. 

240. "Recent Weapons Acquisitions Listed by Nation," Afrique 
Defense , #66, September 1983, pp. 64-65, quoted in JPRS 
84750 15 November 1983, Africa #2870, pp. 3-8. 

2 41. Robert Boyle, "South Africa Starts Arms Export Drive," 
International Defense Review , Vol. 16, #3, 1983, pp. 
268-271. 

242. Harold D. Nelson, South Africa: A Country Study , 
pp. 194-204. 

243. See, for example, "The Threat of Sanctions," Johannes- 
burg International Service, 5 December 19 83, quoted in 
JPRS 85009 Subsaharan Africa #2887, pp. 77-78. 

244. Kenneth Adelman, "The Strategy of Defiance: South 
Africa," pp. 34-35. 

245. Ibid, p. 38. 

2 46. Deon Geldenhuys, A Survey of White Opinion on Foreign 

Policy Issues (Braamf ontein : South African Institute of 
International Affairs, 1982) . 

247. "South Africa's Military Strength," Johannesburg Inter- 
national Service, 1 October 19 82, quoted in FBIS 1 
October 19 82 Middle East and Africa, p. U3 . 



195 



248. Sheryl Raine, "General Backs Offensive Tactics Against 
SWAPO," Johannesburg Star , 29 June 19 83, p. 3, quoted in 
FBIS Middle East and Africa 1 July 1983, p. U3 . 

249. Joseph Lelyveld, "South Africa's Strategy: To Isolate 
the Rebels," New York Times , 6 June 19 83, p. 5. 

250. "Johannesburg Explains Raids on SWAPO in Angola," 
Johannesburg International Service, 7 December 19 81, 
quoted in FBIS Middle East and Africa 8 December 19 81, 
p. Ul. 

251. "Defense Minister Defends Angolan Incursion," Johannes- 
burg International Service 21 November 19 81, quoted in 
FBIS Middle East and Africa, 23 November 1981, p. U2 . 

252. Christopher Coker, "South Africa: A New Military Role 
in Southern Africa 1969-82," pp. 61-62. 

253. Ibid, p. 61. 

254. "The Twenty-Percent Gets All the Effort," The Economist , 
3 April 19 82, p. 72. 

255. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security 
Options," p. 30. 

256. Johannesburg The .Citizen , 7 March 19 84, p. 4, quoted in 
JPRS SSA-84-039, pp. 52-53. 

257. Kenneth W. Grundy, "South Africa's Regional Defense 
Plans: The Homeland Army." 

258. "Labor Will Not Accept Conscription for Coloureds," 
Umtate Capital Radio, 9 February 19 83, quoted in FBIS 
Middle East and Africa 10 February 19 82, p. U4. 

259. "Bill Would Obligate Immigrants for Military Service," 
Johannesburg International Service, 7 March 19 84, 
quoted in FBIS Middle East and Africa 7 March 19 84, 

p. U5. 

260. "Call-Up," Johannesburg The Citizen , 24 December 1983, 
p. 6, quoted in JPRS SSA-84-009, 20 January 1984, 

pp. 104-105. 

261. Unless otherwise noted, material in this section adapted 
from Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing 
Security Options," pp. 36-47; 42-43. 

262. "Botha, RSA Would Consider Aid to Anti-Communists," 
Johannesburg Domestic Service, 18 Feburary 19 83, quoted 
in FBIS Middle East and Africa, 23 February 1983, 

pp. U4-U5. 

19 6 






263. Ibid. 

264. "South Africa Said to be 'Real Target' of Destabilization 
Efforts," Johannesburg The Citizen , 29 August 19 83, 

p. 10, quoted in JPRS 84344 Subsaharan Africa #2846, 
p. 27. 

265. Colin Legum, "South AFrica's Power Game," New African 
March 19 83, pp. 11-14. 

266. Unless otherwise noted, adopted from Christopher Coker, 
"South Africa: A New Military Role in Southern Africa, 
1969-82," and Colin Legum, "South Africa's Power Game." 

267. "Destabilization in Southern Africa," The Economist , 
16 July 1983, pp. 20-21. 

268. Christopher Coker, "South Africa: A New Military Role 
in Southern Africa, 1969-82," p. 63. 

269. "Destabilization in Southern AFrica," pp. 24-26. 

270. Adopted from Robert S. Jaster, "Politics and the 
Afrikaner Bomb," Qrbis , Winter 1984, pp. 825-851. 

271. "Front Line on the Defensive," The Economist , 16 July 
1983, pp. 26-27. 

272. Simon Willson, "Prime Minister Claims Sufficient Oil 
for Embargo . " 

273. Johannesburg The Citizen , 6 October 19 82, p. 1, quoted 
in JPRS 82107 Subsaharan Africa #2711, 28 October 1982, 
p. 63. 

274. Harold D. Nelson, South Africa: A Country Study , 
pp. 193-194. 

275. "Koeburg Nuclear Power Plant Started up 1 March," 
Johannesburg SAPA, 14 March 19 84, quoted in FBIS Middle 
East and Africa, 15 March 19 84, p. U4 . 

276. "Solar Energy System," Johannesburg The Citizen , 29 
April 1981, p. 7, quoted in JPRS 78046, 11 May 1981, 
#2408. 

277. Compiled from a variety of sources, including DMS Marke t 
Report , IISS Military Balance 1983-84 , Bill Gunston, ed. , 
The Encyclopedia of World Air Power (New York: Crescent 
Books, 19 80), p. 37; and Jean Labayle Couhat , ed., 
C ombat Fleets of the World 19 80/81 (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 19 80, p. 444. Other sources are 
indicated individually. 



197 



278. "Arms Industry Ready to Produce Helicopters," JPRS 
84317 14 September 19 83, Subsaharan Africa #2843, p. 31. 

279. "G5 Cannon Developed, Manufactured Entirely in South 
Africa," JPRS 81202 2 July 1982, Subsaharan AFrica 
#2651, p. 57. 

2 80. Willem Steenkamp, "Weapons Procurement Role of ARMSCOR 
Discussed," JPRS 83953, 21 July 1983, Subsaharan 
Africa #2823, p. 96. 

281. Ronald T. Pretty, "South Africa Valkiri Multiple 
Artillery Rocket System," Jane's Defense Review , Vol. 4, 
#7, 1983, pp. 645-650. 

282. Steenkamp, "Weapons Procurement Role of ARMSCOR 
Discussed. " 

2 83. Ronald T. Pretty, "South African Kukri Air- to-Air 
Missile," Jane's Defense Review , Vol. 4, #6, 1983, 
pp. 513-522. 

2 84. As note 277, compiled from a variety of sources. 



198 



INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 



No. Copies 



1. Defense Technical Information Center 2 
Cameron Station 

Alexandria, VA 22314 

2. Library, Code 014 2 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 

Monterey, Calif. 9 39 43 

3. Department Chairman, Code 56 1 
Department of National Security 

Affairs 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, Calif. 9 394 3 

4. Center for Naval Analysis 1 
2000 North Beauregard St. 

P.O. Box 11280 
Alexandria, VA 22 311 

5. Dr. Michael W. Clough , Code 56Cg 3 
Department of National Security 

Affairs 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, Calif. 93943 

6. Dr. David Winterford, Code 56Wb 1 
Department of National Security 

Affairs 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, Calif. 93943 

7. Lieutenant Commander Carl T. Orbann 4 
12876 Firethorn Lane 

Jacksonville, Florida 32216 

8. Helen Kitchen 1 
Director 

African Studies Program 

CSIS 

1800 K St. NW 

Washington, DC 20006 



199 



9. John de St. Jorre 
Senior Associate 
Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace 
11 Dupont Circle 
Washington, D.C. 20036 

10 . Robert Jaster 
Amsbury Hill 
Rockport, Maine 04856 



200 



13 3 t 



210519 

Thesis 

0583^27 Orbann 
c.l South African de- 

fense policy. 



210519 

'Thesis 

0583^27 Orbann 
c.l South African de- 

fense policy.